


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EDITOR

Dr Mark Clapson
6 Forrabury Avenue
Bradwell Common
Milton Keynes
MK13 8NG
UK

Tel: 01908 668548
E-mail: Mjcipts@aol.com

EDITORIAL BOARD

Dr Arturo Almandoz
Departamento de Planificacion Urbana
Universidad Simon Bolivar
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Caracas 1086
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Tel: (58 2) 906 4037 / 38
E-mail: almandoz@usb.ve

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E-mail: R.Freestone@unsw.edu.au

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Thessalonika 54006
Greece
Tel: 3031 995495 / Fax: 3031 995576

Professor Peter Larkham
Birmingham School of Planning
University of Central England
Perry Barr
Birmingham
B42 2SU
UK
Tel: 0121 331 5145
E-mail: peter.larkham@uce.ac.uk

Professor Georgio Piccinato
Facolta di Architettura
Universita di Roma 3
Via Madonna dei Monti 40
00184 Roma
Italy
Tel: +39 6 678 8283 / Fax: +39 6 481 8625
E-mail: piccinat@arch.uniroma3.it

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F-75017
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France

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School of Planning
Oxford Brookes University
Headington
Oxford
OX3 0BP
UK
Tel: 01865 483421 / Fax: 01865 483559
E-mail: svward@brookes.ac.uk

Professor Shun-ichi Watanabe
Science University of Tokyo
Yamazaki, Noda-shi
Chiba-ken 278
Japan
Tel: 81 474 24 1501 / Fax: 81 471 25 7833

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A combined volume

These first two combined issues of 2004 contain three articles on British planning. The first two of these, by Marco Amati and Makoto Yokohari, and by Philip Jones, open up some new and interesting aspects of town planning in Britain between the wars and during the postwar period. The legacy of the greenbelt and of high-rise building is still, of course, strongly in evidence in contemporary Britain. The third article, by Naoki Motouchi and Nick Tiratsoo, assesses one of many important contributions of Max Lock, the British planner who died in 1988, aged 81. Lock was an influential figure, who worked in many countries. The next issue of *Planning History* will contain information on the Max Lock Centre and its contents. This is based at the University of Westminster, in London, and it is an under-used goldmine for planning historians of many different countries.

Call for articles

With the exception of the article on the Rio Exhibition and its wider significance, then, this current publication is almost completely concerned with Britain. Although recent issues have carried articles and other items on aspects of the history of urban planning in different countries, the United Kingdom continues to receive a disproportionate number of entries. Although this is good news if one is a planning historian of Britain, the *Planning History* bulletin, and the IPHS generally, would like to see more submissions from Africa, Asia, the Americas and Europe, especially Eastern Europe. If you feel you have an article of relevance to *Planning History*, please contact the editor

at the address on the inside cover. Similarly, if you are supervising research students on any aspect of planning history, you may wish to tell them that the bulletin is refereed, and offers an opportunity for publication on aspects of their research. Details of how to submit articles or shorter work-in-progress papers are contained on the inside cover.

There is, however, absolutely no shortage of copy for *Planning History*: as both this issue and those of the previous year illustrate, interest in and publications in the history of planning and in town planners is if anything growing. Nonetheless, more diversity would be very welcome.

IPHS Conferences

By the time you read this, the IPHS conference at Barcelona will be over. The 11th IPHS conference was set in one of the world's most exciting cities. A full conference report will follow in Volume 26 Number 3. The next conference is scheduled to take place slightly later than usual, as opposed to the bi-annual pattern, in December 2006. It will be held in New Delhi, India, another exciting and fascinating venue. Subsequent issues of *Planning History* will also contain news and registration details of the forthcoming conference.

Mark Clapson
University of Westminster,
UK.

Research Fellowship to revisit and revitalise Garden City model

Advocates of Garden City planning concepts across the globe are cordially invited to put their ideas forward for a new ground-breaking Research Fellowship.

The Fellowship, to be awarded later this year, leading to a three-month commission in 2005, looks to encourage new and innovative expressions of the Garden City concept, conceived and developed by Ebenezer Howard, Barry Parker and Raymond Unwin. The research should demonstrate how Garden City principles can be applicable globally as part of the response to 21st Century housing needs.

Based in London, the Fellowship attracts an award of £5,000 together with an honorary unsalaried position at the University of Westminster for the duration of the Fellowship. The required output will be a 7,500-word paper, in English, which will be published, potentially in a leading academic or professional journal.

Applications for the Fellowship are welcomed from academics who have completed a PhD in a relevant discipline and professionals, with at least five years experience as planners, architects or landscape architects, and currently working for a professional practice or consultancy.

Those interested in applying for the Fellowship are required to submit their application in no more than 2,000 words by 31 October 2004. Applicants should outline their particular field of interest and inquiry and will need to demonstrate a clear relevance to the Garden City tradition and its future progression as a planning tool.


The Fellowship, the world's first on Garden City revitalisation, is a joint venture of the University of Westminster and Letchworth Garden City Heritage Foundation, the charitable organisation which today owns and manages the first Garden City Estate in Hertfordshire, England.

"This is an exciting opportunity for someone out there to present the case for Garden Cities in the 21st Century," notes Dr Maurits van Rooijen, Vice President (International Strategy and Development) at the University of Westminster, as well as researcher of 'green town planning issues' and Convenor of the last International Planning History Society Conference 'Cities of Tomorrow'. "Embracing the considerable body of knowledge which already exists on Garden Cities, the Fellowship is a timely reminder of the fact that the concepts, on which they were built, can help make a better world," he added.

Stuart Kenny, Director General of Letchworth Garden City Heritage Foundation commented, "I firmly believe that the Garden City concept is as relevant today as it was 100 years ago. Worldwide, there is huge demand for sustainable new communities and, adapted to reflect individual national considerations, the Garden City model has much to contribute."

For more information on the Fellowship, and a FREE copy of the 'Cities of Tomorrow' CD Rom, visit www.lgchf.com/fellowship. The closing date for applications is 31 October 2004.

Brought to you by



The actions of landowners, government and planners in establishing the London green belt of the 1930s

MARCO AMATI¹* AND MAKOTO YOKOHARI¹

¹University of Tsukuba, School of Planning Policy and Science

Tennodai 1-1-1, Tsukuba Shi, 305-8573 Japan

mamati@sk.tsukuba.ac.jp Tel./Fax +81-298-53-5572

Introduction

The green belt purchases of the mid-1930s have rarely been researched. An investigation into how the green belt was implemented at this time, may help understanding of why the separation of town and country remains a feature of UK planning today. The aim of this study is to look at the resistance to the implementation of the green belt and the methods used to overcome this between 1920 and 1938. First, the historical and legislative context of the 1920s and 1930s is detailed. Then, the lead-up to the London County Council's 1935 loans scheme is investigated. Finally, we employ a case study of the purchase of green belt land, made with such a loan, and draw the following conclusions. The results show the important role of civil servants and landowners in allowing the green belt purchases to proceed. The significance of the various methods that are used to allow the green belt to be implemented are discussed in relation to past studies and current debates.

A central tenet of post-War UK planning, has been the separation of town and country. The success of this policy through the use of green belts in the UK, resulted in the same concept being borrowed and replicated in other countries, with varying levels of success. For example, Japan planned a green belt in 1939. During the 1950s and early 1960s, under enormous growth pressure and through a combination of objections from landowners and a lack of administrative support, the green belt was abandoned.¹ Similarly, in Korea green belts have been used to contain urban areas since the policy was imposed by fiat in 1971. Currently this policy is being reviewed, as a result of pressure from landowners.²

The 1947 Town and Country Planning Act, which settled the issue of compensation to landowners and nationalised development rights, also first enabled green belts to be fully implemented in the UK. Prior to this, an attempt was made to introduce a green belt around London in 1935. A number of planning history studies mention this period, but none look further into it.³

*corresponding author

The green belt purchases of the 1930s provide an interesting case study because of the conditions at the time. The pre-War period was characterised by high urban growth, fragmentation of landownership and loose planning control.⁴ In addition, the green belt concept had not permeated local and central government to the extent that it was accepted without being questioned. Investigating this period, and researching the arguments and methods used in implementing the green belt, can deepen our understanding of why the town-country separation has remained a feature of the UK's planning system, compared to other countries. In addition, though the history of the green belt would appear to be dominated by planning pioneers, studies by Sheail and Booth have shown the importance of considering the efforts of local and central government civil servants.⁵ Such an understanding may contribute to the debate on the future of the green belt,⁶ as government and planners cater to the requirements of sustainability, and vacillate between the South-East's housing pressure and the demands of powerful pressure groups such as the Campaign for the Protection of Rural England (CPRE). The present study looks at the years 1920 to 1938 and investigates the lead-up to and the implementation of the London green belt. At both stages, the aim is to show the resistance that the green belt's implementation encountered and how this resistance was overcome.

Methods and data sources

First, as background, and using secondary sources, we explain the relevant historical context of the 1920s and 1930s. Then, at the central government level, we look at the attempts to propose and fund the green belt scheme. Finally, we employ a local level case study of a green belt purchase. From the results, which show how resistance to the green belt was overcome, we aim to propose some reasons for why the green belt has survived. (Figure 1).

Background: Historical Context 1920-1938

The following points, regarding landownership and changes in society, are relevant to the study. Because of a decline in agriculture from 1880, rising tax and death duties, and the death of heirs after the First World War,




Figure 1 - Study Framework

large farming estates continued to be sold and broken up during the 1920s and 30s. This increased the fragmentation of land ownership. In 1914 owners occupied 10% of agricultural land in England and Wales. In 1927 this figure had risen to 37%. Also, a rising standard of living, a shorter working week and improved transport, resulted in new pressures on the countryside during the 1920s and 30s. For example, the area under urban land use in England and Wales increased from 6.7% to 8.0% between 1931 and 1939 a rate not seen before then or since.⁷ Pressure also came from the middle and working classes to access the countryside for holidays, rambling and other leisure pursuits.⁸ To summarise, as a 1926 report for the mid-Surrey JTPC explains, this was a time when the 'natural restraints imposed by distance and the difficulty of obtaining land are now largely swept away'.⁹

Towards the 1935 London County Council Scheme: Overview

To counter the lack of control in planning, throughout the early 1930s, counties around London had been active in buying land for preservation. The Ministry of Health over five years, had been giving loans to allow councils to buy 1,465 ha of land (Table 1). In 1935, the

Year	Total loans sanctioned by MH to buy land (£)	Total area of land acquired (acres, ha)
1930-31	447,101	1,305 528
1931-32	291,311	1,087 440
1932-33	237,720	892 361
1933-34	167,137	335 136
TOTALS	1,143,269	3,619 1465

Table 1 - Cost of loans sanctioned by the Ministry of Health (MH) and acquired land¹⁰

London County Council (LCC) accelerated this process by establishing a separate loans scheme to buy land for conservation in the green belt. In the space of 14 months, agreements had been reached to buy 4,650 ha of land – a significant contribution (19%) towards implementing Unwin's green girdle scheme.¹⁰

During the inter-war period the Ministry of Health was responsible for planning. The Ministry and local and county councils were able to give loans for the purchase of open space.¹¹ A large number of groups were engaged in determining the aim of the green belt. Among these, were Joint Planning Committees (JTPCs). These were described as having a 'purely advisory'¹² function, taking a broader view of town planning. These JTPCs benefited planning by allowing the different local authorities to reach agreements and to exchange ideas on a wide range of issues. By joining these JTPCs, local district councils could participate in determining the aim of the green belt and other regional open space schemes. By 1923, 16 JTPCs had been established in the whole of the UK, 4 of which were in the London area.¹³ Three years later, there were eight such committees around London alone.¹⁴ The largest and most influential of the JTPCs at the time was the Greater London Regional Planning Committee (GLRPC). This was established in 1927 and was composed of 138 local authorities, controlling an area of 2952 km².¹⁵ In addition to these, some influential amenity societies such as the Council for the Preservation of Rural England and the London Society were able to formulate the aim of the green belt. Finally, the actual purchase of green belt land was made by County Councils, local district councils and some amenity organisations such as the National Playing Fields Association (NPFA) (Table 2).

