ISSN 0267-0542

Planning
History
Bulletin

PHB

1985 Volume 7 Number 2



Planning History Group

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CHAIRMAN'S COMMUNICATION

In the normal way of things at this time of the year I should be calling for nominations for the Executive 1985/86, and holding an election for those to serve for the next two years. Usually I make the announcement in the first number of PHB, coming out at the end of March, though the second number (July) is not impossible.

In recent years I have found that it has not been all that easy to persuade people to put their names forward; last year indeed there was no election because the number of those standing was exactly equal to the number of places available. Another experience has been that the business of transmitting voting slips via PHB is messy, while the return of slips by post from an international membership is always likely to be rather slender. A further frailty of the system is that many candidates are clearly not known to each other.

I am of course firmly of the view that an Executive is necessary. At the very least it is responsible for the proper use of Group members' annual subscriptions. The Executive holds meetings, arranges conferences, publishes a Bulletin, all on behalf of others. Someone has to be accountable for all this, and to have people elected by ballot is the right way of doing things.

The Executive has considered however whether it actually needs annual elections. It has concluded that with a new Editor, Treasurer and Meetings' Secretary only just in post, the present Executive should run for a further year, with the next election held in the summer of 1986.

The Constitution requires an annual election, and the Executive Committee is conscious that it is overriding it. But the Constitution was drawn up in 1980 at a time when regular international meetings were thought likely and when necessary adjustments to formal practices could be made without much difficulty. In fact meetings have not been frequent and the Executive has functioned by post (reasonably effectively I hope you will agree). In the circumstances I trust members will understand the decision of the Executive to perpetuate its life by one further year, prior to any further decision as to whether it should revert to a one year cycle or adopt a two-year model. There will be a Day Seminar of the PHG on 19 October; I will call an Executive Committee for that day and I will hope to take soundings of ordinary members attending. There will therefore be another announcement on this matter.

Meanwhile, enjoy your Bulletin and keep your material flowing into the Editor. Enquiries about the Group and its activities provide me with a full post box, so I know that PHB is constantly penetrating new readership territory.

Gordon E. Cherry

EDITORIAL

Daniel Schaffer and I have been giving some thought to themes of interest to the membership to be featured in forthcoming Bulletins. The next issue, as already announced, has a group of articles on historicism in contemporary urban design. Spring 1986 will focus on planning history in the curriculum, Summer 1986 on new towns and autumn 1986, all being well, on government intervention in urban affairs during an era of conservatism: the 1920s. We shall be soliciting articles but also look forward to getting offers of contributions around these themes, as well as the general stream of submissions which remains quite healthy.

Returning to the present, this summer Bulletin contains two welcomely fresh contributions on those endlessly-cited milestones of British planning history, the Barlow and Scott Reports. Sir Basil ENGHOLM was Secretary to the Scott Committee and provides an interesting participant memoir on its genesis and deliberations. Wayne PARSONS' paper sharply challenges some of the traditional wisdoms of planning historiography on the seminal importance of the Barlow Commission. A second brace of articles, by Elizabeth BLOOMFIELD and Stephen WARD, explores the early history in Canada and Britain of what is now in both countries, the only growth area in contemporary planning practice: old-style boosterism, now reincarnated as "local economic initiatives". To round off the Bulletin, Mark SWENARTON reexamines another received wisdom - Unwin's influence on Sellier - and so indeed does Donald LANGMEAD, whose paper queries the credentials of Colonel Light to be considered founder of the City of Adelaide.

The **Research Report** feature seems to have proved its worth and we continue the series in this issue with - among others - a wideranging review of developments in Japan by Shunichi WATANABE, the moving spirit behind the Japanese Planning History Group's growing membership and vigorous programme of meetings. To him and other contributors, all thanks. To other members there's a warm invitation to report on your research in forthcoming issues.

Lastly, a word of real gratitude to Jacky Jennings without whose administrative effort and skill with an often recalcitrant word-processing machine, this Bulletin would never see the light of day.

Michael Hebbert

NOTICES

CONSTRUCTION HISTORY

The Construction History Group announced the publication of the first issue of the new journal Construction History. The journal deals with 'the study of all aspects of the history of building and construction, including economic, technical, organisational, etc., as well as studies of individual firms and unions'. Contents of the first issue include Summerson on construction history, Trowell on architects and speculative housing in 19th century Leeds, and Cooney on innovation in building since 1945. The second issue will include Calabi on 15th century Venice, Yeomans on early carpenters' manuals and Rodger on 19th century Scottish builders. The journal also includes abstracts of periodical literature and book reviews; it is published annually and edited by Mark Swenarton.

The Construction History Group, founded in 1982, holds seminars and other events and also publishes a quarterly newsletter. Annual membership including a copy of the journal, is £7.00. Details from Peter Harlow, Chartered Institute of Building, Englemere, Kings Ride, Ascot, Berks SL5 8BJ.

THE COMPANY HISTORY

Thursday 12th September 1985, 4th Annual Seminar of the Construction History Group, at John Laing plc, Page Street, Mill Hill, London NW7 2ER.

The seminar is intended to explore the company history to establish its value, its application and its production. The emphasis is placed on the experience of John Laing plc but it is hoped that it will provide an example of what might be done and thereby act as a spur to other building firms.

Enquiries to Peter Harlow, Construction History Group, Chartered Institute of Building, Englemere, King's Ride, Ascot, Berkshire SL5 8BJ.

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ON THE MARGINS: MARGINAL SPACE AND MARGINAL ECONOMIES

Saturday 19th October, 1985: A Planning History Group Day Seminar at the London School of Economics (Room A506), Houghton Street, London WC1.

The theme of the seminar - that of marginal development - is one that has not previously been centrally-addressed by the PHG. And yet what happens on the margins often has an important bearing on more conventional developments.

The idea of a day seminar on this theme was prompted by the publication of several recent books on marginal developments, each with an historical theme - Alan Gilbert's (with Peter Ward) Housing, the State and the Poor, Tony King's The Bungalow, Ray Pahl's Division of Labour and Colin Ward's (with Dennis Hardy) Arcadia for All. Their interests range over the spatial aspects of marginal development as well as marginal economies and lifestyles. Examples are drawn from the Third World as well as Britain.

Each of the authors has agreed to present a paper, and details are included on the booking form which is inserted in this edition. For more details about the seminar please contact Dennis Hardy on 01-804-8131, or write to Middlesex Polytechnic, Queensway, Enfield, Middlesex EN3 4SF.

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THE INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP ON HERITAGE AND CONSERVATION
JERUSALEM AS A LABORATORY

Sunday March 16th to Thursday March 20th 1986, at the Laromme Hotel, Jerusalem, Israel.

The Conference is to be held under the joint auspices of the City of Jerusalem and the Conservation Foundation, Washington DC. Each day's proceedings will combine Plenary and Workshop sessions around a wide variety of themes related to conservation of both the historic building fabric and the natural environment.

The call for papers invites abstracts of relevant recent work together with that of the proposed paper to be sent to the Conference Organizers by October 31st 1985.

All enquiries to the Conference Organizers, Atzeret Ltd., 29b Keren Hayesod St., PO Box 3888, Jerusalem 91037, Israel.

REPORTS OF MEETINGS

Housing Policies in the Eighties: choices and outcomes. Conference at the College of Architecture and Urban Studies, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Alexandria, Virginia, U.S.A., 17 and 18 May, 1985.

In 1949 the United States Congress established as the National Housing Goal "a decent home and suitable living environment for every American family". Thirty-five years later the nation remains unable to achieve that goal. Significant segments of the American population do not enjoy a decent home or a suitable living environment, defined by contemporary standards. The housing units they can afford to occupy are often either substandard or unsuited to their economic or social circumstances. And, increasingly, affordability itself is becoming the central housing problem in the United States.

On May 17 and 18 of this year, Virginia Polytechnic Institute's College of Architecture and Urban Studies and the Institute for Policy Studies co-sponsored a conference designed to encourage frank debate among housing experts from a variety of disciplines and political perspectives regarding the need for, possible design of, and likely consequences of new policy initiatives which might allow greater progress towards the goal set forth in the 1949 legislation. The fourteen papers, formal comments by discussants, and audience discussions revealed significant variation in the assessments offered of existing policies and in the proposals offered regarding how to improve the national effort to meet the nation's housing needs.[1]

Housing policies in the United States have traditionally reflected a strong bias towards homeownership, rooted in turn in the historic importance of the notion of property in American life. As documented by a number of historians, throughout the nation's early history the rights and status of citizens depended largely upon their control of property.[2] It was assumed that control of property was linked to the ability to be independent and productive members of a successful democracy. Over time the link between property ownership and political rights was weakened and, at least in theory, disappeared. Nevertheless the link between property ownership and socio-economic status has remained central to American life even to the present.[3] As noted by Peter MARCUSE, that link has remained strong, even as the possibility for ownership of productive property has become increasingly limited for most individuals.[4] In the age of urban industrialism, homeownership has become the symbolic substitute for ownership and control over productive property.

As noted by J.A. AGNEW, homeownership in the United States seems to play a particularly critical role in the process by which individuals incorporate themselves into the prevailing social order.[5] For Americans, homeownership does not simply function as a symbol of social incorporation, but serves to define incorporation. Homeownership not only affords individuals the opportunity to distinguish themselves from non-homeowners, it also provides a mechanism by which different groups of homeowners can establish their relative position in society. Homeowners are constantly seeking larger and better housing units. The result is the housing chain, made up of a series of transactions, each of which yields enhanced status for the individuals who acquire new housing and economic gains. Institutions that facilitate the process also benefit. What has been produced is a situation in which, as noted by Sternlieb and others, owner occupied housing is, typically, the average family's major and often its sole repository of significant personal capital.[6] Individuals become keenly aware of their stake in the health of the nation's mainstream housing market. As a result, there has been little significant resistance to state policies which favor the production of owner

occupied housing over other types of housing units.

Recently, we have seen changes in homeownership patterns and problems in the U.S. For perhaps the first time there has been a dip, albeit a slight one, in the homeownership rate, from 65.6 percent in 1982 to 64.4 percent in 1983.[7] The rate of mortgage delinquency--owners 30 days or more in arrears--was 6.1 percent nationally in the first quarter of 1985, the highest rate recorded by the Mortgage Bankers Association since it began keeping records in 1953.[8] Rapidly increasing mortgage interest rates and housing prices are placing homeownership beyond the reach of more and more American households, particularly newly formed ones. For millions of others, homeownership is a tenuous proposition, attained only by devoting far larger proportions of their income to ownership payments than has traditionally been expected or demanded. The level payment, fixed interest rate mortgage, introduced in the 1930's to combat foreclosures and enhance the possibility of home purchases by lower middle income and working class households, is being supplanted by variable rate mortgage instruments, which shift the burden of inflation from lender to borrower and increase the probability of mortgage delinquency and foreclosure. As described in the conference paper by Ann MAYERSON of New York University, recent moves to deregulate the banking system may in fact make it more difficult to produce and purchase moderately priced housing units.

The underlying context for the conference, then, was the array of problems faced by current and potential homeowners at the lower end of the market and by the one-third of the nation's households that, by choice or necessity, rent their living quarters.

One group of conference papers focused on several constituencies who, despite an expanding homeowner market, continue to be unable to obtain housing that meets their needs. Eugenie BIRCH of Hunter College, addressed the situation of female headed households, focusing primarily on the income constraints of that group. The need for additional initiatives in the area of fair housing in order to address the problems of minority households was discussed by Philip CLAY of MIT. In a paper by Ann SCHNARE of the Urban Institute and Sandra NEWMAN of John Hopkins University, the relationship between public assistance and housing assistance programs was considered in terms of the equity and effectiveness of the subsidies produced. The authors concluded that the complement of subsidy programs in many cases failed on both dimensions, yielding a situation in which many families receiving one or both subsidies remain unable to obtain housing that would be judged as adequate based on local standards.

Michael STONE of the University of Massachusetts, Boston focused on the issue of shelter poverty, a concept that builds on the premise that, if a suitable living environment is our national goal, it is certainly implied that a measure of affordability, related to family size and income, must be included in any assessment of the suitability of housing. Stone presented data illustrating his concept of "shelter poverty"--households who cannot afford both non-shelter basics, as defined and quantified by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and a fixed, arbitrary percentage of income for housing. Stone's argument was complemented by that of Peter MARCUSE of Columbia, who criticized our tendency to use the term 'special need' to refer to the needs of constituencies not adequately served by the housing market. He pointed out that while there are constituencies who have significant special housing requirements, which require specific and specialized responses, there has been an historic tendency to use that label to identify any group whose needs are not being met by the mainstream market. Marcuse addressed the oppressiveness of this labeling process: having been defined as a special group, the various special groups are effectively excluded from access to benefits available to the population at large.