Responsibility for the Green belt	Proximity to Central Government →				
	Ministry of Health	Large County Councils	GLRPC	Other JTPC and County Councils	Local District Councils
FINANCIAL Lends money		(London CC from 1935)			
ADVISORY Formulates aim of green belt					(by joining a JTPC)
EXECUTIVE Buys green belt land					(only NPFA)

Table 2 - Responsibility for the Green Belt in London 1920-1938

Resistance to the green belt

In 1926, Neville Chamberlain, the then Minister of Health, noted to a deputation that the idea that urban growth was a problem, was not a universally shared feeling.¹⁶ In the same year, the Ministry of Health had undertaken a feasibility study of the cost and the

location of the green belt, in relation to the areas that were most in need of open space (Figure 2). This distribution was based on estimating the amount of open space in London (green) and simply buying extra land (red) to make a fair distribution of open space. 25,975 acres (10,493 ha), were thought to be necessary using this method. In a more pragmatic way, a line was drawn where the cost of land was known to be around £100/acre. Land outside this line was assumed to be cheaper and so, affordable for green belt (Figure 3).




Figure 2

1/8" = 1 Mile
GREEN 25,975 acres
RED 48,165 acres
TOTAL 74,140 acres

Note: The green colour indicates the area of existing public open spaces and red the proposed additional area.




Figure 3

1/8" = 1 Mile

Therefore, two types of resistance to green belt implementation can be identified: justifying it to other sections of the government and justifying its cost. The following explains what the GLRPC did to try and overcome this, and how these two types of resistance were related.

Overcoming resistance: arguing for the green belt's necessity

The first green belt purchases were made as part of the founding of Letchworth Garden City in 1909, where 500 ha of agricultural land were purchased as a buffer between Hitchin and Baldock.¹⁸ Howard's green belt was meant to have an agricultural function to supply produce for the town. This aim was later repeated in the London Society's plan for London, which also assumed that the green belt could be paid for through agricultural rents.¹⁹

In 1927, the GLRPC began to question the purely agricultural function of the green belt. A more flexible use was proposed, i.e. the use of land for playing fields as well as for institutions such as mental hospitals. Nor was the green belt meant to be continuous. In some places, development could be permitted, such as that required for arterial roads.²⁰

To argue for the necessity of having a green belt and to find a way of paying for it, the GLRPC changed the green belt's aim four times in ten years. By changing its aim to playing fields, London's residents – those most in need of open space – or the National Playing Fields Association could be asked to pay for green belt purchases. The 1927 GLRPC report above, stated that there was probably 'room for obtaining a large revenue from the provision of private open spaces for playing fields...'.²¹ In 1929, London was showing a 'willingness to contribute to a substantial extent to the cost of land for open spaces outside its own area'.²²

However, the aim of the green belt changed in 1934. When lobbying the Treasury its implementation became a 'national concern'.²³ Following this, the GLRPC suggested that the green belt might be useful to Air and Army Ministries in time of war. Accordingly, the aim of the green belt switched to providing space for aerodromes and barracks.²⁴ In all cases, the appeals for funding were sympathetically received but unsuccessful.

Though a 1926 London County Council (LCC) study on playing fields had shown the need for open space in the city, and a speech by Chamberlain in the same year, had noted that playing fields were the best land for building, and were disappearing fastest,²⁵ there was difficulty in justifying that it had to be in the form of a belt around London. The Treasury's, logic response to a request for green belt funding, highlighted this. Not only could they not give sole priority to London, but felt that 'What is important, [compared to providing a belt] is that large areas of open land should be reserved

within a reasonable distance of the thickly inhabited parts of Greater London'.²⁶ The Air and Army Ministries on the other hand had powers to acquire land in the event of a national emergency.²⁷

Estimating the green belt's cost

In 1927 the Ministry of Health had tried to produce an estimate of the positive effect of open space reservation on neighbouring land and house prices. No firm conclusions could be drawn from this study.²⁸ Despite this, the assumed effect of open space on the value of neighbouring house-prices was important in subsequent discussions.

For example, in a report for the GLRPC in the same year, Unwin discussed legally 'sterilizing' the land which involved entering into a compensation agreement to buy the future developed value of the land. He noted that it might be possible to discount the benefits of preserving the land, from this cost. As he explained, this appeared to suggest a re-distribution of rights over land. In a situation where many landowners exist, a landowner adjoining the reserved land will benefit, whereas the landowner with reserved land will suffer. In a situation where there is one landowner, the benefits and dis-benefits will cancel themselves out. "Is it possible for the same results to be achieved, and, if so, by what measures, where the land is in a number of ownerships, in order that the community may not suffer from this adventitious fact?" he asked.²⁹ Though Unwin incorporated the idea of pooling the benefit from preserving the land, the pre-1947 problem of interfering with land rights, remained.

In addition, the arguments of the GLRPC were not helped by the difficulties of accurately estimating the cost of the green belt. For example, in 1929, Unwin estimated that the cost of reserving an area of land of 154 square miles (246 sq. Kms) would amount to around £2 million.³⁰ A month later however, Unwin revised this estimate arguing that that it was impossible to calculate the exact cost of the green belt, because so many factors affected the land price.³¹

Implementation of the 1935 London County Council's Scheme: overview

Despite the arguments and the attempts to estimate the green belt's cost, its implementation eluded the GLRPC which broke up at the end of 1936. Herbert Morrison, the Chairman of the LCC from 1934, believed in the benefits of depopulation into satellite towns and the role of the green belt for this purpose.³² Thus the LCC was able to take the initiative and in early 1935, proposed the loans scheme for purchasing

green belt land. The conditions of this scheme were as follows:³³

Loans were available for up to 50% of the cost of purchase or legally 'sterilizing' the land. In total, £2 million was available over three years. Interestingly, the LCC's loans scheme contains no specification of the green belt's aim. When clarification was requested in late 1935 from one of the County Councils, the LCC explained the aim in the broadest terms: if playing fields were bought, they must not be reserved for the use of local players only, otherwise the land should be designated for people to 'roam about in'.³⁴

Resistance to the green belt

The LCC's scheme was widely taken up, but nonetheless encountered some opposition. This came from local authorities, in particular certain key figures who tried to block the green belt purchases. For example, in Eton Rural District Council, (1935) a Chairman of the Council saw no benefit from the conservation of land apart from a loss of rates.³⁵ In 1936, the Clerk of Kent County Council was said to be 'particularly obstructive'. This provoked the suggestion, eventually decided against, that the Minister 'as a Kentish man' should intervene.³⁶

There was a difference in the opinion of these local authorities and central government on the function of open space, which can be considered as a possible reason for such opposition. In a 1935 letter from an official at the Ministry of Health to J. A. N. Barlow at the Treasury, the local authorities, were said to be doing "tolerably well in providing sufficient space for public health necessities (i.e. recreation grounds and playing fields) but when it comes to large areas of country which are wanted more for their 'amenity' value than for actual use, the authorities are more diffident about the expense involved. Yet from the point of view of planning, this is of first importance".³⁷ Separating towns was important to central government. Local authorities were simply concerned about the function of open spaces.

The preservation of open space also aroused some opposition from landowners. There were some direct complaints to the Joint Town Planning Committee in Mid-Surrey for example, from a landowner who wished to extract minerals from his land. However, such complaints were described as not being representative.³⁸ In Buckinghamshire, negotiation had to be extensively used to convince landowners to reserve the land as open space.³⁹

Therefore, two types of resistance can be seen to the

green belt's implementation under the LCC's scheme: that of local authorities opposing central government intervention and that of landowners who wished to make a profit from their land. To look closer at the way in which this resistance was dealt with, we employ a case study of one of the green belt land purchases.

Overcoming resistance: a case study of Ockham Common, Surrey

Background to the site

In 1930 Surrey was the richest county in the UK and in the process of undergoing profound changes as a result of urbanisation. For example, the population rose from 845,578 people in 1911 to 1,180,878 in 1931 as a result of the construction of a new railway line and a growth in the number of commuters. Surrey was also a convenient destination for London-based holiday-makers and day-trippers.⁴⁰

Ockham Common was private land with a combination of a location on a major road out of London (the London-Portsmouth road, currently the A3), a frontage of 1.2 Kms on either side of the road, and a dry soil of non-agricultural land-use, making it ideal for development in an area undergoing intense development pressure. This green belt purchase was chosen for this study to expose the roles played by the local authority, landowners and central government. The area comprised 350 acres (141 ha) of mixed woodland and gorse lying 30 kilometres from the centre of London (Figure 4).

In 1931 Surrey had passed the Surrey Local Act in response to urban growth pressures. Sections 70 and 71 allowed the Council to enter into agreements with




Figure 4 – Location of Ockham Common

landowners to allow the purchase of land for preservation. If an agreement could not be reached, then the Council was permitted to use a compulsory purchase order to force the landowner to sell the land. However, to allow this, a public inquiry had to be held. If the Minister of Health then granted authorization, the purchase was permitted to go ahead.⁴¹

Cost reduction through bargaining

Because of the three-year limit on the LCC loans scheme, Surrey County Council was pressed to buy Ockham Common. However, in trying to purchase this and other land for the green belt, the council required a £100,000⁴² additional loan from the Ministry of Health. Such loans could be granted, but this was only possible after a public inquiry.

Up to that time, Surrey County Council had used a method that they termed the 'secret bargain' to purchase land cheaply from landowners. This involved secretly negotiating with the landowner to convince them to sell the land. Secrecy was necessary to ensure that the negotiation did not raise the price of other land.⁴³ Where this method could not be used, i.e. where the landowner refused to sell the land, a compulsory purchase order would be employed under Sections 70 and 71 of the 1931 Surrey Act. Table 3 shows the effect of this secret bargain on the cost of the land. Ranking all the areas bought using the Ministry's loan reveals a significant difference between Ockham Common and Nonsuch Park. Both were bought at the same time, but the latter site had been bought with a compulsory purchase order.⁴⁵

	Area (acres ha)	Price (£)	£/acre
Chertsey Meads	184 74	12000	65
Ockham Common	350 142	24000	69
Shabden Park, Banstead	670 271	67000	100
Further areas in Coulsdon	550 223	60000	109
Kings Wood, Coulsdon	130 53	15000	115
Banstead Wood	316 128	46000	146
Riddlesdown, Caterham	48 19	11000	229
Land W. of Ham House	30 12	12000	400
Nonsuch Park, Ewell	282 114	121000	429

Table 3 – Land bought in the green belt with the Ministry of Health Loan⁴⁴

Such was the need for secrecy that the Deputy Clerk of Surrey Council went directly to the Ministry in December 1935 to ask for a block loan and to 'dispense with the need for a public inquiry'.⁴⁶ Though a public inquiry was held in March 1936, the Ministry encouraged the Council to remain vague about the site they wished to purchase.⁴⁷

The Role of the landowner

In addition to the actions of Sussex County Council, Ockham Common's landowner and the neighbouring landowners played an important role. The owner of Ockham Common, Lady Lovelace, was offering the site for purchase at £24,000. It was widely thought to be a 'gift' at such a price.⁴⁸

In four articles published in the local newspaper during a six-month period in 1935, landowners adjoining Ockham Common were encouraged to contribute to its purchase. One article sub-titled 'An Appeal to Neighbouring Owners', noted that though contributions had been received, it hoped that 'still further contributions towards the purchase price would be received'.⁴⁹

	Contribution	
	Pounds	%
Surrey County Council	12,000	50
London County Council	6,000	25
Neighbours	4,000	16.7
Guildford Rural District Council	2,000	8.3
Total	24,000	100

Table 4 – Contributions to the purchase of Ockham Common⁵⁰

Table 4 reveals the extent of this contribution to the purchase of Ockham Common. What is remarkable is the extent to which neighbouring landowners contributed to the purchase of this open space. In fact, one landowner is said to have contributed £2,500 to the cost.⁵¹ Though the contribution was large, this action by neighbouring landowners was not unheard of as the minutes of meetings show.⁵² Warren farm (66 acres) for example, was purchased with 10% of the cost coming from neighbouring contributions.⁵³

Conclusions

The results show that the implementation of the green belt met with resistance. We show that as well as planners, central and local government civil servants and landowners played a significant role in allowing the green belt purchases. This is in contrast to previous studies in Japan and the UK that emphasised the role of planners (Table 5). Though Unwin's 'green girdle' was influential on Abercrombie's plan for London, the

CASE STUDY	RESISTANCE		RESPONSE	
	Type	Who	Type	Who
I. Central Government	Necessity	Other ministries e.g. Treasury	Change the green belt's function	GLRPC
	Cost	Landowners needing compensation	Include effect of neighbouring open space on land price	GLRPC/Central government
II. Local Government	Necessity	Some local districts resisting interference	Centralisation and pressure to implement	Central government
	Cost	Landowners seeking a profit	Secrecy; Flexible rules; Lowering price/contributions	Central/Local Govt. Large landowners

Table 5 – Resistance and response to the green belt: summary of results

following shown by the results, are also characteristic of the system today.