Another set of papers addressed the question of the difficulties of evaluating the outcomes of existing housing programs. Papers by John WEICHER, of the American Enterprise Institute and William APGAR of the MIT Harvard Joint Center for Urban Studies, and comments by Anthony YEZER of George Washington University and George STERNLIEB of Rutgers University focused on the difficulty of establishing housing standards which are both sensitive to contemporary, and thus dynamic, notions of what constitutes adequate housing and also are useful as concrete guidelines for public policy. While there was consensus that data available for analyzing housing needs and national progress towards meeting those needs are inadequate. Weicher stressed that changing expectations regarding national policy objectives make the task of defining need and reaching objectives almost impossible. Participants in the discussions on this issue tended to fall into one of two groups: those who stressed the progress that has been made since the federal government became directly involved in the provision of housing and those who focused on the constituencies who housing needs, relative to prevailing standards, remain unmet.

A final set of conference papers reflected the authors' willingness to challenge the underlying premises of the housing market and traditional government housing policies. They shared the objective of encouraging the production of adequate numbers of decent housing units to which low income households would have access. Rachel BRATT of Tufts University argued for a federal policy to encourage increased numbers of community-based nonprofit housing organizations to produce the kind of housing needed by lower income households. The model she proposed is based on the system developed by the state of Massachusetts to encourage and support such organizations within the state. Dennis KEATING of Cleveland State University argued for more extensive use by localities of linkage strategies, by which private developers must, as a condition of being allowed to develop commercial properties, agree to produce or subsidize the production of needed housing units. Michael STEGMAN of the University of North Carolina assessed the relative efficiency of federal tax expenditure subsidies in producing different types of moderate-priced multi-family housing units, i.e., owner occupied condominium or co-operatives and rental units. He concluded: if we limit our analysis to housing for low income families, it becomes clear that, "from a tax subsidy standpoint, low-income housing cooperatives are less costly than housing built for rental occupany." Thus, while developers may be willing to produce either if equal subsidies are available, the public and the federal government should target subsidies where they will yield the greatest impact. Emily ACHTENBERG a Boston consultant, proposed a new strategy expanding the existing pool of nonprofit subsidized housing: that the federal government use subsidies and tax incentives/disincentives to encourage the conversion of existing for-profit subsidized rental units to nonprofit socially owned units. She specifically addressed the tendency, abetted by the demand for and subsidies to owner occupied units, to convert already scarce rental units to owner occupied condominiums and co-ops, to which previous tenants generally do not have access.

Finally, a paper by Richard APPELBAUM of the University of California, Santa Barbara called for a program to encourage development of a third sector of the housing market, as an alternative to the traditional homeowner and rental sectors. The program would be designed to separate out the shelter, and perhaps the status, value of housing from its speculative or investment value. Appelbaum proposed government capital grants for construction and rehabilitation as a substitute for its current mortgage credits, arguing that the result could be a two-thirds reduction in monthly housing costs for residents, who would then pay only for ongoing maintenance and occupancy expenses. Applebaum's proposal, developed by national task force, also would

allow individual home-owners facing foreclosure essentially to deed over their unit's speculative value to a public or non-profit organization responsible for maintaining the unit and making it available, at an affordable cost, to successive households. Discussions stemming from these proposals focused largely on issues relating to their feasibility on a significant scale, given the constraints imposed by the market and existing national policies.

While the papers presented at the conference and the discussions did not yield a consensus regarding the most appropriate strategy by which the federal government might address the nation's unmet housing needs, it did produce a heightened sensitivity to the scope of those needs, the difficulties faced in documenting them, the severity of institutionalized barriers to addressing them, and the variety of experiments and proposals available as alternatives to existing policies.

1. A complete listing of conference participants and paper titles is available from either of the authors.
2. See, for example, C. Williamson, American Suffrage from Property to Democracy 1760-1860 (Princeton, N.J., 1960) and R. Hofstader, Social Darwinism in American Thought (New York, 1973.)
3. See A. Heskin, Tenants and the American Dream, (New York, 1983), chapter 1, for an excellent discussion of this issue.
4. P. Marcuse, "The Ideologies of Ownership and Property Rights," chapter 5, in R. Plunz, Housing Form and Public Policy in the United States (New York, 1980.
5. J.A. Agnew, "Homeownership and the Capitalist Social Order", in M. Dear and A. Scott, Urbanization and Urban Planning in Capitalist Society (London, 1981).
6. G. Sternlieb, "Death of the American Dream House," in Society 9,4 (1972)
7. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Press Release CB-84-86, April 30, 1984.
8. P. Kilborn, "Delinquent Mortgages Set Record," New York Times, June 25, 1985.

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Post-War Housing Estates, Humanising the Legacy. An Urban Design Group Conference held at the Polytechnic of Central London, 20 June, 1985.

This year's Conference of the recently formed Urban Design Group tackled an issue of growing concern among the environmental professions; the legacy of the post-war housing estates and the environmental and social problems which they present. All present recognised that there is a crisis in urban housing conditions. Ted CANTLE (Under-Secretary, Housing and Public Works, Association of Metropolitan Authorities) calculated that in excess of £20 billion is needed merely to put right existing defects and bring the country's stock up to reasonable standards. This at a time when only £1 billion is available each year for housing renovation work. Not only are we not able to improve our housing stock, we are not able to keep pace with the constant deterioration. And at the sharp end of this crisis are the post-war public housing estates, most of non-traditional design and construction, poorly conceived and maintained and creating not only substandard houses but substandard residential environments.

It would have been very easy to have spent the day on attributing blame for the appalling design decisions made in the 60s and 70s. The aim was rather to discuss approaches to the problems of today; to learn from the experience of

others in the front line; and, hopefully, to take away some new ideas.

Ted CANTLE set the issue in its policy context. Having heard the different political approaches of Cllr. Duncan HAWKINS (Chair of Housing, London Borough of Wandsworth) and Cllr. Nick SNOW (chair of Housing, London Borough of Southwark) it was becoming obvious that post-war estates were facing not one but three crises - Resources; Management; and Design and Maintenance. Obviously problems would be more easily tackled if more resources were available; but, as Nick SNOW pointed out, "Humanising the Legacy is not just about solving technical problems. We can't afford to solve them all and our tenants can't wait much longer". Even if he could sign blank cheques, available resources need to be channeled in the right direction.

This is dependent on the right management approach. All the participants emphasised the need for close tenant involvement in the design and implementation of improvement works to their estates, though the degree of involvement varied greatly. Southwark and Glasgow offered two different concepts: the former retained municipal control but involved tenants groups in decision-making from planting schemes to the Housing Investment Programme bid. Paul MUGNAIONI (Director of Housing, Glasgow) on the other hand described how ownership was being transferred to tenants cooperatives who, with the advice of the Council, were solving their own management problems, commissioning their own architects to design and implement improvements, and feeling a greater sense of control over their destiny as a result.

But design and maintenance remain the thorniest problems, the primary source of the crisis. Tony SHOULTS (Director of Housing, London Borough of Hackney) said that, "Good management", (and by inference, adequate resources), "is not a cure for bad buildings". The Conference was in general agreement that, where all else fails, redevelopment is the only option. However, warnings were raised about another rash of 'demolition fever'. Dynamite may relieve the symptoms, but it is no cure for the disease. And the scale of the problem is too great for this to be a realistic solution in the current economic climate. In all but the worst cases, sound-proofing, internal and external reorganisation of space, and measures to soften brutal environments are the only solution. 'Decapitation', new pitched roofs, gardens, new housing and tenant mixes, controlled access; all in harness with improved management, and tenant control over their own futures to relieve their despair. Alan GLADWIN (Managing Director, Barratt Urban Renewal (Northern Ltd.) painted a somewhat brighter picture, describing approaches to physical and administrative improvements in the private sector which could be applied in the public. He saw a clear need for greater private/public cooperation.

In summing up, John KERNAGHAM (Director of the Society for Cooperative Dwellings and former Chair of Housing, Glasgow), the Conference Chair, identified four pointers for the future. The need to establish who is the true client and what are their needs. The need to recognise that cuts in public expenditure can foster innovation. The need to exploit the positive role of private investment and to diversify tenure. And the need to encourage tenant participation and community development by providing the tenants' movement with a sound funding base to allow them to take control of their futures. Only then can the housing environments created by inadequate and ill-conceived designs be more adequate humanised.

Lawrence REVILL,
Planner/Urban Designer with the
London Borough of Islington, and Committee Member
of the Urban Design Group.

Interwar Council Housing. Day Seminar at Oxford Polytechnic, 21 June, 1985.

The usual PHG Spring meeting was replaced this year by a seminar on interwar council housing, held jointly with Oxford polytechnic and organised by Richard HAYWARD and Stephen WARD. Despite being held at a busy time in the summer term, the meeting succeeded in bringing together a company of about 30 including academics, mostly with established interests in housing history, and participants from local government, concerned with housing as their daily jobs.

Martin DAUNTON (UCL) opened with a paper on 'The Council as Landlord: local consequences of public intervention in the housing market 1919-1939'. A whiggish assumption that council housing was the inevitable outcome of the failure of 19th century philanthropic efforts was now thrown into question by the present government's attitude to public sector housing. Comparative studies only complicate the problem: in Germany and France for example, local authority provision had never been considered a serious option, Britain seems to be peculiar. So why council housing? Three other explanations were outlined.

The first had its roots before 1914, in the nature of the property cycle, when the Edwardian slump was realised to be a permanent structural crisis, killing off the private rented market. Paradoxically, conservatives were the first to propose subsidised council housing; the other parties were suspicious, liberals seeing it as an attempt to avoid land taxation, while labour sought sufficient wages rather than cheap housing.

A second explanation seeks to show the supply of state housing as a result of popular political pressure. The crisis in the property market was a crisis in the relationship between landlord and tenant. In Scotland before the war, the 'missive question' - the arrangement by which rented housing was contracted for, annually, from a single day in May - had come to a head. Pressure for change had thus politicised the housing question before war-time housing shortages and the rent strikes on Clydeside, when government was forced to control the cost of housing, and thence obliged inevitably to intervene in its supply.

Lastly is the explanation of housing as an antidote to revolution, to stabilise the post-war political crisis. Once provided, council housing demonstrated that the good life was attainable without changing the social structure, and once provided it could change. Local agencies were changed, by new responsibilities and a new beaurocracy, and political perceptions of council housing could change. Labour moved from suspicion to support of state welfare perhaps by the realisation that they could control the state, as Pat THANE has suggested, but why weren't unions or co-ops or housing associations building houses, as was happening elsewhere in Europe?

Of course the three explanations are not mutually exclusive, and (a point made in DAUNTON's paper, not taken up in discussion) the provision of mass housing is a slow and cumbersome process, not really appropriate as a palliative to resolve crisis.

But what was council housing for? Implementation, and perceptions, differed in different areas. As an instrument of income redistribution in conjunction with rent control, council housing imposed local effects, in rates and rents, that were quickly felt, sometimes with immediate electoral consequences, as in Leeds, where better-off council tenants allied with the conservatives to

defeat labour in 1935.

Estate management policy was an area of wide contrasts. To what extent did practice, including selection of tenants, derive from the private rented sector, or from the Octavia Hill tradition? If there is a distinct public sector management policy, where did it come from? Opportunities for comparative local studies abound from such questions.

Simon PEPPER (Liverpool University) spoke next on 'Housing standards and the standard house'. Council housing is generally assumed to produce standar dised dwellings and the relationship of costs to standards has ensured that minimum and maximum standards are never far apart. In early days of council housing large and experienced authorities, like the LCC and Liverpool could negotiate with government on equal terms, and produce a variety of local solutions. Tudor Walters proposed 'simplified principles', the rectangular envelope, prescribing municipal neo-georgian, but space standards and layout standards were high in the post-1919 estates.

Achievement of a general improvement in housing standards by such provision depended on acceptance of filtering theory, but market targets and standards changed, to reach their lowest point in the 1930s.