The results show that the main objective of planners was to implement the green belt, and that its function was secondary. To an extent, the green belt's function was used as a way of responding to concerns at the time in an effort to obtain funding. Most notable among these is the appeal to the Air Ministry. Aerial bombardment had become a concern during the 1930s. This was a result of the use of bombs during the First World War when their potential for destroying cities was recognised.

This process of argumentation, i.e. the way in which the understated, fundamentally aesthetic aim of the green belt is hidden behind whatever appears most likely to justify its implementation, occurs today. The recently renamed Campaign for the Protection of Rural England for example, argue that the green belt helps urban regeneration for example.⁵⁴

Civil servants tended to be flexible with regulations to allow the preservation of land to go ahead. Central government strongly advised and directed the purchase of land, almost to the point of having the Minister coerce the council to deal with an uncooperative clerk in Kent. At the local level, civil servants used negotiations with landowners to secure good terms for buying land. Secrecy was an element in this. Positively identifying this element in today's UK planning system is difficult, but such bargaining represents a precursor of the UK's corporate approach to post-War planning.

Finally, the role of landowners was important. At the time, two kinds of landowners existed: those who had recently purchased land and provoked sprawl, and those that had held land for several generations as part of a large estate and agreed to preserve open space.

The reason that this has a strong effect on the UK's planning is a complex question and is undoubtedly linked to the idealisation of the countryside by the 19th century Romantic Movement. This idealisation coincided with the growth of a rural landowning class able to enjoy leisure pursuits and view the countryside differently. The green belt was not unique in benefiting from this idealistic vision. The National Trust for example had been active in buying and receiving land since 1895.⁵⁵

The post-War planning system was successful despite the erosion of the aristocrat's power during the early

20th Century, because this group was able to maintain sufficient power to impose its ideas on planning at the time⁵⁶. Though the link between aristocratic landownership and the history of planning is known its relationship to the green belt has not been clarified.

In particular, the neighbours' contribution to the purchase of green belt shown in this study, represents a concrete example of the transfer of an aristocratic role in preserving land, to a Not-in-my backyard (NIMBY) role. The role of NIMBYs in preventing any changes to the green belt is well understood. The emergence of this role is not currently well understood and needs further research.

Notes

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5. Booth, P. 2003, *Planning by consent: The origins and nature of British Development Control*, Routledge, London, p. 105. Sheail, J. 1981, *Rural Conservation in inter-war Britain*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, pp1-3.
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9. PRO HLG 4/3353 Report by Adams and Thompson for Mid-Surrey JTPC, 1926.10.14.
10. PRO HLG 52/1217 Annex to the Greater London Region - Reservation of Open spaces, Deputation to the Minister 1934.01.30. Thomas 1970, op cit. p. 81.
11. Sheail 1981, op cit. pp. 94-122.
12. PRO HLG 4/3764 Letter from Minister to participants of Thames valley regional conference, 1922.06.12.
13. PRO HLG 4/3129 Report of the Conference of the Local Authorities, G. Pepler, 1923.10.11.
14. PRO HLG 4/3507 Information distributed to participants of GLRPC, G. Pepler, 1926.03.
15. Thomas 1970, op cit. p. 52.
16. PRO HLG 4/3507 Minutes of deputation to Minister of Health, 1926.03.23.
17. PRO HLG 4/3242 H. G. Baxendale to I.G. Gibbon, Provision of Open spaces 1926.4.20.
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34. *ibid.* Conversation between Sir P. Henriques and W. A. Ross, 1935.12.10; Letter from Culpin to Pepler, 1935.12.13.
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37. PRO HLG 52/1217 Letter from W. A. Robinson to J. A. N. Barlow, 1935.04.11.
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41. PRO HLG 54/175 Surrey County Council Act, Sect. 70-71 1931.
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43. *ibid.* Memo from W.A. Ross to Francis, 1936.01.11.
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47. op cit. (30), *ibid.* Letter from Ross to Sussex CC. 1936.01.13.
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54. CPRE 2001, 'Green Belts...Still Working...Still Under Threat' CPRE Campaign leaflet London, CPRE.
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56. In terms of the power of landowners over the planning system, the battle over 'Glory Woods' provides a good example. The Duke of Newcastle had threatened to withdraw his gift of 'Glory Woods' to Sussex Council if the route of the Dorking By-pass was not reconsidered. See 'Times' article 1929.07.31 'Dorking By Pass' PRO HLG 4/3353. The power of such large landowners over the planning system, remains a feature of the planning system today, see Adams, C. D. 1987, 'Opportunities for landowner participation in local planning', *Planning Outlook*, Vol. 30, No. 2, pp. 66-69.

Paying the price for high hopes: UK public sector high-rise and the Housing Subsidies Act, 1956

PHIL JONES

School of Geography, Earth and Environmental Sciences
University of Birmingham, UK
p.i.jones@bham.ac.uk

The housing programme sponsored by the British state in the years following World War II wrought tremendous changes on the urban landscape of Britain. High-rise housing (five or more storeys), by simple virtue of its built form, remains perhaps the most visibly obvious manifestation of these dramatic changes. Between the 1950s and early 1970s over 6,500 tower blocks sprang up in cities across Britain, which, with the exception of Scotland and to a lesser extent London, previously had a relatively limited tradition of flatted housing types.¹ Although it was individual local authorities that actually carried out these building programmes, they were undertaken within a funding framework controlled by central government in Westminster.

The Housing Subsidies Act, 1956 introduced a payment escalator based on the height of building erected. Though some local authorities were using this building type prior to 1956, the numbers of flats in high-rise blocks built annually increased sharply thereafter, from just over 8,000 in 1956 to a peak of over 44,000 in 1966.² The Act was a critical *enabling* factor in this high-rise boom. Yet the reasons why the Ministry of Housing and Local Government produced this Act – one that had a fundamental effect on the shape of British cities – remain somewhat murky. Previous studies examining Britain's high-rise, particularly those by Dunleavy and Cooney, did not have access to Public Record Office files covering the period leading up to the 1956 Act.³ This paper seeks to build on these early studies and shed a little more light on the arcane process of policy formation within the Ministry during this period.

Origins of the Flats Subsidy

The flats subsidy was introduced as part of the Housing Act, 1935 which changed the additional subsidies available where local authorities were building on expensive land. Where flats of four or more storeys were being built to relieve overcrowding, the floor price triggering the additional subsidies was reduced from £3,000 to £1,500 per acre. This provision was retained in the Housing (Financial and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1946. Civil servants considering revisions to the subsidies in 1954 could find no record

of why the £1,500 figure had been decided on, hypothesising that it was based on the cost of building flats in London, although the subsidy was applied nationally.⁴ Dunleavy argues that this early flats subsidy was designed with the hope that local authorities might be encouraged to redevelop their inner areas at a density sufficiently high to require the use of flats, with the assumption that most authorities would otherwise be unwilling to use this housing type.⁵

The Housing Act, 1952 gave an overall increase in funding levels without making big changes to the overall subsidy structure. As a result, the expensive site subsidy, central government's main tool for encouraging inner city redevelopment, became a large drain on the Exchequer. The other problem was that the additional subsidy was paid on a per-flat basis, meaning that local authorities had an incentive to squeeze as many flats as possible onto an expensive site to maximise the subsidy paid.⁶ This 'site cramming' issue was of great concern to the garden city lobby, a group of people that the Ministry's Accountant General FL Edwards clearly felt were a nuisance. When proposing in 1954 that a study group be set up to look at the question of the flat subsidies, Edwards counselled discretion, as:

...publicity at the outset would only excite the long-haired ones who want to reduce the densities in our cities and who would abate the flat subsidy to a derisory sum in order to ensure that everyone lives in a house with a garden.⁷

In the government mindset of the period, providing housing for all in low-density settlements was simply incompatible with the fundamental desire to prevent further urban sprawl and minimise the use of greenfield sites.⁸

Pioneers in the provinces

While the Ministry's belief that there was unwarranted bias against flats in provincial cities was well founded in many cases, there were a number of pioneering authorities. Both Birmingham and Coventry were using high-rise by the start of the 1950s.⁹ Indeed, both authorities not only built tower blocks to replace slums

in their central areas, but started using this building type on greenfield sites around the urban fringe. These midlands authorities had a particular problem as they had large slum clearance programmes, relatively limited stocks of suburban land and, with the exception of a small development serving the steel mill at Corby,¹⁰ no new town to absorb surplus population displaced by redevelopment.¹¹ Both cities thus felt it was imperative to stretch their remaining stocks of building land as far as possible, using high density building types in their outer suburbs.

Both authorities ran into the same problem, however, with the calculation of the additional flat subsidy under the Housing Act, 1952. Civil servants working in the Regional Office of the Ministry felt that as these greenfield sites cost significantly less than the £1,500 per acre threshold, the flat subsidy would not be granted on a project in the Tile Cross area of Birmingham.¹² This caused panic in the two cities, as both had a number of suburban high-rise schemes already in train.¹³ If the additional subsidies were not granted, they would find themselves with a number of blocks where the unsubsidised rent levels would be so high as to exclude most low income slum dwellers. Both cities lobbied the Ministry to reconsider and Whitehall-based civil servants, investigating the issue, took the view that the problem was a misunderstanding by the Midlands Regional Office. The Whitehall view was that the £1,500 figure should be based on the development costs of the land, rather than the purchase price. As tower blocks required expensive foundations, Higginbotham of the housing division commented that 'I have yet to come across a case where blocks of flats have failed to qualify for the flats subsidy on the ground that the cost of the site as developed was below £1,500'.¹⁴ Birmingham would later claim that having to put their flat building programme on hold during the confusion led to a loss in output amounting to 500 homes.¹⁵

Revisions to the subsidy structure were, therefore, becoming an important issue, particularly given the difficulty the Ministry seemed to be having in operating the existing combination of expensive site and flat subsidies. The Ministry did not want to be seen as discouraging the use of tall blocks where high densities were required, particularly as more large and influential provincial authorities were beginning to use this type in greater numbers. The irony of this was that the scheme that prompted the debate, Birmingham's Tile Cross, was built at the relatively low density of 57 rooms to the acre, thus defeating the object of paying out the extra subsidy to build flats.¹⁶ Indeed, this was one of the arguments marshalled in favour of a subsidy based on density, rather than housing type.

The Design Question

In the early 1950s the Ministry clearly believed that provincial local authorities were still very much anti-flat. Responding to a letter from Frank Holland of the London County Council in February 1952, the Ministry's HB Riddle confided:

In many of the provincial cities especially there is unreasoning prejudice against flats so that they go on eating up the countryside with cottage estates while their decaying centres cry out for redevelopment at high density. If we pull down the starting part of the expensive site subsidy too far and pay them too much they will certainly redevelop their central zones – but entirely with cottages!¹⁷

Unease was growing, however, about the impact of the flat building subsidy structure as laid out in the 1952 Act. This is illustrated in the discussions that took place during 1953 about a new edition of the Housing Manual providing guidelines to local authorities with model designs and layouts.¹⁸ The preferred design template was clearly that of 'mixed development', where tall blocks were combined with low-rise flats and houses, a model pioneered by the London County Council (LCC). This is perhaps unsurprising, given the successive appointments of JH Forshaw, AW Cleeve Barr and HJ Whitfield Lewis as the Ministry's Chief Architect – all ex-LCC men.¹⁹

At a meeting in November 1953 members of the housing division clearly expressed the view that any new subsidy structure would need to be compatible with the Ministry's design objectives.²⁰ The existing subsidies, with their incentive to 'cram' sites with flats in four-storey blocks, were simply not compatible with the 'mixed development' ideal. A radical suggestion for reforming the subsidies to overcome this problem was suggested at the end of the year by D Nunn, the Chief Quantity surveyor, based in the Ministry's architect's division. His proposal was for a system based around density, rather than housing type, taking the form:

Sxy + z, where
S is a basic or standard subsidy
x is a factor related to size of dwelling
y is a factor related to density
z is an additional subsidy related to the cost of site as developed in excess of £1500 per acre.²¹

The system was thus based around what Nunn described as a 'density multiplier' (factor 'y'). This, he felt, would allow local authorities to use a mix of

housing types to achieve the desired density for a given site, but without relying on 'excessive' use of expensive building types such as high-rise.²² In a departmental meeting just before Christmas 1953 to discuss revising subsidies, some disquiet was expressed at Nunn's proposals. Mr Beddoe, of the housing division, did, however, comment that a change to the way subsidies were calculated might be used to 'camouflage' a reduction in the general needs subsidy.²³

This idea of merely tinkering with the subsidy structure to disguise a general reduction seems to have remained the guiding principle. This lack of seriousness about radically recasting the 'flat' subsidy can be seen in the failed attempt to set up a working party to review the whole question. Nunn's proposals were being discussed, generally negatively, in memos to the Permanent Secretary during the summer of 1954.²⁴ The new Minister Duncan Sandys was unenthusiastic about dedicating too much time to the issue, recommending that the proposed working party be called a 'study group' and questioning whether there was any need for it at all.²⁵ The group never really got anywhere: indeed it had still to meet in May 1955, held up by 'a silly little squabble' with the Association of Metropolitan Councils over nominees to the body.²⁶ The design manual that had been planned for 1954 to give guidance to local authorities on the use of flats was delayed until 1958, *after* the critical change in the subsidy structure of 1956.²⁷

The economics of flatted housing

A major review of all housing subsidies took place in 1954 for which the Ministry's Accountant General gave three reasons. First, with the introduction of Harold Macmillan's 'People's House',²⁸ the floor area of 3-bedroom houses being built by local authorities, and subsequent costs, had been dramatically reduced. Second, average wages had increased, suggesting that council tenants could afford to pay higher rents, which could reduce the proportion of costs borne through subsidy. Finally, a 0.5% drop in the interest rates of the Public Works Loan Board – then the major lending body for local authority capital projects – in 1954 reduced costs still further.²⁹

As a result, negotiations began with the local authority associations about a possible subsidy reduction. One major problem was that there had been no equivalent of the savings produced by the 'People's House' in flat building schemes. There was a concern therefore that a strict arithmetical reduction in flat and house subsidies would be seen as discouraging flat building.³⁰ This issue was particularly worrying to the London County Council, who were heavily invested in the 'mixed

development' concept, which they felt would be unduly penalised if flats were made proportionally more expensive in relation to the cost of houses.³¹ In the end a compromise was reached, whereby the flats subsidies were reduced by a slightly lesser amount in the 1954 cuts, though even this caused some jitters in the Ministry as *The Economist* condemned this as evidence of 'extravagance'.³²

This difficulty with regard to differential subsidies for flats continued to be a problem in the formulation of a new housing subsidy Bill in 1955. The core of this Bill, and the eventual 1956 Act, was the removal of subsidies for 'general needs' housing – state sponsored housing was henceforth to concentrate on providing dwellings for those displaced by slum clearance schemes. There were two core reasons for this: the ideological preference of the Conservative Party for the private sector to provide as much housing as possible and the Government's attempt to implement an overall credit squeeze and reduce public spending.³³ Duncan Sandys, the new Minister, was keen to retain a certain amount of leeway within the Bill, to allow him to grant general needs subsidies in 'exceptional' cases.³⁴ This idea was ruled out very quickly, as to add such a clause to the impending Bill would have required permission from the Treasury – which Sandys' civil servants were all too well aware would not be granted.³⁵

This still left the problem of flats, however. As had been the case in 1954, there was a realisation that a straightforward removal of the subsidy for flats built as general needs housing would hamper attempts to increase densities. In the event, most authorities needing to build to high densities were doing so to cope with tenants displaced from high-density slums and thus would qualify for subsidies regardless. Nonetheless, there seems to have been a reluctance to send any message that would seem to discourage flat building. There was, however, some lobbying within the Ministry to scrap the general needs subsidy for flats altogether. In a memo of September 1956, SWC Phillips gave four reasons for this. Firstly, it was only the larger authorities that were building flats and they had large pools of housing stock that could be used to keep rents down through cross subsidy. Second, most flats would be built for slum clearance and so would not be affected. Thirdly, scrapping the flats subsidy would encourage local authorities to develop more economical designs. Finally, and perhaps most interestingly, removal of this subsidy would mean that '...our position vis-a-vis the Treasury will be strengthened to resist direct programme control'.³⁶ The flats subsidy had thus become a contentious point in

the Ministry's attempts to defend itself against the competing interests of, on the one side, the local authorities attempting to maximise the resources available to them and, on the other side, the Treasury's desire to keep costs under control.

Subsidy by height: a compromise

In the event, the finished Act compromised. General needs subsidies on houses were withdrawn altogether. Table 1 indicates the level of subsidies laid down in the 1956 Act. General needs flats continued to be subsidised, but at a lower level than flats built for slum clearance – the difference being £12, the level of the general needs house subsidy following the 1954 review.³⁷ Yet there was a critical new element introduced with the 1956 subsidies, the progressive height escalator.

I have been unable to locate a document among the Public Record Office's Housing and Local Government series that records who came up with the idea of a progressive height subsidy. There is no mention of this model prior to 1955 and it seems to have emerged at some point after Nunn's concept of the 'density multiplier' had been dismissed and the 'study group' looking into the question had stalled. At some point after June 1955 (the document is undated) a set of tables appears among the file papers for the 1955 Bill, which lists the number of blocks of flats built in Britain, divided into two categories, 3-4 storeys and 5 or more storeys, suggesting that a differential subsidy based on height was under consideration.³⁸ In a meeting at the end of September, the minutes of which were classified 'secret', the leading civil servants in the housing division, along with the Ministry's Accountant General, Solicitor and Deputy Secretary met to discuss a meeting the Minister would shortly be having with representatives of the local authority associations to discuss the new subsidy proposals. There is no mention of the progressive height subsidy here, only that the '...flat subsidy will only be paid in blocks of 5 or more storeys and that it will be about 1½ times the cottage subsidy'.³⁹

At the Minister's meeting with the local authorities, the main concern being raised was the fact that by only subsidising flats of five or more storeys it would be

more difficult to provide the blocks of 3- to 4-storey flats required as part of mixed developments.⁴⁰ An indication that a progressive height escalator was under consideration, however, appears in a memo sent by the Permanent Secretary, Evelyn Sharp in November 1955. The Minister had asked her to investigate a claim by the architect Joseph Emberton that blocks of flats built to one of his designs did not cost more per flat for each increase in storey height.⁴¹ In part this can be seen as part of a long-running battle between Emberton and the Ministry, as its predecessor, the Ministry of Health, had rejected designs for flats that Emberton had drawn up whilst working at the Ministry of Works in 1946.⁴² Still, the fact that there were conflicting claims over the costs of flats only heightened the difficulties in creating a suitable subsidy structure, and Sharp candidly admitted in the same memo that '...the Minister, I know, is not convinced that we have a sensible policy in relation to flats...'.⁴³

The subsidy structure that was settled upon, with the funding levels increasing with the height of the building, was drawn up in such a way as to keep the amount of rent paid by house and flat dwellers roughly in proportion – a difference of around 3s.6d. (17.5 new pence) per week.⁴⁴ Thus authorities needing to build high flats for density purposes would not be penalised for doing so and would not have to cross subsidise them through their larger rent pools in order to produce economically viable rent levels. This, however, was in the context of a series of swingeing cuts, particularly the removal of the general needs subsidy on houses.

Conclusion

Thus one can interpret the progressive height subsidy as a compromise, a sop to those authorities pressing for simpler subsidies to provide flats in high-density areas, partially offsetting (or camouflaging) the general round of cuts. Given that the Ministry felt it was having difficulty persuading most local authorities to use flats for high-density inner city redevelopment in the early 1950s, no one really anticipated the dramatic effect that these changes would have on the skyline of Britain's cities over the next decade.

Table 1: Subsidies paid by dwelling type under the Housing Subsidies Act, 1956

Purpose of scheme	Dwellings other than flats	3-storey	4-storey	5-storey	6-storey	Each additional storey
General needs	nil *	nil *	£20	£26	£38	£1 15s
Special needs	£22 1s or £24	£22 1s or £24	£32	£38	£50	£1 15s

* Transitional period paid at £10

Source: Housing Subsidies Act, 1956

General needs subsidies were reintroduced by the Conservatives in the Housing Act, 1961 and the whole system radically recast in by the Housing Subsidies Act, 1967. That 1967 Act, though more generous to local authorities, removed the progressive height element, a key factor in the dramatic decline in high-rise building thereafter. In eleven years of operation, however, this device introduced in 1956 had subsidised the building of more than a quarter of a million flats in high-rise blocks.⁴⁵ As such, the Housing Subsidies Act, 1956, can be argued as, albeit unintentionally, transforming the high-rise block from being a device for raising housing densities in certain circumstances, to becoming the icon of Britain's modernist reconstruction. High-rise have since served as a cipher for everything that was wrong about that reconstruction, yet their creation in such numbers was an unintended outcome of the contested process of recasting the overall subsidy system.

Notes

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- 2 Ministry of Housing and Local Government (hereafter MHLG) *Housing Statistics* HMSO, London, 1966-70
- 3 Dunleavy, Patrick *The Politics of Mass Housing in Britain 1945-1975: a study of corporate power and professional influence in the welfare state* Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1981; Cooney, EW 'High flats in local authority housing in England and Wales' in Sutcliffe op. cit. See also McCutcheon, Robert 'High flats in Britain, 1945 to 1971' in *Political Economy and the Housing Question* papers presented to the Political Economy of Housing Workshop, 1975
- 4 Public Record Office Housing and Local Government Series (hereafter HLG) 101/738 Memo Harrop [unclear] to Beddoe 4/5/54
- 5 Dunleavy p159
- 6 Dunleavy pp162-3
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- 8 Hall, Peter; Gracey, Harry; Drewett, Roy & Thomas, Ray *The Containment of Urban England Volume Two: the planning system* George Allen & Unwin, London, 1973
- 9 Finnimore, Brian *Houses from the Factory: system building and the welfare state, 1942-74* Rivers Oram Press, London, 1989
- 10 Osborn F.J. & Whittick A. *New Towns: their origins, achievements and progress* Leonard Hill, London, 1977 p331
- 11 For a detailed discussion of the problems facing Birmingham and the solutions adopted, see Sutcliffe, Anthony & Smith, Roger *History of Birmingham Volume III: Birmingham, 1939-1970* Oxford University Press for Birmingham City Council, London, 1974
- 12 HLG 101/737 Memo, Holden to Hickinbotham "'Houses 1954" Cost of flats etc. Notes on existing material' 25/8/53
- 13 'Birmingham seeks special rents for flats' *Evening Dispatch* 18/5/53
- 14 HLG 101/737, Note on file, Hickinbotham 23/10/53