The LCC did differ from government during the interwar years, first in identifying a need for small dwellings. The 'A class' cottage, with narrow frontage and bath in kitchen, contrasted with the wide-fronted Tudor Walters approach, though there were exceptions, such as the 'blue ribbon' estate at Roehampton, with 50% parlour cottages. Response to the 1934 Act was closer to the government line, though two and three bedroom cottages were often overcrowded and had bathrooms downstairs.

But LCC was still pursuing policies of its own, particularly on flats, which formed 50% of its production in the 1930s. Besides 'normal' provision, with 725 square feet average floor area, 'simplified' and 'modified' designs were employed, not self-contained and with shared bathrooms, at lower rents; designs that were never published. The eventual effect of ministry pressure was to standardise these products, by reducing 'normal' floor areas to 700 square feet, and enforcing provision of a separate bathroom.

Still the pattern of LCC housing was characterised by variety in the 1930s. Becontree was planned for a population of 120,000, and was to include private housing. The moderates favoured mixed development: labour abolished the lowest standards, but retained that policy. The message - a further requirement for comparative studies - was to look at the whole stock, to get to the thinking behind policy.

Di BLIGH (LB Greenwich) spoke from the standpoint of an estate manager, in a paper based on management and historical research on the White Hart Lane estate, developed by the LCC from 1901 to the later 1920s. 'It was lovely here then, just like living in the country' indicated the expected recollections of early settlers in an out-of-town garden suburb, but deeper investigation had revealed less simple and less happy images.

A paper depending so largely on recorded oral history is not easy to summarise, but the tokens of extreme respectability, hardly paid for and maintained by the early occupants of these tiny houses, indicated the obstacles to assimilation that faced relocated east-enders, when eventually the estate began to accommodate families in serious housing need. DI BLIGH's work will take the study of interwar rehousing neglected since the pioneer work at Bristol and Becontree, a great way further, and already demolishes the cosy notion of community, much traded by protagonists of patterns of post-war

housing.

David LEVITT (Levitt Bernstein Associates), an architect experienced in renovation of older housing, also concentrated his attention on the LCC's early building, discussing the difficulty of maintaining the architectural integrity of the early garden estates, in the face of aggressive improvement by home-owners.

The greater part of his illustrated talk concerned experience with higher density walk-up flats from the interwar slum clearance era. These will present a recurring problem, even with the highest improvement investment being not willingly accepted by tenants and still hard to manage. Disposal through private sales, as at 'Battersea Village' in Wandsworth seems to this reporter to illustrate the desperation of housing need in London today, rather than hope of its resolution.

Ian BENTLEY (Oxford Polytechnic) in 'Experiences of the good life' provided a provocative interpretation of interwar housing in terms of collective and individual expression as exemplified in public and private sector suburban development. Deriving from the Unwin model there was a convergence of council and spec-built housing between the wars, and curiously a cross-over, when the private builder took over the garden suburb architectural vocabulary but rejected the collective organisation of open space. It is that aspect of the debate that is thought-provoking, rather than the 'design' bit: open space has been regarded as a good in itself, never properly evaluated. A performance specification for the housing environment is an urgent need.

Discussion suggested new and urgent lines for investigation: interwar housing in its economic context, supporting industrial needs and demanding variation in residential qualifications, suggesting a perceived role for 'state' housing'; why the enthusiasm for slum clearance? - to be explained perhaps by concern about loss of ratable value in a decaying stock as much by concern for its residents; the effect on the construction industry of councils as large-scale clients; whether collective living, shared housekeeping, child care and communal life generally was promoted or discouraged by the new housing, and whose housing is public housing anyway?

A proposal for a housing history network, in a letter from Professor John BURNETT, was supported by the meeting. The idea is to bring together various groups, working on housing of various periods, in Britain and perhaps in Europe and abroad. Anyone interested should write to Stephen WARD, Department of Town Planning, Oxford Polytechnic, Oxford OX3 0BP.

A full report of the seminar is to be published as a Working Paper by the Department of Town Planning, Oxford Polytechnic.

David Whitham
London Borough of Haringey.

RECENT AND FORTHCOMING PUBLICATIONS

Fellow members! The Bulletin provides prompt world wide publicity for your books and papers in the field of planning history. We distribute blurbs at modest cost and carry abstracts or short reviews. But authors and publishers do sometimes forget to let us know of work recently published and in the pipeline. Keep us informed!

SPECIAL ISSUE OF AMERICAN QUARTERLY

Zane Miller, Professor of History at the University of Cincinnati and Co-Director of its Center for Neighbourhood and Community Studies, has edited the forthcoming special issue of American Quarterly on the theme of "Cities and Suburbs" with the following contributions:-

Alan I. MARCUS (Iowa State University) "The City as Social System: The Importance of Ideas"
Kathleen D. MCCARTHY (Metropolitan Life Foundation) "Creating the American Athens: Cities, Cultural Institutions and the Arts, 1840-1930".
Carol O'CONNOR (Utah State University) "Sorting Out the Suburbs: Patterns of Land Use, Class, and Culture".
Patricia Mooney MELVIN (University of Arkansas at Little Rock) "Changing Contexts: Neighborhood Definition and Urban Organization"
Michael H. EBNER (Lake Forest College) "Re-Reading Suburban America: Urban Population Deconcentration, 1810-1980"
Carl X. ABBOTT (Portland State University) "Frontiers and Sections; Cities and Regions in American Growth".
Jon C. TEAFORD (Purdue University) "New Life for an Old Subject: Investigating the Structure of Urban Rule"
Robert DYKSTRA (State University of New York at Albany) and William SILGA (State Historical Society of Iowa) "Doing Local History: Monographic Approaches to the Smaller Community".

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Alice Coleman (1985) Utopia on trial. Vision and reality in planned housing. London, Hilary Shipman, 219 pp., £16.00 (hardback) and £7.95 (paperback), ISBN 0 948096 00 4 and 0 948096 01 2.

One of the great post-war visions in Britain was of an ideal housing environment. The reality has been less than ideal. Drawing on the research of the Land Use Research Unit at King's College, London, the author and the Design Disadvantagement Team of the Unit attempt to identify links between social malaise and the design and layout of postwar housing estates in urban Britain, and put forward proposals for their improvement.

J.B. Cullingworth, Town and Country Planning in Britain, Ninth Edition , George Allen & Unwin, 1985, pp.447. Cloth £18.00, paper £9.95.

This well known volume, first appearing in 1964, went through a substantial revision in 1980, at the time of the eighth edition. The new edition introduces a new lengthy appendix dealing with the issues of the early 80s. As Cullingworth admits, the confines of 'town and country planning' have become indefinable, and so we are taken even in the appendix, from such matters as local government reorganisation, to public transport, the statutory planning system, mobile homes, regional reports, pollution, land registers, enterprise zones, old housing and to the Inspectorate.

But the catholic embrace is compelling. As a handy compendium of the course of

post war planning it is a remarkable tour de force, an invaluable reference guide. The Bibliography of Official Publications is comprehensive, while the references and guides to further reading at the end of each chapter are marvellously full. The text is as pithy as ever and provides a very compact, single source of information.

George Gordon (editor)(1985), Perspectives of the Scottish city. Aberdeen University Press, 314 pp. £17.50 ISBN 0 08 030371 4.

The nine contributors to this volume examine the evolution and changing character of the four large cities and the life and work of their citizens over the last 150 years. Edinburgh, Glasgow, Dundee and Aberdeen have each developed markedly distinct characteristics of their own. The processes of urbanisation and suburbanisation, of redevelopment and renewal, the new patterns of house building and ownership, and changes in employment and emigration have all contributed to the creation of new city perspectives and problems over recent years. Chapters include: Management and Conservation of the Historic City by George Gordon, and Renewal, Redevelopment and Rehabilitation in Scottish cities, 1945-1981 by Michael Pacione.

Cliff Hague (1984) The development of planning thought. A critical perspective. London, Hutchinson in the Built Environment series, 349 pp., price £25.00, ISBN 09 158070 6.

Provides an introduction to the critical/political economy approaches to planning, and outlines theories of uneven development, the state and ideology, showing the theories can be applied. The first part of the book is theoretical in focus. In order to understand town planning, three major interlinked dimensions have to be taken into account: the economic, political and socio-cultural. The second part is concerned with the practice of planning, as exemplified by the experience of Edinburgh over an extended time period.

Roger H. Harper (1985). Victorian building regulations: summary tables of the principal English Building Acts and by-laws, 1840-1914. London, Mansell Publishing, 137 pp., price £20.00. ISBN 0 7201 1751 8.

Presented in tabular form, the book is designed to show how regulations governing a particular aspect of building design and construction evolved from preceding legislation and how they subsequently developed. Many of the tables are illustrated with drawings and diagrams. An introductory essay describes the evolution of the English building regulations and considers the factors that affected them.

John W. Reps (1984). Views and viewmakers of urban America. Lithographs of towns and cities in the United States and Canada, notes on the artists and publishers, and a Union Catalog of their work, 1825-1925. Columbia, University of Missouri Press (distributed by harper & Row in Britain), 570 pp., £85.00, ISBN 0 8262 0416 3.

Over 4,500 different views of over 2,400 American cities and towns had been produced by the first decade of the present century. Introductory chapters describe how the views were drawn, the methods by which they were printed, how they were used by the people who bought them, how they were regarded by critics, and their reliability in recording the appearance of towns and cities in the past. For every view known to exist, the catalogue provides data on title, date published, size, artist, lithographer, printer, publisher, locations where it can be found, and exhibition or collection catalogs in which it is identified. Entries are arranged alphabetically by locations with each

state and Canadian province.

Jack Rose (1985). The dynamics of urban property development. London, Spon, 289 pp., price £20.00 hardback. ISBN 0 419 131160 4.

Drawing on his direct personal experience in property development over 50 years, the author argues that development has been, and will continue to be, a struggle between those who wish property to be in private hands, and those who wish it to be in State ownership. In an appraisal of the property scene in Britain since the beginning of the century, the author assesses the impact of changes in transport, national and local taxation, rent control and security of tenure, and the social aspects of changing land tenure. A case study is included of a major property company affected by economic pressure during the period of the rent freeze.

J.W.R. Whitehand (1984). Rebuilding town centres. Developers, architects and styles. University of Birmingham Department of Geography, Occasional Publication, 19, 54 pp., price £3.00 ISBN 0 7044 0732 9.

One of several studies of physical change in British urban areas being undertaken by the Urban Morphology Research Group at the University of Birmingham, the study examines the building types constructed during the 20th century in the central areas of two British towns - Northampton, a free-standing county town, and Watford, a suburban town. Particular attention is given to the characteristics of building owners and architects, and to the varied factors, local and national, affecting commercial building.

WORK IN PROGRESS

Suplement 7

In this seventh supplement to "Work in Progress" a distinction is again drawn between recent publications and activities (A) and work in progress (B).

Mr. Alan Hutchings, Executive Planner, South Australian Planning Commission, 55 Grenfell Street, Adelaide, South Australia, 5000.

B1 "The Development of Comprehensive Town Planning in South Australia: 1915:1930: Its Successes and Failures". Master of Planning thesis, University of Adelaide. Evaluates the early Town Planning Movement in South Australia and the work of its first practitioners - Charles Reade, William Earle and Walter Scott Griffiths.

B2 "History of Town Planning in South Australia" (with Dr. Ray Bunker, S.A. Institute of Technology). Overview from Colonel Light's "parklands" plan for Adelaide in 1836 to the Metropolitan Development Plan and the new towns of post World War II. To be published by Wakefield Press and the Royal Australian Planning Institute. To be released at the World Town Planning and Housing Conference in Adelaide in August 1986. (Jointly organized by I.F.H.P., E.A.R.O.P.H. and R.A.P.I.)

RESEARCH REPORTS

Japan: A growing interest in the historical and international dimensions

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Tsukuba

(Dr. Watanabe combines a report on his own current work with a wideranging summary of planning research in contemporary Japan. PHG members are identified by asterisk*)

Standing in the middle of the 1980s, Japanese planners are finding a variety of big events coming nearer to them which would eventually broaden the scope of their future research interests.