- 15 'Mr. Fidler tells how the City lost 500 homes' *Birmingham Gazette* 6/11/54
- 16 HLG 101/737 Memo, Beddoe to Wilkinson & Edwards 'Houses and flats in areas of high density' 21/1/54
- 17 HLG 101/737 Letter, Riddle to Frank Holland [LCC] 'Cottages on Expensive Land' 26/2/52
- 18 HLG 101/737 Minutes of meeting 'Houses 1954' 9/10/53
- 19 Finnimore p73
- 20 HLG 101/737 Minutes of meeting 'Revision of housing subsidies' 20/11/53
- 21 Nunn collaborated with Mr Lichfield on this proposal. This summary appears in HLG 101/737 memo Holden to Hickinbotham 9/12/53
- 22 HLG 101/737 Nunn and Lichfield 'Housing subsidies' 9/12/53
- 23 HLG 101/737 Minutes of meeting 'Revision of housing subsidies' 18/12/53
- 24 HLG 101/394 Memo, Edwards to Permanent Secretary 'Subsidies for flats and houses' 29/6/54; Memo, Wilkinson to Permanent Secretary, 'Subsidies for flats and houses' 1/7/54
- 25 HLG 101/394 Memo, Edwards to ?, no date, c. December 1954
- 26 HLG 101/394 Memo, Edwards to Wilson (Department of Health for Scotland), 20/5/55
- 27 MHLG *Flats and Housing, 1958: design and economy* HMSO, London, 1958
- 28 Macmillan being the Minister at this time. Ravetz, Alison *Council Housing and Culture: the history of a social experiment* Routledge, London, 2001 p97
- 29 HLG 101/739 Accountant General [Edwards] 'Annual review of housing subsidies: subsidies in respect of houses completed after 30th June, 1954 (confidential draft) n.d. c. 21/5/54
- 30 Or overly encouraging it if flat subsidies were not cut in line with those for houses. HLG 101/739 Anon. 'The proposed reduction in housing subsidies: note for the Minister's meeting with the Associations of Local Authorities on June 21st at 4.45p.m.' n.d. c. June 1954
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- 33 Malpass, Peter & Murie, Alan *Housing Policy and Practice* Macmillan, Basingstoke, 3rd edn. 1990 p66; HLG 101/713 Memo (Secret) Edwards to Minister [D. Sandys] 'Borrowing by local authorities' 20/9/55
- 34 HLG 101/748 Memo O'Brien to Phillips 'Housing Subsidies Bill' 1/12/55
- 35 HLG 101/748 Memo Phillips to Cox 30/1/56
- 36 HLG 101/748 Memo Phillips to Deputy Secretary, 13/9/56
- 37 In effect, halving the levels laid down in 1952. HLG 101/748 Extract from Cabinet Minutes, 18/10/56
- 38 HLG 101/713. The document file is titled 'Housing Subsidies Bill, 1955'. These tables appear in an undated, untitled document early in the file.
- 39 HLG 101/713 Minutes of meeting (Secret) 'Housing Bill, 1955' 27/9/55
- 40 HLG 101/713 Minutes of meeting 'Housing Subsidies' 10/10/55
- 41 HLG 101/394 Memo Sharp to Phillips 'Cost of flat building' 9/11/55
- 42 HLG 101/354 Memo Sharp to Wrigley 'Emberton flats' 10/4/46
- 43 HLG 101/394 Memo Sharp to Phillips 'Cost of flat building' 9/11/55
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Max Lock, Middlesbrough, and a forgotten tradition in British post-war planning

NAOKI MOTOUCHI

(University of Luton)

PROFESSOR NICK TIRATSOO

(University of Nottingham)

Introduction

In the spring of 1944, the young architect and planner Max Lock accepted a commission from the local council to re-plan Middlesbrough, an iron and steel town of 130,000 people in the North East of England. His intention, he explained, was to work in a new way, planning *with* the inhabitants rather than *for* them, thus transforming what had previously been a largely technical discipline into 'a democratic process'. This paper examines how Lock functioned in Middlesbrough, and comments on various aspects of his final recommendations, before turning to discuss what impact he had on the subsequent development of British planning. Our conclusion is that though Lock's insights and achievements were substantial, they were then for the most part 'forgotten' during the 1950s and 1960s, and in a brief coda, we speculate as to why this was so.

Max Lock and his ideas

Born in 1909 to middle-class parents, Max Lock studied and then taught at the Architectural Association in the 1920s and 1930s, meanwhile starting a private practice. He was a Quaker and had marked liberal sympathies, both in terms of architecture and politics. In the later 1930s, he joined the Modern Architecture Research Group (MARS), undertook a tour of Scandinavia to learn about new advances in housing policy, and became an independent councilor in his home-town of Watford. When the Second World War broke out, Lock, as a conscientious objector, found life hard, but in the end, as interest in reconstruction blossomed, he was employed by Leverhulme to undertake a survey of the badly bombed city of Hull.¹ Always an energetic proselytiser, Lock now began promoting what he saw as no less than a wholly new method of planning.

Lock believed that planners had lost their way in the inter-war years. The humanistic tradition, associated with Geddes, Branford and Mumford had been forgotten. Instead, vested interests had been allowed to dominate, and define the realm of possibilities in terms of their own narrow ends. As a result, planning had been reduced to the merely 'cosmetic', while sprawl and congestion had spread across the country unchecked. Yet, as Lock saw it, this phase was now, in

turn, being superseded. The experience of the Blitz had radicalised people's ideas and provided the physical space for a fresh start. In this context, the pioneers' agenda was once again becoming relevant. For the younger generation, the urgent challenge was to see how it might be developed and then applied.²

Lock's starting point was the axiom that planning had necessarily to involve extensive dialogue with ordinary people. The citizens of a place, he insisted, were 'the planner's clients' and 'must be consulted in the same way as the clients of an architect are consulted'.³ In order to achieve this, he believed, planners needed to break with the 'cosmetic' and develop the 'diagnostic'. He explained:

This entails a revolutionary change in two directions. In the use of the scientific analytical method, on the one hand, and in the study of sociology and human problems, on the other. These two together form as it were the parallel tracks of a permanent way, upon which alone the vehicle of planning can traverse the crowded and difficult ground of contemporary life. Mere factual analysis can mean nothing apart from its complement, human sympathy and the sympathetic investigation of vital human needs which constitute the energising live-rail of this track. Investigation by itself is not enough. It must see and know its goal. It must be linked to a long-term objective – an integrated environment.⁴

In practical terms, Lock concluded, this meant that the planner could no longer work as a narrowly technical practitioner, but needed to interact with other disciplines, most importantly, he stressed, 'the science of sociology'.⁵

Planning Middlesbrough

After moving to Middlesbrough in the spring of 1944, Lock rented a two-storied suburban house, and began recruiting helpers. After a few weeks he had assembled a formidable group, which included the geographer A. E. Smailes, the sociologist Ruth Glass, four planners, and 18 assistants (some part-time). Lock then turned to collecting raw material. The team scoured

printed sources and also did much fieldwork. Lock himself, together with the other planners, surveyed the town's housing, open spaces, transport and public utilities; Smailes examined the economy; while Glass completed an ambitious investigation of neighbourhood structure, health and education services, and the retail sector. Much of this work involved recording fairly predictable metrics. But the team was also able to tap into more subjective dimensions, because, fortuitously, the government's Wartime Social Survey was persuaded to organise a complementary exercise in opinion research, distributing detailed questionnaires to a randomly selected group, drawn from every twenty-third household, of 1,387 housewives and 1,209 other adults.⁶

Then came a fairly fevered period of analysis. Lock and his team transferred much of the raw data onto transparent maps, and learnt much from overlaying them in combination.⁷ By the late summer of 1945, the plan was finished and in the hands of the council. Three months later, it was formally accepted 'in principle' and became official policy.⁸ The final version, complete with numerous maps and tables, was published in 1947, alongside a book edited by Glass that summarised much of the fieldwork.⁹

A 'peoples' plan'?

Lock aimed to construct a 'peoples' plan'. To what extent did he succeed? Two observations are pertinent. The first concerns popular interest in planning. Lock had always believed that it was part of the planner's job to cultivate enthusiasm and debate, and as a result, he took a great deal of care in Middlesbrough to ensure that communication with ordinary people remained a priority.¹⁰ His team opened an office in the town centre; addressed many meetings with residents and community groups; gave interviews to the press and radio; produced 'penny pamphlets' on their main ideas, together with a popular version of the final plan; built models for display in local venues; and collaborated with the council on a major exhibition.¹¹ Not all of these initiatives were equally successful. But it appears that Lock did at least partly achieve his goal. Most visitors to Middlesbrough directly before and after this time tended to view it as generally introverted, without a vibrant civic culture. Priestley labeled it a 'dismal town', whose chief passions were beer and football.¹² Others concurred.¹³ Yet during 1944 and 1945, there was without doubt a pronounced upsurge in public engagement. Some 22,000 people, perhaps one-sixth of the population, visited the exhibition; an array of inhabitants, from industrialists to schoolchildren, took

part in discussions about planning issues; and the plan itself was, for some months, a major topic of local conversation. Outsiders registered the change, with one informed observer, for example, reporting that the plan had 'aroused a storm of protest and interest'.¹⁴ Given that some other planning schemes of this period provoked only marginal and fleeting comment from the population at large, this, in itself, was certainly a significant achievement.

Second, there is no doubt that Lock took what ordinary people wanted extremely seriously, and built their preferences into his final recommendations wherever possible, even at the expense of ignoring the conventional wisdom that was circulating amongst his peers. Two examples are germane. The first concerns neighbourhood units.¹⁵ These were in vogue at the time, and so might have been expected to appear at the heart of the Middlesbrough plan. But in fact Lock took a rather more original approach, based upon a real respect for the evidence. The starting point was Glass's enquiry into neighbourhood structure. Much planning discourse tended to treat the phenomenon of working-class community rather uncritically, perhaps through a rosy haze. Glass punctured some illusions. She demonstrated that 'integrated' neighbourhoods were both numerically rather rare and closely associated with 'negative factors' like 'poverty and geographical isolation'. As such, they were hardly models for emulation. What planners should focus on, Glass argued, were places that better reflected how society was currently developing. The reality, she believed, was that the more affluent people became, the more they wanted 'to pick and choose' – to look for, and perhaps pursue, social and institutional contacts *outside* their immediate street or area. Accordingly, the planner's task, she concluded, was to design residential areas in a more flexible and holistic manner. She explained:

Convenient access to institutions is essential, but standards of convenience vary for different groups and for different types of services. There will inevitably be a good deal of criss-cross movement and residential cells should, therefore, be closely related to each other. The pattern of urban areas should express and facilitate the coherence of groups of neighbourhoods: it should not be split up by a number of small subdivisions.¹⁶

Of course, Lock might well have resisted this logic, but he did not. His plan certainly provided local services for the less mobile, and sited them at regular intervals.

But it also acknowledged that 'the vast majority of healthy adolescents and adults' required 'easy access both to the centre of the town and to other neighbourhoods', and drew the apposite planning lessons, for example, that clubs and facilities should be sited *between* communities rather than within them. This was, as Lock underlined, very different from 'the somewhat romantic concept of the neighbourhood unit as a self-contained cell modelled on the lines of the village green'.¹⁷

Lock's recommendations on suburbs were equally sensitive to popular priorities. The Wartime Social Survey had exhaustively analysed local peoples' feelings about housing and planning, and discovered a deep yearning for the suburban lifestyle. An emphatic 90 per cent of 'housewives', 92 per cent of 'working men' and 93 per cent of 'working women' wanted gardens. More pointedly still, when questioned about *where* they would like to live, 'a large section of the [local] population' named Middlesbrough's existing suburbs, because of 'their open development, more modern housing and more healthy surroundings'.¹⁸ Some planners might have blanched at such findings, fearing that they would be used to justify sprawl and incursions into the green belt. But Lock took a more relaxed view. His approach balanced the desire for extensive development with the need to preserve both the countryside and what he saw as one of the town's great glories, the vista of the Cleveland Hills to the south. Six new estates would be built on the fringes of the town, 'pointing southward towards the sun and view', but each would be closely demarcated, separated out by 'green wedges' that flowed right into the city centre. As Lock explained, what he sought to create resembled the imprint of a spread out hand, with the estates as the fingers, and the wedges as the spaces in-between.¹⁹ Again, this was a solution that gave due weight to what ordinary Middlesbrough people really wanted.

A forgotten tradition

Lock's planning in Middlesbrough was innovative and significant. Many of his contemporaries recognised that popular participation in planning was important,²⁰ but few gave it such salience or identified such a clear pathway for its implementation. Nevertheless, the whole episode made far less of an impact on developments over the next thirty years than might have been expected. Symptomatically, when planners, politicians, and community activists turned again to the problem of consultation at the end of the 1960s, few, if any, referred back to Lock's magnum opus. Indeed, the widely shared view, best captured in David Eversley's

very influential *The Planner in Society*, was that *all* 1940s planning had been in essence an exercise in paternalism, with the planner and the planned operating, as in the earlier years, on entirely different 'planes'.²¹ What explains this unexpected amnesia?

Part of the explanation lies with the man himself. Lock was an enthusiastic and able communicator, but he never wrote the textbook that might have spread his ideas more widely. Moreover, from the mid-1950s, Lock often worked abroad, and this, too, obviously lessened his impact.²² Finally, it is notable that Lock, in later life, anyway grew rather disillusioned, believing that the achievements of his heyday had been squandered. Addressing a RIBA audience in 1964, he characterised the 1947 Town and Country Planning Act as stultifying, a measure that imposed bureaucratic procedures at the expense of real engagement. His considered view, in fact, was that British planning had become 'pot-bound'.²³ Whether this was true or not, it hardly encouraged the view that the 1940s legacy might be a source of inspiration for a younger generation.

At the same time, broader factors also need to be acknowledged. At the heart of Lock's wartime credo, as has been underlined, was the insistence that planners must necessarily work with sociologists. Yet this was always likely to attract controversy. The disciplines of planning and sociology had grown up following very different paths, and there was little sense of compatibility or dialogue among their practitioners.²⁴ One observer characterized the gulf between the two professions in the early 1950s as follows:

If...the planner were to ask for advice about the planning of a railway, and the frequency with which trains should be run along the lines...the sociologist would give him a report on the colours of the socks worn by the engine-drivers...perhaps...embellished by a series of statistical correlations between those colours and the drivers' sex life and criminal propensities.²⁵

In this situation, Lock could easily be perceived as a maverick, neither 'one of us' nor 'one of them', and thus fair game for reviewers in the specialist journals.²⁶ Again, this hardly helped his reputation.

Political fashions, too, may have played their part. Lock held progressive views, as has been noted, but he was never zealous or sectarian. Questioned in 1944 about how he got along with Middlesbrough's

councillors, he replied that they were 'very reasonable and helpful', and singled out the Conservative mayor for particular praise.²⁷ But in the late 1960s, the tone of discussion was rather different. Some activists and academics took a much more polemical line, based upon neo-marxist concepts like the 'local state', and there was a general sense that planning was becoming highly political and therefore contentious. In this later context, Lock's implicit belief in the importance of consensus inevitably seemed increasingly outdated.

Conclusion

Max Lock was an important Twentieth Century British planner, whose determination to "retain the imagination of the planned"²⁸ gave his work in places like Middlesbrough a particular quality and integrity. Yet, as this paper has noted, Lock ultimately never received the attention that he deserved – and this is a reminder, if any was needed, that history can sometimes be the most unforgiving of arbiters.

Notes

- 1 *Independent*, 3 May 1988 and Max Lock Centre Exhibition Research Group, *Max Lock 1909-1988*, London: University of Westminster, 1996.
- 2 Max Lock, 'The Revolution in Town Planning', in F.J. Osborn (ed.), *Planning and Reconstruction 1944-45*, London and New York: Todd Publishing, 1945, pp.95-6.
- 3 Max Lock, 'Preface', in Ruth Glass (ed.), *The Social Background of a Plan. A Study of Middlesbrough*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1948, p.xiii.
- 4 Lock, 'The Revolution', p. 96.
- 5 Lock 'Preface', p.xiii.
- 6 Glass, *The Social Background*, pp.1-6. For the Social Survey, see Frank Whitehead, 'The Government Social Survey', in Martin Bulmer (ed.), *Essays on the History of British Sociological Research*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp.83-100.
- 7 *Illustrated*, 11 November 1944.
- 8 F.J. Osborn (ed.), *Planning and Reconstruction 1948*, London and New York: Todd Publishing, 1948, pp. 345-6.
- 9 Max Lock et al., *The Middlesbrough Survey and Plan*, Middlesbrough: Middlesbrough Corporation, 1947; Glass, *The Social Background*.
- 10 Max Lock, 'Town Planning and Public Relations', *Town and Country Planning*, Vol. 14 No. 55, 1946, pp. 110-14.
- 11 *Listener*, 11 October 1945; Max Lock Centre Exhibition Research Group, *Max Lock*; and *Picture Post*, 11 August 1945. The popular version of the plan was published as Max Lock, *A Plan for Middlesbrough. The Proposals in Outline*, Middlesbrough: Middlesbrough Corporation, 1945, priced at 2/6d. (30p). See also *Architects' Journal*, 2 August 1945.
- 12 J.B. Priestley, *English Journey*, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977, pp. 319-20.
- 13 See, for example, National Archives [hereafter NA] HLG 108/5, Dinah Fine, 'Two Towns. Middlesbrough and Malvern. Preliminary Report', May 1947, pp. 18-19.
- 14 *Listener*, 11 October 1945, and NA HLG 108/5, Fine, 'Two Towns', p.20-1.

- 15 For the background here, see Andrew Homer, 'Creating New Communities: The Role of the Neighbourhood Unit in Post-war British Planning', *Contemporary British History*, Vol. 14 No.1, 2000, pp.63-80.
- 16 Glass, *The Social Background*, p.43.
- 17 Max Lock, 'The Middlesbrough Experiment: Planning From Within', in J. B. Drew, *The Architects' Year Book No. 2*, London: Elek Books, 1947, p.48.
- 18 Dennis Chapman, *A Social Survey of Middlesbrough. Part Three. Public Opinion in Relation to Planning and Housing*, London: Wartime Social Survey, 1946, p. 32 and p.16.
- 19 *Listener*, 11 October 1945; Lock, *A Plan for Middlesbrough*, pp.10-11.
- 20 Nick Tiratsoo, 'The Reconstruction of Blitzed British Cities, 1945-55: Myths and Reality', *Contemporary British History*, Vol. 14 No.1, 2000, pp.36-42.
- 21 David Eversley, *The Planner in Society. The Changing Role of a Profession*, London: Faber and Faber, 1973, p.161.
- 22 Max Lock Centre Exhibition Research Group, *Max Lock*.
- 23 University of Westminster, Max Lock Archive, 9.27, Max Lock, 'The Missing Half of Planning', paper delivered at RIBA, 15 December 1964, p.3 and passim.
- 24 Nick Tiratsoo, "'New vistas': the Labour Party, citizenship and the built environment in the 1940s", in Richard Weight and Abigail Beach (eds.), *The Right to Belong. Citizenship and National Identity in Britain, 1930-1960*, London and New York: I.B. Taurus, 1998, pp.144-5.
- 25 T. S. Simey, 'The contribution of the sociologist to town planning', *Journal of the Town Planning Institute*, Vol. 39 No. 6, 1953, pp.126-7.
- 26 See, for example, William Holford, 'Quae Erimus', *Journal of the Town Planning Institute*, September-October 1947, pp.177-9, and R.L. Reiss and Max Lock, 'Middlesbrough Survey and Plan', *Town and Country Planning*, Vol. 15 No. 60, 1947-48, pp.184-195.
- 27 *Illustrated*, 11 November 1944.
- 28 Quoted in Peter Newman, 'Locked in to modern practice', *Planning*, 24 January 1997.

EXHIBITION: MEMORY OF DESTRUCTION – Rio, a History that was lost (1889-1965)

SANDRA HORTA

Master in the History of Thought and director of the Division of Research of the City Archive, Rio de Janeiro

ALBERTO TAVEIRA

Architect, master in History and the Theory of Architecture and researcher of the City Archive, Rio de Janeiro

The Rio de Janeiro City Hall and the Department of Cultures, with the support of the City Archive, organized a photograph exhibit entitled **Memory of Destruction – Rio, a History that was lost**, inaugurated on December 14, 2001. The theme selected for the exhibit was the city of Rio de Janeiro between the years of 1889 and 1960¹, highlighting the violent interventions from the government and real estate speculation, which destroyed several memorable places of priceless historic, architectural and sentimental value.

The idea arose as of the occasion of the publication of the Decree set forth by mayor Cesar Maia in 2001, launching two new APAC's (Areas for the Protection of the Cultural Environment) at Leblon and Laranjeiras (Rio de Janeiro districts), which, once again, brought to public discussion the issue of the importance of preserving the city's cultural heritage, a highly controversial idea, as it involves powerful interests from several sources.

At the time, newspapers published a series of interviews in which city dwellers, architects and urbanists took a stand for and against the measures contemplated by this legislation. The purpose of the Decree was to bar the devastating wave that was assailing both districts, two of the most pleasant districts of the city's south region, thus making a choice for the population's standard of living. Those who favoured the Decree affirmed that if similar measures had been taken in the past, the Rio Branco Avenue would nowadays be a landmark in our history, and the one hundred years that elapsed after its inauguration would not have undergone a constant building and tearing down scenario, resulting in four succeeding generations of buildings.

The concern with the maintenance of material and immaterial city registries, as from a new concept of heritage, is very recent in Brazil – it dates back to the 1970s. Lately, the preservationist view has acquired a more comprehensive meaning, for even though it has continued to give prestige to buildings and monuments, it has also started prizing their surroundings as well as cultural and natural contexts.

The creation of the "Cultural Path" in the city, a pioneer project of city preservation that emerged in 1979, was decisive to prevent dozens of old houses in downtown Rio de Janeiro, some of which remnants from the city's original historic site, from the systematic destruction and character loss being implemented on account of predominant economic interests and lack of sensitivity on the part of some sectors, both public and private.

In the 1980's the APAC's emerged – preservation tools created as from the successful implementation of urban measures by the Cultural Path. The APAC's are ideal for urban complexes, as they allow for their conservation without the severe restrictions imposed upon by historic preservation measures, being basically oriented by an attempt to preserve original volumetric features (façades and roofs), or the equivalent, of models chosen through technical studies, allowing, however, for internal modifications that would not interfere with external original features. They have also had the privilege of extending protection to other urban regions' real estate, so as to prevent its aspect to be completely changed by random intervention without the participation and agreement from the major interested parties: those who spend their lives in those areas.

The City Archive, in the capacity of an agency managing the City's Memorial System, then sought to be a part of, and more fully integrate itself into this discussion. This involves institutions, architects, urbanists, historians, anthropologists, all concerned with the preservation of memory, which is what is at stake here, that is, the preservation of architectural, historical and cultural registries still present in Rio de Janeiro. Its precious collection – photographs, blueprints, maps, written documents and caricatures – lends itself very well to this purpose, as it brings to the present time the former Rio de Janeiro, unknown to the majority of its dwellers, and promotes comparisons between the past and the present.

Thus, the exhibit **Memory of Destruction – Rio, a History that was lost**, was conceived so that the large

urban interventions implemented by those who held the power, whether or not delegated², for the purpose of transforming the urban stratum according to their intentions, political and/or financial interests, were shown to a substantial number of people and contributed towards a discussion over which city everyone wanted to live in and wished for future generations. In spite of undergoing the action, often inconsequential, of its "renovators", Rio de Janeiro still is, apart from its ever so celebrated natural beauty, owner of priceless cultural heritage, worthy of being acknowledged and disseminated.

Therefore, before the eyes of the exhibit's visitors – who had the opportunity of undertaking a true journey in time – there was a succession of images of a Rio de Janeiro that remained only in the memory of the elderly or in the city's visual documentation. Divided into five modules, the exhibit evidenced, in a didactic and chronological manner, the main urban changes that occurred.

Initially, in the period just after the Proclamation of the Republic (1889), in the midst of the political conflict and economic crisis following the consolidation of power, there was an initial attempt to do away with everything that recalled Monarchy and the backwardness which, according to the new regime, that form of government represented. One of the first matters opposed was that of tenement houses³, many of them being the property of important people of Rio de Janeiro society. (Photo 1) Mayor Barata Ribeiro intended to eradicate all tenement and rooming houses, albeit he ran out of time, as his government lasted only five months (1892-93). The most important of such tenement houses, called "Pig Head"⁴, was "impressively" demolished in only one day, in a true "field battle". There were not, however, enough places to shelter all the people who were evacuated and who, in large numbers and making use of debris, lodged themselves on the neighbouring Providence mountain, helping consolidate its occupation by a low-income population, more strongly initiated after the Canudos Rebellion⁵, in the state of Bahia.