The first of these started in the form of EXPO's 85 in Tsukuba Science City this March. During the six month opening period, the exhibition is expected to draw over 20 million visitors from all over the world. With the theme of "Science-Technology and Human Settlements," the one square kilometer site is full of new kinds of transport and tele-communication tools. The EXPO site may be a preview of the 21st century city just as Burnham's White City indicated the 20th century city nearly a hundred years ago.

The year 1987 is designated by the United Nations as the International Year for Shelter for the Homeless (IYSH). The research interests in housing and urban development issues, especially in developing Asia, which is gradually growing among Japanese academicians, will get momentum around the IYSH.

The biggest event, however, will occur in 1988. The year will celebrate the centenary of Japan's urban planning, counting from the enactment of Municipal Improvement Ordinance (shiku kaisei jorei) of 1888. It is also the 40th year of the Ministry of Construction and the 20th year of the present City Planning Act of 1968, which replaced the half a century old 1919 Act. Only few people are now aware that the year 1988 will be "Japan's Planning Year," but it will surely become full of celebrations, one of which may well be the publication of the centenary year history of Japanese urban planning.

By 1988, when the Olympiad is held in Seoul, Korea, international relations may turn into a far more friendly mood in the East Asian region, including highly developed Japan, now rapidly developing Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and then developing China and North Korea. So the need will rise to mutually learn planning experiences in the process of nation's modernisation and development and to make international and historical comparisons among these countries and areas.

Thus, the dominant key word for the Japanese planners will be "international" and "historical". Both of them, as combined, indicate the need for critical evaluation of Japan's planning history so that our experiences may become positive or even negative lessons for developing Asia and also may serve as a case to "relativise" Western modern urban planning, which has been dominant in the present world. The planning system of Britain, U.S. and other Western countries are based upon large-scale public intervention into the market mechanism as well as large amounts of public expenditure in providing urban infrastructure. It is a planning system of the "affluent" society. "Affluence," if viewed at the global scale, however, is not a common phenomenon but "poverty" is. It is important to think that poverty is "normal" and affluence "abnormal". Any consideration about the planning system of the world and of the future, must be based upon this crude reality and be tailored to suit the "poor" condition of the society.

In this context, the City Planning Institute of Japan has stepped towards

international and historical emphasis. In response to the proposal of Anglo-Japanese Workshop on Urban Planning Issues proposed by Professor Ian Masser of Sheffield University, the CPIJ's International Committee (chairman Professor Sazanami) has established a sub-committee (chairman myself) to carry out the collaborative project and to serve as a channel for international cooperation between Japan and Britain. The Committee has also moved towards an organisational agreement with Korea Planners' Association for future cooperation. The Committee seeks to enter into similar agreements with other scholarly organisations of the entire world. There is even a talk about a vision to organise a world-wide federation of such planning institutions.

The CPIJ's Academic Committee (chairman Professor Kawakami*) has created a sub-committee on planning history (chairman Professor Ishida*), which is collecting interview records of the past presidents of the Institute, and is compiling a list of the collection of Hiroshi Ikeda (1818-1939), who drafted the 1919 Act. The interests of the CPIJ members in international and historical aspects are gradually rising. Out of 89 papers presented at the annual conference of the institute last year, about 10% fell into this category, and some promising young scholars are growing into specialists of various countries, such as Dr. Nishiyama* on Britain, Dr. Ohmura* on Germany, Dr. Suzuki* on France, and Dr. Koshizawa* on China, who interestingly enough all share historical interests.

Until recently, planning in developing countries was a rather neglected field of study in Japan, although it is rapidly advancing. A research team of the Toyo University (head Professor Maeda) has carried out an intensive study on Indonesia's kampong housing for the past several years. The Building Research Institute team (head Mr. Matsumoto) started a 3 year joint research project with Indonesian Government on housing strategy in 1984. The team of the United Nations Centre for Regional Development, Nagoya (head Mr. Hoshina) launched a project on slums and squatter settlements in Asian metropolises last year. The Tokyo University team (head Professor Kawakami*) is going to undertake a comprehensive study of housing improvement in selected Asian capitals.

Planning History Group of Japan (chairman myself*), the Japanese "branch" of the PHG, meets in "feature cities" regularly every summer. Two day sessions include a lecture/discussion day of the city's planning history and a day for a guided tour to the planning monuments of the city. In the past 7 years, the group featured Tsukuba, Nagoya, Yokohama, Tokyo (downtown), Hiroshima, and Tokyo (Dojunkai) each year. The members plan to get together in Osaka this summer.

In the past 5 years, the core members of the group have been engaged in a series of historical studies of pre-war housing policy, publishing a report each year. The last year's report was a "lexicon" of the 50 key words of the pre-war housing history, and the task for this year is to compile an annotated bibliography of the publications of the pre-war housing.

In accordance with these developments, the author's research strategy is directed towards the establishment of comparative urban planning research as an academic discipline in Japan. His ultimate goal is the "theorisation" of urban planning at the global scale. Some of his recent writings include: a paper (CPIJ) on "City Planning Movement of Yasushi Kataoka," who played a pivotal role in enacting the 1919 Act; a brief paper (Architectural Institute of Japan) on the RIBA Town Planning Conference of 1910 and its impact upon the AIJ; and a paper (Toshi Mondai) on participation in British planning and Thatcherism as viewed from a comparative standpoint.

The author is publishing a book, tentatively entitled: Introduction to Comparative Urban Planning: Law and Administration of Land Use Control in Britain and the U.S.A. (Tokyo: Sanseido Co., scheduled May 20, 1985, 300pp). This year he plans to publish his fourth book by co-editing interview records of the pioneers in Japan's urban planning as well as the biography of Hiroshi Ikeda.

As part of his official activity at the BRI, the author visited Indonesia

and China in the past two years. Planning responsibilities of the government there seemed to be overwhelming research activities. Yet problems there seemed to a great challenge to the planners of the countries which have already experienced modernisation process several decades ago.

Lastly the author wishes to express his desire to travel abroad for lectures and international conferences and would be delighted to receive information about, and an invitation to such opportunities.

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The Making of the Modern European City: Rome 1870-82

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Historians have already showed the link connecting the creation of planning as a discipline to the mode of production of the capitalist city; this link, openly admitted at the beginning, was later hidden while still operating. During the second half of the XIXth century planning started to have pretensions to a scientific status, implying knowledge of laws and principles regulating the city as well as new objectives and ways to reach them. However, as soon as theoretical paradigms were translated into urban policies a major contradiction became clear between the official goals - as stated by the discipline - and the actual goals of the social subjects involved in city making.

Historical research has not yet investigated a number of aspects which promise to throw light on the process through which the industrial city was shaped: namely the material conditions of the urban development process, the inevitable resulting contradictions between theory and praxis, and the scientific articulation of the discipline on the basis of those very contradictions.

Our study, involving a collaboration with Gerhard Fehl, Juan Rodrigo Lores and Carlo Olmo, is built on a comparative analysis of some cities in Germany and Italy (Rome, Turin, Frankfurt, Mannheim, and Munich) during the periods of fast growth in the XIX and XXth centuries, taking into account the actual process of production of the city, planning practice as a production factor and the language of planning itself.

While the comparative analysis is still in its early stages, interesting results have already been obtained in the investigation of the case studies. My team is studying the case of Rome, 1870-1882. The first step consisted in identifying political and economic operators and their role within Roman administration. We tried in this way to overcome the usual approach (in the last decades) to the new Rome as the mere result of strong speculative forces, therefore dating every event before or after the "building fever" of the late 80's. In a city which is at the same time a municipal administration and national capital, economic and political powers are not necessarily coincident; the problem is to identify the subjects and the levels of decision, as well as the questions of political representativenness and of the relationship between private and public sectors.

So we tried to get at the power group involved in building the city, investigating both their actual interests and their ideas. This research meant not only locating a number of individuals within their social institutions, but also reviewing their biographies in order to understand cultural backgrounds. We also went through speeches, pamphlets, and articles in order to discover how much Rome was the result of a premeditated project or a product of circumstances. Our point is that, while the market remains the subject place of urban development, social relations are realized in the link between ruling classes and city construction.

We are working on social and cultural elements - taking for granted, at first, existing analyses of economic and speculative structures in order to

portrait local and national controlling groups, and in the meantime locating the places where decisions are taken. An analysis of the work of the city council proved to be highly revealing, for our purposes, since it allowed us to identify individuals and their roles, to check the route of actual building projects through administrative procedures, to understand the dialectical relationship between ideal and material production of the city. We found a strict continuity in the ruling classes before and after the annexation: "black aristocracy", professionals, country merchants. The main legal instrument for speculation was the "convention", based on public powers of expropriation, which had the effect of excluding direct owners of the land to be expropriated, usually in favour of ad hoc financial corporations.

The "idea" of the city seems rather confused, with very poor attention given to low-cost housing, and fears are sometimes openly expressed: the city will not develop because railways will bring in well-off people who will go back in a short time after accomplishing their own business, flourishing industries in Turin, Genoa, Milan and Naples will not allow any concentration of workers in the capital city, food prices will stay so high as to force many families to migrate towards the provinces.

The district of Castro Pretorio is one of the six areas designated for development in the master plan of Rome proposed in 1873, which actually records projects already under way. This section is being analysed in its layout and characteristics in connection with city programmes, near-by districts, existing villas and parks, the proposed new road pattern. The City's archives were investigated in order to understand the whole process down to the final agreement between the city and the Societa' di Credito Immobiliare: the Societa' itself is given the rights of expropriation and gives back the land for streets and squares, which have to be built according to specific norms. Buildings are multi-storey apartments and villas; department stores, warehouses and noisy crafts are excluded, indicating the middle to upper class quality of the neighborhood. Some 40 buildings constructed between 1872 and 1882 have been analysed for ownership, typology and design: figures of the new political and administrative milieu as well as old aristocrats appear in the list.

Through such intensive investigation of specific developments across Europe, our research will proceed dialectically towards a wider understanding of the genesis of modern town planning and its subsequent contradictions, and reports of this voyage of discovery will be appearing in future editions of PHB.

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Researching the Australian Garden City

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> "I can only say that so far as Australia is concerned my heart and soul are entirely with those who work for garden city and town planning principles, in the certain hope that their adoption and successful adaptation by Australian States will be of inculculable benefit and advantage to generations, both present and future."(Ebenezer Howard 1920[1])

Ebenezer Howard expressed great optimism about the prospects for garden city reforms in Australia on several occasions. Some years before writing the above words, he had told a group of Australasians at Letchworth that he looked forward to 'the best and brightest chapters' of the garden city movement being written 'in the great continent of the Pacific'[2]. Such hopes were not to be fulfilled, which is probably why the general literature on the garden city movement has had little to say about the Australian experience. Moreover, even some of the passing references have been erroneous. This is also the case with Australian urban and social history generally, with planning

historiography a relatively undeveloped field [3]. Sandercock's Cities for Sale, the only general account of the pioneering years before 1930, draws attention to the early influence of garden city concepts, but the actual evidence presented is limited [4]. Some of this has fortunately been gathered in specialist studies, many of them unpublished students theses.[5]

In relation to previous work, the direction of my own doctoral research was to provide an overview of the garden city in Australia that would hopefully clarify the ideas and influence of Howard and the garden city movement, establish the international status of the garden city, and, in most detail, discuss the character of local garden city thought, and present the first inventory of actual projects. Data gathering commenced in Melbourne in 1978 and was 'completed' at the Centre for Environmental and Urban Studies at Macquarie University in Sydney in 1984. Some of my early thoughts and findings have found their way to publication.[6] Originally, I had planned to follow the trace of the garden city into the post world war two era but as this threatened too voluminous a project the thesis just covers the two decades 1910-1930 [7]. This period, coinciding with the flowering of the garden city overseas, saw a fairly cohesive Australian milieu of garden city advocacy revolving around certain ideas and individuals as well as the most direct landscape impact.

The thesis is structured into fourteen chapters. An introductory chapter establishes the objectives, approach and organization. A 'deradicalization' focus is introduced and linked to previous interpretations of the garden city legacy by Buder, Fishman, Swenarton and Schaffer [8]. Chapter 2 outlines Howard's basic argument, associating its more temperate elements to the practical politics of mainstream liberalism. Chapter 3 examines the ideas and influence of the garden city movement in Britain, an account pieced together from contemporary and secondary sources. What Walter Creese in The Search for Environment (1966) termed 'the image overseas' is surveyed briefly in Chapter 4.

Australian material is first introduced in Chapter 5, a wide-ranging look at urbanization, urban reform and planning in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as a backdrop to, and significant influence upon, the subsequent course of events. A basic task in studying the international transmission of planning ideas and ideologies is to identify the mechanisms which enable the transfer to take place [9]. Chapter 6 identifies and discusses the general agencies, brokers and channels of communication facilitating the diffusion of garden city thought to and around Australia. Chapter 7 is essentially a bridging chapter - between previous discussion of the garden city as a British and international phenomenon and its importation to Australia on top of indigenous developments, and the subsequent detailed examination of the local response in theory and practice.

Chapter 8 considers the first strand of the Australian garden city: as an image of, and catchphrase for, the ideal urban environment. This role of the garden city in mobilizing community and professional interest in town planning is well captured by an editorial in The Sydney Morning Herald in 1911, which hailed the role of the garden city in replacing " bad old ideas of huddled, unhealthy dwellings, and sprawling streets, with the new idea of cities nobly planned and suburbs housed airily wholesome in adequate surroundings" [10].

Chapter 9 explores the second and most important strand: as a cohesive set of ideas concerning lay-out, housing type and tenure, provision of amenities and other matters for realizing the garden city ideal. The principles were not fully imported, nor did they represent a hard and fast set of rules. John Sulman came closest to a precise definition in 1921, when he noted that "The special characteristics which differentiate them from the ordinary town or suburb are the allocation of special quarters or sites for each kind of building, the absence of congestion of dwellings and their better arrangement, the ample provision of parks, playgrounds, and open spaces, the planting with trees and grass of part of the width of the roads where not required for traffic, and the provision of greater opportunities for social intercourse.

The dedication of a tenth of all new subdivisions... would go far to make a garden suburb if properly planned and planted". [11]

Chapters 10 to 12 examine the 'town planning on garden city lines, in operation in three environments. Chapter 10 looks at the planning of 'garden towns':Canberra, the national capital, where in the 1920s garden city principles held sway within the geometrical contours of Walter Burley Griffin's competition winning plan of 1912; model irrigation settlements such as Barmera (South Australia), Leeton (New South Wales), and Theordore (Queensland); Yallourn, an industrial town planned, built and demolished by the State Electricity Commission of Victoria in the space of sixty years; small rural centres planned under the provisions of the South Australian Town Planning and Development Act 1920; the 'model township' scheme of the Perth City Council that produced the 'satellite ' suburbs of City Beach and Floreat Park; and large-scale, speculative 'new town' ventures, notably those of surveyor-subdivider Henry Halloran in New South Wales.

Chapter 11 looks at Australian versions of planned industrial housing communities such as New Earswick, Margaretenhohe, and Yorkship Village: H.V. McKay's Sunshine near Melbourne, a pre-war land and housing development embodying proto-garden village ideas; 'Buffalo City', a partially completed housing estate for employees of a boot and shoe manufacturer in Goulburn, New South Wales; model estates planned by companies in the Collins House empire, such as EZ's Lutana, the most tangible demonstration of welfare capitalist ideology; the industrial garden village initiated by the Cadbury-Fry-Pascall consortium near Hobart; and Littleton, a housing estate for employees of the Commonwealth Small Arms Factory at Lithgow, New South Wales.

Chapter 12 documents the influence of garden city principles on suburban residential development: the state showpieces of Daceyville (1912) in Sydney, Colonel Light Gardens (1921) in Adelaide, and Garden City (1926) in Melbourne; garden suburbs for war veterans, notably the estates developed by the Commonwealth's War Service Homes Commission from 1919; garden suburb and subdivision projects sponsored by private capital, e.g., Rosebery and Castlecrag in Sydney, Hampstead Gardens in Adelaide, Springfield Garden Suburb in Hobart, Wembley Downs in Perth, and many other developments; and the general operation local government by-laws, general planning legislation, and expert advice by central authorities.

Although overshadowed by its status as a general environmental ideal and as a practical approach to lay out and housing, the garden city also functioned as a loose set of ideas about the desired size, shape and structure of major urban areas. This garden city idiom is the subject of Chapter 13. No garden city blueprint for a metropolitan area was made official before 1930, although moves were made to give legal standing to an agricultural belt for Brisbane and there were discussions in other states.

Chapter 14 is confined to a resume of general findings and suggestions for further research: alternative approaches to garden city history, extensions of the historical coverage to the post-world war two period, and development of the 'diluted legacy' notion as a general theme for planning history. Discussion of the latter point draws on David Harvey's conceptualization of 'revolutionary' and 'status quo' theory [12] and on Thomas Reiner's analysis of the planning of ideal communities which employs Mannheim's distinction between ideologies and utopias [13].

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City. Sydney: George Allen and Unwin, 1983, pp.175-204.

4 L. Sandercock, Cities for Sale: Property, politics and urban planning in Australia. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1975.

5 It is intended to provide a full bibliographic review in a future edition of PHB.

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Holiday Camps

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In the course of undertaking a research project on plotland developments, Colin Ward and I came across some interesting source material and case evidence of holidays camps. The discovery was not entirely coincidental. Both types of development were frequently to be found in marginal locations along the coast, and both emerged mainly in the first half of the twentieth century.

The step, then, from plotlands to holiday camps seemed to us in research terms to be natural enough. And it is certainly proving to be an enjoyable and productive project. We are due to complete it this year and the outcome will be published as a book in the Mansell Planning History series. Some funding to support the project has been available from Middlesex Polytechnic and the British Academy.

A topic with such frivolous associations does, however, present its own problems. An acdemic readership will need to be convinced that the topic lends itself to anything more than a book version of 'Hi-de-hi'.* Our response is that while, of course, there is an element of fun that is an essential part of the story, a study of holiday camps can also be designed to illustrate and exemplify wider trends and processes.

The first of these is simply an acknowledgement of holiday camps as a social institution. Whether one likes them or not, the fact remains that since the early years of this century literally millions of people have poured through the camp gates for a week or two of communal living. The camps are a part of our modern social history and we attempt to record the process and to

note the inter-related changes in camps and society in this period.

We are also interested in the motives for providing holiday camps. Commercial motives that lie behind the better-known camps provide only a partial explanation. Educational ideals, trade union and welfare considerations, the cult of the outdoor life and political utopianism have all played their part.

Another source of interest lies in the planning and design of camps. Historically, this is an illustrative process, intertwined within the various threads of an environmental lobby and an emerging planning system. In this context, camps posed both a threat and an opportunity. Camps were a threat in the sense that they represented one more source of development in a coast or countryside setting that was already under pressure. Yet, at the same time, they offered an opportunity in that, however intense the activity within the camp compounds, it could be contained and the development could even be well-designed. In terms of planning history, then, holiday camps occupy an interesting place within the wider debates of the time.

Finally, holiday camps are without doubt a source of contention. Have they provided social opportunities or do they signify the very worst of twentieth century mass society? An evaluation of holiday camps draws one inevitably into broader issues of individual freedom and popular culture. Like so much of planning history, justice cannot be done to a subject without reference to the wider social context in which it is located.

* Popular comedy series about holiday camp life on British television.

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BONUSING AND BOOSTERISM: INDUSTRIAL PROMOTION BY ONTARIO MUNICIPALITIES TO 1930

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Many English local authorities undertook industrial promotion policies between 1900 and 1940, as Stephen Ward and others have reported.[1] Canadian municipalities made similar efforts, which have also been subject to "historical amnesia" until recently. The Canadian experience, notably in the province of Ontario, was a little different from the English - in the timing and dimensions of such activity, the main modes of promotion and their rationales and effectiveness. Industrial promotion began earlier in Canada, and was associated with the establishment and early expansion of the urban economic base, as well as being a response to later declines in staple enterprises. "Bonuses", or direct cash grants and tax exemptions, were more common though advertising and boosterist rhetoric would also be used from 1900. As most bonuses were required by law to be approved by a majority of local ratepayers voting on each specific case, the associated debates and politicking provide valuable evidence of contemporary perceptions and priorities and of community dynamics.

An earlier essay, in the Urban History Yearbook 1983, has surveyed the larger themes of community initiatives in the urban economic growth of Canada.[2] Municipal inducements to manufacturers were considered in the context of the earlier and continuing bonuses to railway companies, and as part of the strong tradition of government support of private enterprise in Canada. Bonusing and booster advertising were found in all provinces, though there were regional differences in growth policies and confidence which reflected variations in stages of urban development and situational factors. Maritime cities were least confident and aggressive.[3] Latest to develop and growing most rapidly, western Canadian cities relied most on advertising and boosterist rhetoric to promote themselves.[4] The cities and towns of central Canada, in Quebec and Ontario, were the most determined in their use of municipal inducements for railways and factories. Various Quebec towns were assiduous in their efforts though, as Rudin has shown, hampered by their leaner tax-base, weaker attraction for American enterprise and problems of access to banking services.[5]

Ontario, particularly the populous southern part of the province, had various advantages for urban-industrial growth in the last third of the nineteenth century, being a closely-settled and productive farming region, located centrally within Canada and close to the United States manufacturing belt. Large numbers of urban municipalities were incorporated here, earlier than in other Canadian provinces, following the Municipal Corporations Act of 1849. Generally permissive legislation gave the municipal councils plenty of scope for local initiative, especially to take advantage of the protection offered to domestic manufacturing by the National Policy tariffs of 1879. Community leaders in Ontario cities, towns and villages were early to organize themselves in local boards of trade which, with the local newspapers, were able to build up strong feelings of loyalty among the permanent residents, as well as a belief that community well-being depended on continued steady growth, especially of manufacturing industry. There was also a conviction that determination and self-help were essential, that "Towns do not just grow; they are built."[6]

Ontario municipalities, led by their boards of trade and local newspapers, did use advertising, mottos and slogans to reinforce local loyalties and to attract the attention of outside entrepreneurs, but only from the late 1890s. Hamilton projected itself as the "Ambitious City", Oshawa as the "Hustling City", Peterborough as "Electric City", Cornwall as the "Factory Town of Canada" while Berlin exploited alliteration to proclaim itself "busy, bustling, bigger, better and beautiful." Ontario towns and cities compared themselves to larger and more illustrious industrial centres in England or the United States: Hamilton was the "Birmingham of Canada", Galt the "Manchester", and Brantford "Sheffield of the West", while Berlin styled itself "the Akron of Canada" and Waterloo "the Hartford." Brantford's motto was "Industria et Perseverentia" and symbols of industry, such as beehives, beavers, locomotives and factory chimneys, abounded on

municipal coats of arms. But most advertising, certainly in the nineteenth century, drew attention to the more material inducements municipalities were able to offer manufacturers. Larger centres did come to rely more on advertising as their bonusing powers were restricted from the turn of the century. In 1897, Ontario towns and cities of over 5000 population were permitted to budget up to $500 per annum for "diffusing information regarding the advantages of such city or town as a manufacturing, business, education or residential centre or as a desirable place in which to spend the summer months" and smaller places could spend up to $100.[7] Cities began to appoint industrial commissioners between 1905 and 1912, whose primary job was to advertise their city's advantages to outside businesses; their methods were influenced by American and western Canadian "boosterism." However, there remained a strong sense that mere advertising was worthless, that the best way to advertise a city was by attracting successful enterprises. As the St. Catharines Board of Trade declared in 1906, "We would rather see deeds than words".[8]

Municipal councils also served manufacturers' interests by improvements in the infrastructure of urban services - by providing water supply for fire protection and innovations in gas and electricity generation, and by obtaining competitive railway connections. Some went to great lengths to develop hydro-electric power or to improve waterways, in the belief that their towns would become more attractive to entrepreneurs. But such places as Peterborough, Orillia, Trenton and St. Catharines, which emphasized these general improvements, found themselves obliged to offer specific inducements as well.

Bonusing, the use of material inducements to attract and hold manufacturers, was clearly the most distinctive instrument of municipal industrial policies, especially before 1900 but also, whenever possible, until the 1920s. This essay raises several questions as to the powers and procedures, dimensions and effectiveness of municipal bonusing, and comments on various aspects which deserve more research.