Photographs of the opening of Central Avenue, between 1903 and 1905, nowadays called Rio Branco avenue, evidenced the destruction of a large number of houses from the time when Brazil was a colony of empire, which were substituted by *Beaux Arts* buildings, following an urban health and beauty concept⁶ duplicated in Rio by mayor Pereira Passos⁷. In turn, nearly the total number of eclectic-style buildings – built on that new avenue and the result of a large



Photo 1 – Tenement houses at Inválidos Street – Malta photo, c. 1910, AGCRJ

The central courtyard of tenement houses was both an area of leisure and work for their dwellers. Tanks for washing clothes and community bathrooms led to promiscuity, becoming a focus of diseases.



Photo 2 – Central Avenue – Malta photo, 1907 – AGCRJ
The building on the left is one of the few survivors to the fourth generation of buildings already erected on this boulevard.



Photo 3 – Central Avenue – Malta photo, c. 1910, AGCRJ
The *Beaux Arts* architecture, such as that of "O Paiz" newspaper press, object of a façade contest, was substituted by skyscrapers without the same refinement, and which put an end to the urban scale design.

international façade contest⁸ – do not exist any longer; in their place huge buildings – at first *art deco* and proto-modern; later, modern, and finally, contemporary – have totally modified the urban scale



Photo 4 – Botafogo – w/a photo, c. 1910, AGCRJ
Botafogo Bay and Sugar Loaf, Urca and Cara de Cão (Dog Face) Mountains. Today, a barrier made of buildings would almost hinder the view of the water table.



Photo 5 – Castelo Mountain – w/a photo, w/d, AGCRJ
"... it was necessary to eliminate it, not only in the name of hygiene and aesthetics, but also of capital increase." Maurício de Abreu



Photo 6 – Rodrigo de Freitas Lagoon – Malta photo, c. 1920, AGCRJ
Almost the entire plain and altered area on the borders of the lagoon is a result of landfills.

and landscape idealized and accomplished by Pereira Passos. (Photos 2 and 3)

In 1922, the demolition of the Castelo mountain removed the very cradle of the city from existence, overrunning the Fortress, the School of Jesuits, the Saint José Seminary, the Saint Sebastian Church, and the Observatory, leaving as a souvenir a small section of the *Misericórdia* (Mercy) slope⁹. (Photo 5) The excuse given was that of ventilating the downtown area to eradicate the epidemics caused by "miasmas", thus disguising the real intention of its administrators: to sweep away from the downtown area the poor population who hung clothes outdoors and herded its goats on the mountain's slopes, a scene that could be viewed by passers-by who strolled down Central avenue, a symbol of modernity and civilization, a Brazilian financial, commercial and cultural centre. On the large stretch of land where the mountain was, pavilions were built of the states and countries that took part in the International Exhibit held that year to celebrate the Brazilian Independence Centennial. Those also had a short period of existence, as only a few buildings remained from this impressive exhibit, such as those which house the Museum of Image and Sound and the Brazilian Academy of Letters.

The opening of President Vargas Avenue, an icon of the "New State"¹⁰, inaugurated in 1944, allowed for a direct link between the north region and downtown; however, it resulted in the loss of expressive landmarks of our history, such as the eighteenth century churches of Saint Domingos, of Lord Jesus of the Calvary, of Our Lady of Conception, in addition to the church of Saint Peter of Clergymen, a jewel of baroque art. Another loss was that of *Praça Onze* (Eleven Square), a public park the name of which persists in the minds of Rio de Janeiro dwellers, one of the cradles of *samba*, the main Brazilian rhythm. There, musicians got together, those whose musical work became Brazilian Popular Music classics; there, the population also organized, within Schools of Samba, associations began emerging at the beginning of the 20th century, and the famous low dance hall¹¹ Kananga of Japan was built. The square was also famous by the harmonious integration among immigrants (Jews, Arabs, Italians, Spaniards and Portuguese) who lived and worked in that area and other neighbouring areas and who contributed with their traditions, habits and customs to make it very special and distinguished.

Other landmarks and buildings of great historic and/or architectural meaning were lost, the names of which have remained as survivors as the designations of parks

located where they had once been, such as the *Mourisco Pavilion*¹² on the Beira-Mar Avenue, the *Municipal Market*¹³ and the *Monroe Palace*¹⁴, at Cinelândia, are evidence of that destructive rage.

As regards natural heritage losses, the profile of the Rodrigo de Freitas lagoon was systematically being modified since 1778¹⁵, giving rise to imbalances in its fragile ecological system. Several projects and ideas were put forth – many of them extraordinary, such as that of a complete landfill – in order to solve environmental and sanitation problems of the lagoon, but in concrete terms, there was only the addition of soil to its borders. At first in isolated points; however, as from the 20th century, comprising more substantial official modifications. Just now, some illegal landfills, in spite of their historic preservation in the 80's, are taking away areas of the lagoon's water table, which has lost over one third of its original area. (Photo 6)

In the 60's, the destruction provoked by the works carried out at *Aterro do Flamengo* (Flamengo Landfill) accounted for irreparable losses of its landscape and affective nature, such as the loss of the Saint Antônio mountain and its rows of houses¹⁶. Once again, the Rio de Janeiro dweller was kept away from the sea, due to the disappearance of the curvy water line coasted by buildings along the Beira-Mar avenue, so closely linked to water sports, to keg beer served at the Mourisco and Regattas pavilions, and to hikes on the Flamengo Beach. The Flamengo Park was designed by the Flamengo Park Work Group, managed by the "omnipresent" Ms. "Lota"¹⁷. The Flamengo Landfill, located between the Santos Dumont Airport and Botafogo Bay (Photo 4), consolidated the quick connection through expressways between the Downtown area and the South Region. Comprising an area of 1 million 200 thousand m², it currently has a museum, a puppet theatre, a bandstand, areas for airplane and ship scale model activities, multiple-sports courts, a playground, gardens, an artificial beach with 1,500 meters of extension and soccer fields, making up one of the most pleasant leisure areas in the city. Thus, the losses undergone were offset, which was not the case with the best part of the renovations undertaken in the city.

That is how we started, as time went by – and what is worse, in a short period of time – losing at each intervention, as small as it could be, at times slowly, at others fast, some of our connection with the continuity of our history.

We could mention other sorts of abuse practiced in the name of "modern times" and "civilization", which

would undoubtedly constitute a much more accurate testimony of the importance of having legislation for the preservation of city culture, and of the existence of protection mechanisms which, instead of preventing development, would contribute towards the harmonious relationship between what should be preserved, a result of discussions among all those interested, and the natural need for urban expansion and growth.

But what should be preserved? It is not the case of keeping all time registries unchanged. In addition to this being impossible – the cycle of life must be respected in all its structures – the city is fascinating due to its dynamics – building/destroying, re-building/demolishing, in sum, a succession of "yeses" and "no's". The important issue is to respect some basic values – which will always be interacting with time and modifying themselves – so that the city's line of evolution does not break abruptly, producing gaps and voids, incomprehensible cuts in the ephemeral or punctual existence of its dwellers.

Therefore, all opportunities for reflection about a city we once had, which we now have, and that we would like to have, about what could be changed without breaking with tradition, and what could be preserved to keep the ties that ensure the cultural identity or Rio de Janeiro dwellers and their standard of living, are welcome.

We should turn our attention towards, not only be curious about, but mostly inquire about, the various interventions carried out in the urban stratum and which have caused the city to lose its features, rendering it less beautiful and more inhospitable. To think about how wild and random growth could have been avoided and which legal measures could have been enforced to bar the uncommitted action of speculators would be extremely timely at a moment when all – public administrators, urbanists, intellectuals, artists and city dwellers – are attentive to the problem, and as from several points of view, would bring forward extremely relevant discussions over the ideal city, expecting to leave for their descendants as a legacy, a place that would be like home, irrespective of the walls and barriers that separate individuals from society. A place where public would not only be an extension of private, but a place for peaceful and democratic interaction.

The exhibit **Memory of Destruction – Rio, a History that was lost** consisted mostly of the possibility, endorsed by nearly 4,000 visitors while it was shown in

the City Archive, and by an inconsiderable number of people¹⁸, when it was shown for nearly 2 months in the city's main subway station – of exercising our democratic right of learning about history and past facts, trying to understand them, fully practicing our status of citizens, and making use of such learning in the present time, for all cities are a result of the actions and omissions of their administrators and, mainly of their citizens.

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English translation – Lenora Hupsel.

Notes

- 1 When the capital of Brazil was transferred from Rio de Janeiro to Brasília by President Juscelino Kubitschek;
- 2 During the period covered by the exhibit, Brazil went through arbitrary periods in which rulers (governors and mayors) were several times appointed by those in power and not elected by popular vote.
- 3 Officially defined as "...collective dwelling, generally made up of small wooden rooms or light constructions sometimes built in back of buildings or one above the other, with porches and stairs of difficult access; without a kitchen and with or without a small patio, area or hallway; with a community bathroom and laundry room...", tenement houses were absolutely sovereign – jointly with rooming houses and inns, designations that were often confused – as the most economical alternative to low-income homes in the city of Rio de Janeiro up to the start of the 20th century;
- 4 Located at 154 Barão de São Félix Street – Downtown, and where nearly 4,000 people lived, was so called because there was a pig head made of wrought iron above its entrance. One of its owners was Count D'Eu, husband of Princess Isabel, daughter of the dethroned Emperor D. Pedro II;
- 5 There are several versions written by historians over the appearance of the first city slum. Among such versions, one made reference to the time when the Canudos Rebellion came to an end, at which time "vivandeiras" (women who escorted troops for the purpose of selling food), soldiers from other states seeking government support and assistance, and even ex-convicts lodged themselves there, strengthening an already existing and beginning occupation of the mountain's foot;
- 6 Which stood out by the construction of wide boulevards that tore through the heart of the city, once a small place, with narrow, crooked and poorly lit streets;
- 7 Thereby called, in contemporary studies, "tropical Haussmann", in reference to the baron who remodelled Paris;
- 8 Which contemplated historic references in a vast repertoire of "neo's" and not only made use of Greek, Roman, Egyptian, Persian and Gothic influences, but also of the most impressive blends among them;
- 9 The oldest access to the mountain, and which nowadays does not lead anywhere;
- 10 As the Getúlio Vargas dictatorship period was called, in which imposing works were accomplished inspired by the fascist model;
- 11 A hall where people dance the *samba*;
- 12 A restaurant with bulbous golden towers designed by architect Alfredo Burnier, built at Botafogo Beach in 1903 and torn down in the 50's;

- 13 The Municipal Market of Fifteenth of November Square was the most significant example of "iron architecture" built in Brazil. Designed by Alfredo Azevedo Marques, it was a 150 meters sideways and made up of 24 single, trapezoid pavilions, in addition to five octagonal pavilions (one central and another four at the extremities of its square layout) with two floors, totalling nearly 25,000m² of built area. Its parts were supplied by distinguished manufacturers – Hoppins Cause & Hoppins from Birmingham and Willenbrock from Brussels – and work starting in 1903;
- 14 Designed by Marcelino de Souza Aguiar (later city mayor between 1907 and 1910) to be the Pavilion of Brazil at the Saint Louis International Exhibit of 1904 (receiving the Gold Medal of Architecture), was torn down and re-built at the bottom of Central avenue in 1906 to be the seat of the Third International American Convention, and later assisted several federal bodies, mainly the Senate, being torn down at the end of the 70's;
- 15 The date of its oldest cartographic registry drawn up by João Francisco Roscio;
- 16 The systematisation of the mountain's excavation works, which had been previously started, dates back to 1952 under Dulcilio Cardoso's government. However, they only had a boost as of the creation of SRSAN (Urbanization and Sanitation Superintendence) under the Negrão de Lima's government (1956/58);
- 17 A consequence of the passion of Maria Carlota "Lota" de Macedo Soares (at the time, friends with the American poetess Elizabeth Bishop), its creator, and with the support of the first governor of the State of Guanabara, Carlos Lacerda (1960/65), the park was built by a Work Group made up by experts in the areas of urbanism, architecture, landscaping, engineering, botanic and education (Affonso Eduardo Reidy, Jorge Machado Moreira, Sergio Bernardes, Burle Marx, Berta Leitchic and Luiz Emidio de Mello Filho, among others);
- 18 Nearly 38,000 people travel through this station (Carioca) daily;

Jeffery W. Cody, *Exporting American Architecture 1870-2000*
(London: Routledge, 2003; ISBN 0-415-29915-2; pp. 205; illustrated)

As Cody notes at the beginning of his introduction, the destruction to the World Trade Center towers in 2001 was not only a terrible waste of life but an attack on the iconic symbols of American architectural modernity. Mohammed Atta, a leading plotter of the attacks, is reported to have said that 'high rise buildings had desecrated Egypt.'