What were the bonusing powers of Ontario municipalities? After being mainly permissive, municipal powers were increasingly restricted by the provincial legislature from the 1880s, though determined towns and cities could usually contrive to aid desirable enterprises till 1930. Municipalities could offer manufacturers a variety of inducements: a grant of money (either as gift or loan); the guarantee of credit; the gift, cheap sale or rental of land as a factory site; the opening or improving of access roads or railway sidings; the supply of cheap or free water, light or power; a total or partial exemption from local taxation.[9] Until 1900, there were different rules for inducements consisting of a cash gift or loan (strictly a "bonus") which would create long-term debt, than for the other forms of aid such as tax exemptions and free or cheap sites and services. A cash grant or loan, (permitted from 1870) had to be approved by a majority of the community's property-owning voters, while an exemption (from 1868) could be passed by a simple majority of the municipal councillors.

From the mid-1880s, a series of amendments imposed some constraints on bonusing powers, increasing the proportion of the eligible voters who had to approve a specific bonus, limiting the total value of bonus debt a municipality might incur, and seeking to prevent bonusing of enterprises from elsewhere in Ontario or in product lines already represented in the municipality. The main reason for the Ontario Legislature's concern was the fear that excessive municipal debt might harm the province's credit rating in the British money market. Between 1892 and 1900, municipal councils might not grant cash bonuses at all, except by appealing to the provincial legislature for a special act in each case. In 1900, the Ontario Legislature defined a "bonus" more comprehensively to include all imaginable forms of aid to industry - factory sites, tax exemptions and fixed assessments as well as cash grants. All such bonuses were made subject to the approval of a two-thirds majority of all entitled property-owners, unless those voting against the bonus constituted only one-fifth of the entitled ratepayers, in which case a three-fifths majority for the by-law was enough. After 1924, municipal bonusing powers were limited to fixed assessments for local tax purposes, but a specific vote by the ratepayers was still necessary.[10]

How, exactly, was an inducement proposed and put into effect? Why were community ratepayers apparently so willing to approve virtually all bonuses? The community dynamics of effecting a cash bonus may be illustrated by the case of Brantford. Incorporated as a city in 1877 with a population of over 9000, and with a Board of Trade formally chartered in 1879, Brantford was alive to its opportunities under the National Policy protective tariffs of 1879. In a pamphlet published in 1880, the Manufacturers' Committee of the City Council advertised the potential of its "enterprising and prosperous" city to become "an important manufacturing as well as commercial centre," and its willingness to grant tax exemptions to new factories. In 1870, Brantford had granted a $32,500 bonus to the Grand Trunk Railway company for the establishment of its workshops to serve all of western Ontario. In 1880, $5000 was given to an Englishman, Clayton Slater, to build a cotton mill just outside the municipal boundary.

At the Board of Trade's annual meeting in January 1882, Slater proposed a second factory, making wincey and chambly flannel, in which he would invest $50,000 and employ 75 "hands", if the city would grant a $5000 bonus and an exemption from taxes for ten years. The Board recommended the proposition to the City Council, which had to wrestle with the legal difficulties of the proposed site's being outside the city limits but decided to put a bonus by-law to the vote of the ratepayers in mid-March. For the next month, the Board of Trade and local daily newspaper, the Expositor, set about organizing the voters, using tactics which would be replicated a thousand times in other cities, towns and villages. In general and ward meetings, frequent editorial columns and a circular to all households, citizens were told that this would be the first wincey factory in North America. It was asserted that every new enterprise "keeps up and increases the value of real property", that an influx of new factory workers would benefit all merchants and tradesmen, that new jobs for women would help every workingman's family, and that all the growth would yield future municipal taxes which would more than offset the initial cost of the bonus. All the city's manufacturers apparently supported the bonus, and the critical motion at the mass meeting held at the campaign's climax was moved and seconded by the city's two largest ratepayers. The only timid suggestion that bonuses might not be right in principle was countered by the arguments that bonusing was necessary in municipal self-defence that growth depended on factories which required inducements. The wincey factory by-law was passed by 628 votes to 50.[11]

In the Slater case, Brantford was using the cash bonus as a means of expanding its urban economy. A bonus might also be used defensively, in response to a disaster such as destruction by fire, failure or removal of a staple enterprise. A community would be motivated by fear of extinction to vote in support of a bonus which would enable an entrepreneur to rebuild a burned out factory or to move into premises vacated by a business that had failed or been bonused away. Thus, after Strathway's knitting factory was burned down in 1892, the town obtained a special act to allow it to subsidize "industrial enterprises of equal labour-giving extent" as "a relief from unemployment." Citizens were told that the only alternative was "retrogression:"

> It rests with the people of Strathroy whether their town shall be an unknown country hamlet, a market for the grain of the immediate neighbourhood, destitute of all manufacturing institutions and fitted with empty stores, rendezvous for starved rats and mice, or whether an effort shall now be made to set our town rolling along the path of prosperity.[12]

A lucky or discerning community might choose to bonus the ideal enterprise for its circumstances, as Leamington did in winning the Canadian plant of the H.J. Heinz Company of Pittsburgh in 1908. In return for the town's purchasing an existing tobacco factory for $10,000, building a sewer outfall and granting a total tax exemption and free water for twenty years, the Heinz company agreed to process food products at Leamington from at

least 1600 acres from its second year. Not surprisingly, such an ideal bonus was passed by 551 votes to 18.[13]

What is more remarkable is that less fortunate towns, where a bonused enterprise failed, would seldom turn against the system of bonusing, though the municipal council might become more cautious in demanding certain conditions and safeguards. Brampton suffered probably the worst failure of any Ontario municipality after it was deceived into voting the enormous sum of $75,000 to the local Haggert foundry in the belief that the firm was expanding, while the money was really being used to pay off debts. In 1891, Haggert was forced into liquidation and, although the town held a mortgage, this eventually proved worthless. Two other bonused factories also failed in the 1890s. Yet from 1905, urged by a new Board of Trade and the local Conservator newspaper, Brampton began another series of inducements (now all loans or loan guarantees) which totalled $138,000 to six firms by 1919.[14]

Tax exemptions were very commonly used to attract and hold manufacturers. Some municipalities from the late 1860s advertised their willingness to exempt any new or expanding enterprise which employed more than a particular number of workers or, perhaps, which used steam power. Exemptions were also cheap, which meant that a town might assist a fair number of businesses for the same cost as a single cash bonus. An exemption was usually sufficient inducement for a local enterprise, while an outside business would probably not move for anything less than a substantial cash bonus. Until 1900, exemptions were easier to pass than cash bonuses, as they did not have to be submitted to a specific vote by the ratepayers, so were increasingly preferred by the larger cities. They were especially common between 1892 and 1900, when the Ontario Legislature forbade cash bonuses except in very special circumstances. Even Toronto, which as provincial metropolis could rely on its centrality and natural advantages, had to resort to a wholesale exemption on all manufacturers' plant, machinery and tools in 1892, when it seemed to be suffering from the determined promotion policies of other places, including the nearby suburban municipalities such as West Toronto Junction and Swansea.[15]

After 1900, when by-law exemptions and all forms of inducements should have been approved by large majorities of the voters, many municipal councils continued to pass them informally. They would instruct the assessors to treat all or particular manufacturers "liberally," "generously", "reasonably" or "leniently", so that exemptions and fixed assessments continued much as before. Some municipalities turned to other modes of promotion after 1900, especially the provision of factory sites, in what may be considered pioneer industrial parks or estates. The most basic method was to carve factory sites out of municipally owned parkland. Hamilton annexed a large tract from a neighbouring township, but froze the assessment at the previous agricultural level, to encourage several large American branch plants to locate there.[16] In some schemes, there was a mixture of private enterprise and municipal sanction, a land developer offering free factory sites which would be effectively paid for by the sales of residential lots to workingmen, while the municipal council co-operated in provision of services and lenient assessment of the factories.[17]

How much bonusing was there in Ontario? By combining details from the various sources, relating to 178 of the 260 urban places incorporated by 1900, we have traced over 250 cash bonuses worth $2,157,215, passed by Ontario municipalities between 1867 and 1900. In the 1890s alone there were also 556 exemptions, totalling nearly $10 million, but are understatements.[18] For the period after 1900, the dimensions of bonusing were examined through a sample of municipal financial statements, including all 26 of the southern Ontario cities and towns with 5000 or more population in 1901, 24 of the 40 towns in the size-range 2,500 to 5000 and 12 smaller centres with under 2,500 population. A total of 250 cash bonuses, worth $4,662,706, was found in these 62 places between 1901 and 1924. The five largest cities, Toronto, Hamilton, London, Ottawa and Brantford passed no cash bonuses after 1900, but the rest of the urban centres with over 5000 people passed an average per town of 3.5 bonuses worth $13,630 each.

How deeply did municipalities commit themselves to promote local industry? Comparable

provincial statistics are available only for bonus debt for 70 urban centres in 1894, and for exempt assessment in 134 places in 1901.[19] Bonus debt averaged $15,000 for the 70 places reporting; in half of them, bonus debt amounted to at least 50 percent of the property taxes or at least $2.50 per inhabitant - approximately the weekly factory wage for a woman or boy. Exempt industrial assessment averaged over $70,000 for the 134 municipalities reporting, though it varied from over $2 million in Toronto down to a few hundred dollars. At a typical rate of 20 mills, the forgone tax would average $1,404 annually. The median proportion of total assessment which was exempt for factory property was 2.5 percent, but it exceeded 10 percent in 12 municipalities. Half of the 134 places had exempted assessment to the value of at least $7.00 per capita, representing forgone taxes of 14 cents for each inhabitant annually.

How effective was bonusing, for the enterprises that benefitted and for the municipalities which gave aid? Did the grants simply enrich entrepreneurs who had no need of such help, or prop up feeble businesses which were otherwise non-viable and should not have been encouraged? Examples of both sorts of abuse can be found. There is also some evidence for Naylor's theory that municipal bonuses may have helped to fill the gap left by the banks and financial institutions, which did not provide sufficient capital for industrial investment.[20] Comparison of the detailed experience of several municipalities suggests that a typical bonus of the 1870s and 1880s may have provided enough capital to build the whole factory, while after 1900 the bonus was regarded more as a token of community support for the enterprise and was only a small proportion of the total cost. Opponents of bonusing pointed to a high failure rate; the 1899 return from 155 municipalities showed that 22.5 percent of the enterprises which had been granted cash bonuses had failed, been burned out or bonused away elsewhere. Just over 10 percent of the enterprises given exemptions in the 1890s were reported as having failed. These data should probably be related to general patterns of business failure.

Could judicious use of the bonusing system enable an ambitious municipality to rise in the urban hierarchy faster than its rivals? Detailed analysis of the case of Berlin (later Kitchener) concluded that, as part of a comprehensive industrial policy, in the right circumstances and promoted by community leaders cohesively organized in the board of trade and using the power of the local press, municipal bonusing could be associated with dramatic urban-industrial growth. It is noteworthy that Berlin's preference for the frugal tax exemption tended to encourage mainly local and/or established enterprises and that the town began its industrial policy early.[21] The strength and persistence of municipal industrial promotion in so many Ontario urban centres must have somewhat counteracted the trend to metropolitan concentration of industry and general growth in Toronto. This hypothesis is currently being tested in research relating details of municipal bonuses and services to time-space data of urban-industrial development between 1850 and 1930.

The politics of bonusing are fascinating, too, and the implications of a consistent bias toward business. Why did municipalities persist with bonusing, despite the setbacks, frauds and scandals? To what extent did
municipal promotion of industry skew local energies and resources away from any concern with the quality of the environment and of urban life? Another case-study of Berlin/Kitchener-Waterloo explores the relationship between planners' ideals and the priorities of the local business elite which still dominated the community.[22] Why were the opponents of bonusing so ineffective in their attempts to convince the workingmen that it was against their class interests? Could the strength of local loyalities really transcend class and other factional divisions? We need more empirical studies of the experience of particular communities as well as more comparative research on municipal industrial promotion policies.

NOTES

1. Stephen V. Ward, "Local authorities and industrial promotion, 1900-1939: rediscovering a lost tradition," in Planning and Economic Change: An Historical Perspective, edited by S.V. Ward, 25-49 (Oxford: Oxford Polytechnic, Department of

Town Planning, 1984).

2. Elizabeth Bloomfield, "Community, ethos and local initiative in urban economic growth: review of a theme in Canadian urban history," Urban History Yearbook 1983, 53-72 (Leicester: Leicester University Press 1983).

3. The absence of a consistent industrial policy has been noted for Halifax by L.D. McCann in "Staples and the industrialism in the growth of post-Confederation Halifax" Acadiensis 8, 2 (1979): 47-79, but smaller Maritime centres did offer bonuses, as described in P. DeLottinville, "Trouble in the hives of industry: the cotton industry comes to Milltown, New Brunswick, 1879-1882," Historical Papers, Montreal 1980, 100-115 (Ottawa: Canadian Historical Association, 1981) and Catherine Johnson, "The search for industry in Newcastle, New Brunswick, 1899-1914", Acadiensis 13 (1983): 93-111.

4. Alan F.J. Artibise, "Boosterism and the development of prairie cities, 1871-1913", in Town and city: aspects of western Canadian urban development, edited by A.F.J. Artibise, 209-235 (Regina: Canadian Plains Research Center, 1981).

5. The general phenomenon is surveyed in Ronald Rudin, "Boosting the French Canadian Town: municipal government and urban growth in Quebec, 1850-1900', Urban History Review 11, 1 (1982): 1-10, and the classic study of urban-industrial promotion is Paul-Andre Linteau, Maisonneuve: comment des promoteurs fabriquent la ville (Montreal: Boreal Express, 1981), now available in translation as The promoters' city: Building the industrial town of Maisonneuve, 1883-1918 (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1985).

6. For the patterns of municipal incorporation and the development of local newspapers and boards of trade see Elizabeth Bloomfield, Gerald Bloomfield and Peter McCaskell, Urban growth and local services: the development of Ontario municipalities to 1981 (Department of Geography, University of Guelph, 1983) and Elizabeth Bloomfield "Boards of trade and Canadian urban development", Urban History Review 12, 2 (1983): 77-99.

7. Statutes of Ontario 60 Vic. ch. 45, 1897, sect. 17.

8. St. Catharines Board of Trade, Minutes, 7 March 1906.

9. Elizabeth Bloomfield, "Municipal bonusing of industry: the legislative framework in Ontario to 1930," Urban History Review 9, 3 (1981): 59-76.

10. Powers of fixed assessment remained valid till the 1960s. In addition, from 1929, municipal councils were allowed one other form of assistance to manufacturing, though this was "deemed not to be a bonus". A council might acquire tracts of land, for subdivision and sale or lease as industrial sites at a fair market value. This also required the consent of the electors. It was little used until after World War II.

11. Brantford Expositor 31 January 1882 - 1 June 1882; "History of the Brantford Board of Trade" (typescript).

12. Katherine McCracken, "The Strathroy Knitting Company: an indicator of early economic attitudes and development in Strathroy" (University of Waterloo, M.A. History term paper, April 1985).

13. Janine Grant, "The H.J. Heinz Company of Canada: a vital transplant in the sun parlour of Canada" (University of Waterloo, M.A. History term paper, April 1985).

14. Naomi Brusse, "Brampton's early boards of trade: a preliminary study" (University of Waterloo, M.A. History term paper, April 1985).

15. Dean Beeby, "Industrial strategy and manufacturing growth in Toronto, 1880-1910," Ontario History 76, 3 (1984): 199-233.

16. Diana J. Middleton and David F. Walker, "Manufacturers and industrial development policy in Hamilton, 1890-1910," Urban History Review 8, 3 (1980): 20-46.

17. Small-scale examples are known in Guelph and Berlin/Kitchener, while Windsor formalized the role of the municipality in special legislation. (Statutes of Ontario, 1907, Ch. 97).

18. Sources for a comparative and quantified analysis of bonusing include: Statutes of Ontario (270 special acts between 1867 and 1930); special returns from municipalities to Provincial Secretary (Sessional Papers No. 50 of 1883, No. 68 of 1896, No. 69 of 1900 and No. 28 of 1901); annual municipal financial statements (Archives of Ontario, Record Group 19, F-4-A-1 - village records not available before mid-1930s). For selected municipalities only, council minutes and bylaws and other local records were also searched. In a test of completeness, it was found that inducements cited in the systematic sources cited first above (Statutes, sessional papers, municipal financial statements) comprised 67 percent of the total traced in greater detail through the council records and bylaws of the six towns of the Middle Grand Valley (Berlin/Kitchener, Waterloo, Galt, Preston, Hespeler and Guelph).

19. It is estimated that a further 34 municipalities had bonus debt (as a result of inducements to manufacturers), but were not listed in Sessional Paper 68 of 1896 and at least another 16 municipalities had exempt industrial assessment not reported in 1901.

20. Tom Naylor, The History of Canadian Business, Vol. 2 (Toronto: James Lorimer 1976): 130-160.

21. Elizabeth Bloomfield, "Building the city on a foundation of factories: the 'industrial policy' in Berlin, Ontario, 1870-1914," Ontario History 75, 3 (1983): 207-243.

22. Elizabeth Bloomfield, "Economy, necessity, and political reality: Town planning efforts in Kitchener-Waterloo, 1912-1925," Urban History Review 9, 1 (1980): 3-48, (reprinted as "Reshaping the urban landscape: Town planning efforts in Kitchener-Waterloo, 1912-1925" in Shaping the Urban Landscape: Aspects of the Canadian City-Building Process, edited by G.A. Stelter and A.F.J. Artibise, 256-303 (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1982).

BRITISH BOOSTERISM: AN AREA OF INTEREST FOR PLANNING HISTORIANS

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1. Introduction

An area to which planning historians have, as yet, devoted but little attention is the promotion of industrial and other forms of economic development by local authorities. Yet this is currently the major growth area of local government responsibilities and initiative in Britain. Economic recession, increasing doubts about the effectiveness of regional policy and its active dismantling by the present government have increasingly focussed municipal minds of the possibilities of stimulating their own local economies. In many ways though this recent growth of local initiative is not the entirely new direction it appears; it is rather the rediscovery of a lost tradition of local government initiative that predates regional policy.

A few pointers to this as a potential area of interest have come in recent work by planning and urban historians and others. Thus in the last issue of PHB, Marshall referred to Sheffield's important initiatives immediately after World War I, indicating its place in the history of planning in that city[1]. Aspinall and Hudson's recent official history of Ellesmere Port referred at relative length to the genesis of a municipal promotion policy in the 1930s, spurred on by Liverpool's example.[2] Law briefly drew attention to a tradition of local promotion in his historical account of regional development.[3] Interestingly Simpson's very recent biography of Thomas Adams has established the clearest link yet between the early planning movement and the development of industrial promotion in Wolverhampton in 1906.[4] But the most significant work has focussed on civic boosterism in urban North America. Particularly important is Elizabeth Bloomfield's work on Canadian experience, most readily available in her article in Urban History Yearbook 1983,[5] and summarised in her article in this issue. Also in 1983, I attempted to draw together the very disparate strands and passing references to industrial promotion in Britain, re-examining the conclusions of the only substantial British work on this topic, written in 1947 by Fogarty,[6] (when such initiatives were on the point of disappearing because of full employment and centrally controlled regional policies), and incorporating detailed case study material undertaken for my doctoral thesis.[7] This short article restates some of the main points of this review, incorporating findings of more recent research, and suggesting future directions for work.

2. The Promotional Initiatives

During the period 1900-1939, two main peaks of promotional activity are detectable, coincident with the economic downturns of c1907 onwards and of the early 1930s, though with a significant low peak in the early post war period, when important readjustments from war were taking place. While there were some general evolutionary tendencies in promotional practice, the very local character of the initiatives, largely undirected by central policies, brought great local diversity, so that promotion rarely seems to have followed exactly the same course in any two areas, at least until the late 1930s. Despite these qualifications though, we can identify three major modes of promotional practice: publicity and information, operating concessions on municipal trading services and the provision of land and buildings. In addition several minor modes are identifiable, principally direct financial assistance, rating and regulatory concessions. Space permits only a very brief consideration of the 3 major modes:

Publicity and Information: This was the most widespread promotional activity, as Fogarty emphasises. The origins of local self-publicity were in the holiday resorts, some of which, most notably Blackpool, had levied publicity rates during the later 19th century. However, the first use of municipal publicity to stimulate business investment in a locality seems to date from the first decade of the 20th century. At that time economic development had become a concern in several boroughs (e.g. Worcester, West Ham, Wolverhampton, Burton and York), and some of them produced publicity material, notably "West Ham: The Factory Centre of Southern England: and "The Industrial Advantages of Worcester". Both these booklets were produced in English and German, and the Worcester booklet also in French, indicating that foreign investment was consciously being sought.[8]

After the First World War the increasing economic difficulties of many areas brought a resurgence of interest in publicity initiatives, though it was symptomatic of the vague legal status of all promotional initiatives that there was considerable confusion about whether municipal publicity was ultra vires. Whereas the 1921 Health Resorts and Watering Places Act gave specific publicity powers to resort towns, a string of non-resort areas failed to secure the powers to publicise the industrial advantages of their areas that they sought in local bills, either by outright rejection or because they were persuaded to withdraw the offending clauses. Amongst those seeking powers

were Sheffield (1920), Wigan (1921), Bristol (1922), Hull (1924), Newport (1925), Accrington (1928), Birkenhead (1930) and West Hartlepool and Southampton (1931).[9] Only Bristol secured any local powers to publicise from these efforts, but these fell well short of what was asked for and were limited to advertising the municipal docks.

However, illegality did not always prevent local publicity being undertaken. Sheffield, having been refused powers to levy a publicity rate, used trading surpluses from its tramways account, itself a move of doubtful legality.[10] Some authorities embarked on publicity schemes without any attempt to secure legal authority, as with Rotherham in 1928.[11] A common device, however, was to conceal municipal financial involvement behind the facade of a local development association/ board/conference structure, which would normally include local business organisations and very occasionally trades unions as well as munipal authorities. Bristol, for example, pursued its general publicity ambitions by this means,[12] and other early examples were the Tyneside Industrial Development Conference (1926) and similar bodies for Glasgow and District, and Tees and District, (both 1930).[13]

However, municipal financial contributions to such bodies were still illegal, as Felling UDC discovered in October 1926, when it asked for Ministry OF Health approval for contributions to the Tyneside body.[14] As the Minister, Neville Chamberlain, wrote to an M.P. who had taken up Felling's case:

> "I fully appreciate the conditions on Tyneside, but I confess that looked at from the point of view of the country as a whole, the expenditure of public monies on advertising the advantages of one place as against another, does not seem to me a form of public activity to be encouraged."

This was to be the foundation of Ministry of Health policy on this question throughout the period of our concern here, and beyond.[15] How, then, did such bodies and municipalities acting on their own, manage to undertake publicity? The answer seems to be that the county boroughs were able to stand outside the law because central government lacked general audit powers over their operations. The district auditor could force an authority like Felling to desist, but not a Newcastle or a Gateshead. Technically there could be an investigation if any ratepayer objected, but in view of the smallness of the expenditures involved, usually less than a penny rate, and local sensitivity to the need to attract new industries, this was highly unlikely.

In 1931 the Local Authorities (Civic Publicity) Act was passed. This was a

Private Member's Bill, supported by the Government, and promoted by the Travel Association of Great Britain and Ireland, a body which undertook overseas publicity of tourism in the British islands. Shortly afterwards it was renamed the Travel and Industrial Development Association, and it was the approved association in the 1931 Act through which local industrial development publicity was to be channelled, or at least through which it was supposed to be channelled. In practice many local authorities took the Act simply as an encouragement for local publicity, and the most important limitation of the Act, that civic publicity could only be undertaken overseas, was widely ignored.

In the economic recession of the 1930s, therefore, this Act provided a legislative "trigger" for a spate of publicity brochures. Titles were either snappily aliterative, like "Do It At Dundee" (1931), "Barrow in Furness Commercially Considered" (1931), "Wakefield Commercially Considered" (1932) and "Burnley Means Business" (1935), or counterposed the name of the town against some striking motto which emphasised its industry and centrality such as "Birmingham: The Hub of Industrial England" (1932) and "Leeds: The Industrial Centre of the North" (1934). There were other more focussed publicity ventures in addition to these general brochures, and the impression is that these were more successfully targeted on mobile industrialists.[16]

Other parts of central government outside the Ministry of Health seem to have connived in the ignoring over the overseas limitation in the 1931 Act. In particular the Board of Trade's Industrial Adviser in the early 1930s, Sir Horace Wilson, was very much in favour of forming federations of local authorities in depressed regions to undertake publicity work.[17] According to Fogarty this was "... a face-saving expedient for covering up their own inaction",[18] though in fairness it should be added that when central government began to assist the depressed areas, this encouragement continued. Thus Sir Malcolm Stewart, the first Commissioner for the Special Areas was instrumental in the formation of the North Eastern Development Board in 1934 on the model of the earlier bodies for Wales, Lancashire and Scotland.[19] However, this aggregation of the local into a regional dimension to partly mirror the central development of a regional policy did not prevent local: central tensions appearing both over publicity [20] and other matters to be dealt with below.