Exporting American Architecture is thus a highly topical as well as an original book that assesses the role not only of American architects but also of engineers, construction companies and manufacturers in the selling and assembling of American expertise abroad. The first two chapters examine the exporting of steel-frame and concrete technologies during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Bridge-building and skyscrapers symbolised the American presence, and provided large American profits. Following the First World War, American builders engaged even more enthusiastically in major and not so large construction projects abroad, for example in Latin America and China, the subject matter of chapters three and four. Becoming 'a paradigm for progress' by the Second World War, American design and construction continued to spread across the globe. Hence subsequent chapters expand on the expansive and energetic US contribution to the architecture of war and peace from World War Two and during the Cold War (chapter 5). The Marshall Plan and US Government intervention greatly assisted the American presence in business and construction. During the 1980s the transition to a new world order continued to be characterised by American technology and its imagery: it was at the heart of the rise of 'High-Tech' era. The Cheung Kong Centre in Hong Kong, with its curtain wall, 'linen steel' and fibre optic lighting was one of many striking new buildings, as the photographs of it from both distance and close-up, demonstrate.

As this last point also demonstrates, the book is very well illustrated indeed, and many of the photographs, maps and diagrams enhance the understanding of the text, whether it is houses, bridges or commercial skyscrapers that are being discussed.

Cody's sources are diverse, including architectural, engineering and construction trade journals, from the USA and other countries. He has also lived in many of the countries that he is writing about, and this lends the book an engaging and readable quality that mediates the often formal language of planning and architectural histories. As Cody points out a number of times in the book, business-minded and construction-minded entrepreneurs was not always aware of or tuned into the nuances and differences of other cultures. Nonetheless, many countries benefited from the importing of infrastructure that the Americans brought, often more cheaply and efficiently than their competitors. The British, for example, were outbid by American businesses in late nineteenth century Africa. More generally, the export-import relationship was an active one and governments of countries that were poor or relatively affluent often actively sought American expertise.

Exporting American Architecture is an attractive and useful account of a neglected history, strongly deserving to be on the reading lists of many courses concerned with globalisation and the built environment.

Mark Clapson,
University of Westminster,
UK.

Carola HEIN, Jeffry M. DIEFENDORF and Yorifusa ISHIDA (Eds.),
Rebuilding Urban Japan after 1945
 Palgrave, Hampshire 2003, 274pp.

This book is a welcome and useful addition to the growing field of studies on Japanese planning by covering material that at up to now has only been available in Japanese. The book's main focus is on the reconstruction of Japanese cities following the Second World War. The book's 10 authors mainly look at the reasons for the successes and failures of Japanese post-War planning and some compare Japanese planning with other countries.

The first of these issues is addressed by Yorifusa Ishida, one of Japan's foremost planning historians whose works remains largely un-published in English. The author details the scale of devastation following the War and addresses the question of why, despite a history of earthquake-related destruction and rebuilding, did the effective planning of Japan's cities come so low on the central government's list of priorities. Though the scale of destruction wreaked on Japanese cities can be seen in other works (e.g. Dower's *Embracing Defeat*) Ishida juxtaposes this with details on the efforts made by Japanese planners to implement their idealistic schemes – most famously the green belt around Tokyo – and the opposition that this generated. Such opposition came from the American forces' General Headquarters but was also exacerbated by the considerable pressures of inflation, housing demand, population growth and the need for economic reconstruction. Overall, this chapter offers a much more balanced view of the apparent failure to effectively plan Japanese cities following the War than is traditionally advocated or assumed. For example, the author points out that though the ratio of successfully implemented land readjustment schemes around Tokyo was very low, the ideas that post-War reconstruction generated at the time were later taken up and incorporated in subsequent legislation. Finally, Ishida argues that the real measure of Japan's planning failure is the lack of a system to adequately represent the public interest against land-owners' rights and the demands of central government.

These conclusions subsequently occur as themes in the book's case studies. Matsumoto for example, looks at the reconstruction of Nagaoka, a small provincial city. He points out how the reconstruction was dominated by short-term goals which came at the expense of long-term objectives and the suggestions of the community's

own locally-based planners. In a detailed account of Hiroshima's reconstruction, Ishimaru highlights the role of Tange Kenzo's architecture to create a peace memorial park. However, though this reconstruction was successfully implemented, it failed to resolve the conflict between the public interest and the private land-owners rights which remain a problem to this day.

Other authors focus on the way that Japanese planning achieved successes through two case studies, noting the exceptional circumstances under which this was possible. Ishikawa looks at the reconstruction of Kabuki-cho near Shinjuku in Tokyo. He highlights the role of a triumvirate of visionary developer, entrepreneur and local government in implementing the plan. Such a triumvirate had been important in reconstructing other parts of Tokyo, such as Ginza and Asakusa and allowed the schemes to prevail at a time when Tokyo's War Damage Rehabilitation plan was being scaled-back. Tucker on the other hand, shows the considerable success that Japanese planners had in planning colonial cities during the pre-War era. This case shows the planners learnt a great deal from their experiments in the colonies but that this success was related to the suppression of land-owners' rights.

The second issue that the book addresses is comparing Japan and other countries. Hasegawa looks at the efforts of Osaka's planners to implement much-needed improvements to harbour infrastructure and designate urban parks in the face of opposition from local citizens and upper levels of government. He first points out a principal similarity between the UK and Japan, that the governments put pressure in both countries to curtail city planning. However, Hasegawa highlights important differences in both cases that led to a relatively successful reconstruction in the case of the UK. In the UK, though central-local battles existed, it could by no means be assumed that the demands of central government would subsume those of the local planners and their communities. This was not the case with Japan.

Diefendorf highlights the different challenges that Germany and Japan faced at the end of the War. The author here notes the important role of the local planners in allowing the reconstruction to go ahead. In Japan on the other hand, this local interest was

subsumed as part of the central government's overall aim. Additionally the author shows how Germany and Japan differed to the extent to which they were prepared for the reconstruction, the pressures caused by population growth and the differing extent to which aesthetics were considered in the reconstruction. Hein also considers this difference and places the wartime reconstruction in the context of the present-day Japanese city. She points out how the rush to modernise Japanese cities has had just as much effect on the form of cities as the American bombs – as can be seen in the case of Kyoto.

Some of the author's writing styles can make reading a little difficult at times and a knowledge of Japanese planning is required before tackling some chapters. This is mitigated by the inclusion of a glossary and the book's main overall strength, which is to juxtapose of a wide-range of issues related to the development of Japanese cities. In particular, it is likely to remain required reading for any researcher or student wishing to reach a deeper understanding of Japanese planning.

Marco Amati
University of Tsukuba
Japan

**Peter J. Larkham,
New Suburbs and Postwar Reconstruction: The Fate of Charles Reilly's 'Greens'**

Faculty of the Built Environment, School of Planning and Housing,
University of Central England, Working Paper Series, No. 89, 2004

Abstract

'Of the production of the numerous "reconstruction plans" that appeared in wartime and postwar Britain, many explicitly proposed substantial restructuring of residential areas and the creation of new ones, either as slum clearance operations, reconstruction of bomb-damaged areas, or to house growing populations. Yet many of these grandiose proposals were never developed.

One of the most striking visions for such areas was that of Professor Sir Charles Reilly, originally in response to the Borough Engineer's proposals for an area in Birkenhead. Reilly developed the idea of small communal 'greens'. The idea was widely publicised in a book that made much of the possibilities of communal facilities and living, and in turn this was

seized upon by the Town Clerk of Bilston. Reilly was employed as a consultant, and suggested former students and friends to design several of these estates. The Town Clerk moved to Dudley, and again Reilly's ideas were put into practice.

Yet virtually none of these estates were built as Reilly intended. The Ministry of Health exerted exceptionally tight control over finance and design, local conditions were not ideal, there was some local resistance, and the movement of the Town Clerk on two occasions appears to have led to a decline in priority. After Reilly's death in 1948 little more was heard of these radically innovative designs; the estates that were built did not have the communal facilities and have since lost their unique characteristics, and many have become problem estates.

**Edited by Peter Larkham and Joe Nasr,
The Rebuilding of British Cities: Exploring the
Post Second World War Reconstruction**

Faculty of the Built Environment, School of Planning and Housing,
University of Central England, Working Paper Series, No. 90, 2004

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PLANNING HISTORY

BULLETIN OF THE INTERNATIONAL PLANNING HISTORY SOCIETY

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The prime aim of *Planning History* is to increase awareness of developments and ideas in planning history in all parts of the world. In pursuit of this, contributions (in English) are invited from members and non-members of the International Planning History Society alike, for any section of *Planning History*. Non-native English speakers should not be concerned if their English is not perfect. The Editor will be happy to help improve its readability and comprehension, but unfortunately neither he nor the Society can undertake translations.

Contributors should supply one copy of their text, clearly printed, in double spacing and with generous margins. Do not supply copy already in column format. A disk copy is also encouraged, which should be in Word Perfect or Word for PC if possible. Illustrations should be clear black and white photographs with good contrast (it is rarely possible to print satisfactorily from colour transparencies or photocopies) or good quality line drawings. Contributors are responsible for securing any necessary copyright permissions to reproduce illustrations, and to ensure adequate acknowledgement. Captions should be printed double-spaced on a separate page.

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All articles are refereed. Two hard copies should be sent to the editor, in addition to one in electronic form, either as attachment to email, or on a disc. These should be in the range of 2,500 - 4,000 words. They may be on any topic within the general remit of the IPHS and may well reflect work in progress. Articles should normally be referenced with superscript numbers and endnotes. Refer to recent issues for guidance on referencing and text style.

OTHER CONTRIBUTIONS

Other types of contribution are also very welcome. Research reports should not be of more than 2,000 words. They need not be referenced, but any relevant publications should be listed at the end, in the standard format. Illustrations, where provided, should conform to the above notes. Similar short pieces on important source materials, aspects of planning history practice (e.g. conservation) are also encouraged.

Notices of relevant publications from publishers' publicity material are useful; and full publication reviews (700 - 1,000 words) are encouraged. Abstracts of relevant journal papers, particularly those originally published in a language other than English, are requested.

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These are welcome from any part of the world. Organisers of events should, however, bear in mind that *Planning History* is only published three times per year; normally in April, August and December. Please try to ensure that Calls for Papers etc. are notified to the Editor in sufficient time for inclusion. Later inserts are possible at the time of despatch. Sufficient copies, folded as required, must be supplied by the event organiser. Nothing larger than a single A4 sheet will normally be accepted. Every effort will be made to include such inserted news material without cost. However, the Editor reserves the right to make a charge for such material at normal advertising rates.

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- invites national organisations, whose work is relevant to IPHS, to affiliate status;
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PRESIDENT

Dr Robert Freestone
Planning and Urban Development Program
Faculty of the Built Environment
University of New South Wales
Sydney NSW 2052
Australia

Tel: 02 9385 4836
Fax: 02 9901 4505

E-mail: R.Freestone@unsw.edu.au

EDITOR OF PLANNING HISTORY

Dr Mark Clapson
6 Forrabury Avenue
Bradwell Common
Milton Keynes
MK13 8NG
UK

Tel: 01908 668548

E-mail: mjciphs@aol.com

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