<u>Operating Concessions on Trading Services</u>: While it is very difficult to assess the impact of any local initiatives, most accounts agree that

publicity's effectiveness lay primarily in drawing attention to real local advantages. One of the most important areas of local authority activities which potentially allowed them to enhance the attractiveness of their areas for manufacturing investment lay in their trading services. Before 1914 West Ham and Derby made use of their electricity services to consciously promote industrial development. Thus the move of Rolls Royce to Derby from Manchester in 1908 seems to owe a good deal to the existence of a municipal electricity supply available on attractive terms, and the enterprise of the local council in drawing this to the firm's attention.[21] At the same time West Ham's electricity department offered a range of incentives to new firms, including cheap rentals of motors and what they claimed was the cheapest electricity in the south of England at 1.25 old pence per unit.[22] Again some success was claimed for this policy.

After the First World War, which accelerated manufacturing reliance on electricity from a public supply, there were several examples of pricing concessions consciously being used to attract new industries. Worcester, for example, offered concessions on electricity and water in the 1920s, with claimed success. Barnsley in 1930 offered concessions on similar services, while Southampton in 1938 was offering "attractive terms" on electricity, water and gas in its attempts to attract industry.[23]

Generally it is much more difficult to identify clear uses of incentive pricing of electricity, especially in the 1930s. While many authorities were offering promotional tariffs by the later 1930s, their main intention was to secure more favourable load factors and promote electricity sales rather than to attract new industries to particular localities.[24] It seems likely that the creation of the Electricity Commissioners in 1919 and the associated standardisation of generation practice, reinforced with the creation of the National Grid by the Central Electricity Board from 1926 greatly undermined the degree of local variation in and local discretion over the conditions of local electricity supply.[25] However this remains a very grey area, and in practice it is very difficult to sort out how particular pricing arrangements with particular industrial users were actually decided.

Even if this impression is correct there remain other areas of trading activity that were of significance for industrial development and seem to have been used by some authorities to consciously promote new firms. Ipswich, for example, used its ownership of the Docks to encourage industrial development,[26] and there are many hints that investigation of local authority

aerodromes might highlight examples of conscious policies to encourage adjacent industrial development.[27] Generally though the use of trading services as part of industrial promotion strategies remains greatly under-researched.

Land/Buildings Provision: In contrast to the uncertainties about the trading services, the development of initiatives based around land and building provision is more clearly documented. By the 1930s many authorities were involved in such schemes, including Liverpool, Manchester, Rotherham, Wakefield, Derby, Burnley, Bacup, Croydon, Southampton and Jarrow. There were many variations in the manner in which the policies were developed. Thus Croydon seems to have been primarily motivated by a desire by the municipality to enjoy financial returns from otherwise surplus lands; this may also have been a factor in Southampton.[28] In Liverpool and Manchester town planning objectives were very significant, though in Liverpool the promotional dimension was certainly more important in the development of the Speke and Fazakerley (Aintree) industrial estates. Liverpool was also important in that it was the first local authority to secure specific powers to promote industrial development in its 1936 Corporation Act.[29] This Act was primarily intended to give the city the power to develop its Speke satellite town on similar lines to those granted in 1930 to Manchester for its Wythenshawe development; however the Liverpool Act was the first one to specify factory development powers.

Not all schemes showed this link between planning and promotion, nor indeed this concern about legal niceties. Burnley based its ambitious 1935-7 promotion scheme on the acquisition and reconditioning of empty cotton mills, replacing steam engines with municipal electricity, and thus effectively municipalising the 'room and power' function formerly provided by private companies.[30] Yet it had no specific powers for these actions, nor for the new modern factory which it constructed for the branch plant of an American hardware company in 1937. Total spending on the scheme was equivalent to about a third of the town's rateable value, and though the council applied for a loan sanction, there was no certainty that this would be granted, and alternative plans for a single massive rate increase were made. In the event the loan was sanctioned after a local inquiry, but the council was told not to repeat this strategy.[31]

Most clearly indicative of the underlying tensions present in local promotion was the case of Jarrow.[32] Reflecting frustration at the repeated inaction of

central government in dealing with the problems of the town, even after it had been included within the Special Area declared in 1934, Jarrow Council decided in 1936 to seek local powers to promote new industrial development. The proposed Bill included publicity and land development and financial powers, the latter closely following those adopted in Liverpool. There were great central misgivings about the Bill and the general principles involved:

> "It is at least doubtful whether it is desirable from a general point of view for Local Authorities, even of the calibre of Liverpool, to possess powers of this character. Local enthusiasm has been found to outrun discretion and the temptation to try and get round the safeguards, usually inserted in such acts, to prevent lease or sale at less than the economic price is serious...
>
> At the present time, however, outside the Special Areas, there is no organization charged with the duty of planning the location of industry either generally or regionally. Accordingly it has been necessary to adopt the attitude that local initiative must play a primary part in securing new industrial undertakings. Even in the Special Areas the Government has been tempted to use this argument in answering representatives of areas which are disappointed because a new undertaking has not been set up there. In such circumstances it is somewhat difficult now that a Local Authority is showing very definite initiative to say that it is wrong for Parliament to grant the powers desired".[33]

With some toning down, Jarrow got its powers in 1939, though the war period saw the development of a national location of industry policy, and specific central action in Jarrow that made them largely irrelevant.

3. General Issues

There is a great deal more we need to know about local promotion. Some of the research questions are potentially very big ones. The issue of central:local tensions is one such. Was local promotion doomed to a partially submerged existence (to reduce central resistance), because of the centralizing tendencies of the British state mirroring those of industrial capital itself? Were in fact such local policies only present at all because the central state was slow to move towards national policy? Another large question is why councils, many of them under Labour control, (e.g. Jarrow and Burnley, though not Liverpool) seem to have sought merely the local reproduction of capitalist production; were there any experiments in co-operative production such as are now fashionable? These do not exhaust the possibilities, but it is clear that

with these and other theoretical questions go a much wider range of more empirical questions. The very localised character of promotional initiatives, the absence of any real central guidance and its non-professionalisation as an area of official activity mean that our knowledge as historians can initially only develop through good local studies of how and why such initiatives developed. We still cannot say with any certainty what kind of authorities were most/least active, or followed particular mixes of policy. As noted earlier the cloud of unknowing about the exact importance of trading services is particularly dense. And we need to know more about the detailed relationships between local and the developing regional policy dimension in the 1930s. Not least, of course, is how effective such promotional schemes were; even with full information it is not an easy question to answer.

So I will end by encouraging planning historians not to neglect this area of activity. Or at the very least tell me about the initiatives they have come across!

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THE SCOTT REPORT - A PERSONAL PERSPECTIVE

Sir Basil Engholm,K.C.B.

(Note:- During the second World War, three planning reports of considerable long-term significance were published in Britain. The first, by the Royal Commission on the Distribution of the Industrial Population (the Barlow report) was prepared before the war, and published in 1940. The second was the report of the Committee on Land Utilization in Rural Areas (the Scott report), published in 1942. The third consisted of an interim and final report of the Expert Committee on Compensation and Betterment (the Uthwatt report), also published in 1942. Sir Basil Engholm joined the Ministry of Agriculture in 1935, and became Principal Private Secretary to the Minister in 1943. He was appointed Assistant Secretary in 1945, Under Secretary in 1954, and retired as Permanent Secretary of the Ministry in 1972.)

It is now over fifty years since the Scott Committee, of which I was joint secretary, reported. Memories grow dim, but in looking back, some of the main images have perhaps become simplified, and so clearer - perhaps too clear! It may perhaps be of interest to try and recall some of the reasons why the Committee was set up in the middle of a war, why it reported in the way it did, and whether its recommendations have had any influence on politics and policy in the years that have followed. Was it worthwhile, or just another bundle of waste paper that need never have happened?

To try and answer some of these questions, it is necessary to think back to the conditions before the 1939/45 war. Agriculture in the 1930s was a depressed industry, and the Ministry of Agriculture was the graveyard of politicians. The general view of many economists and of the Treasury was that agriculture was an expensive luxury that we could not afford. Far better and cheaper to import our main foods - cereals, beef, lamb, butter, sugar, and much of our fruit and vegetables. The land thus released could be used for decentralised industry, housing, recreation for the urban population, and forestry, with a sprinkling of dairy farming and market-gardening to provide fresh milk, and vegetables, and flowers.

Then came the war. Suddenly food production was vital. Agriculture became a front-line industry, not just a way of life. Our farms were modernised, and our farming mechanised with the manufacture and import of sophisticated agricultural machinery. The stored-up fertility of the land was exploited, and the incompetent farmer was dispossessed as his land was too valuable to waste. Agriculture became an efficient and thriving industry that at last gained respectability - at any rate for the time being. In the space of two or three years agriculture had moved right up the pecking order, and all those in the industry, in associated industries and in the Ministry of Agriculture

did not want it to slip back again. They knew that leopards do not change their spots, and that the Treasury, the economists, and the industrialists would quickly relegate agriculture to the scrap heap as soon as the nation was no longer dependant upon the food it produced. They, therefore, wanted to establish its place in the sun, and to make sure that it had an honourable part to play in the post-war reconstruction plans.

The opportunity came with the refusal of the Royal Commission on the distribution of the industrial population to recognize agriculture as an industry, or even to consider what the effect on agriculture might be of its recommendations in favour of dispersing industry, and the workers in it, into the countryside. The Ministry of Agriculture pressed hard that this gap should be made good, and in 1941 the importance of the agricultural industry made this pressure effective. The case for a further committee to consider the agricultural arguments on industrial dispersal was conceded, and it was set up with terms of reference closely related to the recommendations of the Royal Commission:

> "to consider the conditions that should govern building and other constructional development in country areas consistently with the maintenance of agriculture and in particular the factors affecting the location of industry, having regard to economic operation, part-time and seasonal employment, the well-being of rural communities and the preservation of rural amenities."

Notice the underlined words! It is now assumed that agriculture will continue to be important, and must be maintained, while the well-being of rural communities is stressed. This was a fundamental change from the pre-war attitude to agriculture, and the rural community.

Moreover it was underlined by the composition of the Committee. The Chairman was a judge who lived in the countryside, and was known to be sympathetic to agriculture and the rural community. As regards members, at least seven had their roots in the countryside. There was a geographer, basically concerned with rural land-use, agriculture, and the countryside: there was a rural land agent; an eminent lady responsible for the Woman's Land Army; a member from the rural local authorities; an agricultural worker; a prominent agricultural land-owner; a farmer; and finally, one of the joint secretaries was an official of the Ministry of Agriculture. Such a committee was almost bound to make recommendations favourable to agriculture and the countryside, and to construe its terms of reference in the widest possible way.

This was reinsured by the appointment of the geographer, Professor Dudley

Stamp, as Vice-Chairman. His powerful personality, his sweeping and generalised views, and his quick assertion of a captivating influence over the Chairman, dominated the work of the committee. It should really have become known as the Stamp report, not the Scott report, since it was Dudley Stamp's views on the interpretation of the terms of reference, on the subjects to be included, and on the recommendations to be made, that swayed the Committee, and almost invariably carried the day. Professor Stamp could not, of course, do it single-handed, and he looked to the secretariat for help. Thomas Sharp was a temporary civil servant, his real profession being that of a distinguished author who had written a number of books on the rural landscape. He was serving in the Ministry of Works and Planning, and his background and the official views he tended to represent seemed to favour a view of the countryside as a rural amenity for the enjoyment of the urban population rather than the cradle of a vital industry. I, on the other hand, was a career civil servant from the Ministry of Agriculture with views influenced by my official background, which tended to chime in with the outlook and sympathies of Professor Stamp. (Indeed as a result of meeting on the Committee, we became personal friends, a friendship which lasted until Dudley's death.) It was, therefore, natural that he should look to me primarily for support, and much of the structure of the Committee's report and the recommendations which emerged, resulted from this collaboration, with the benign backing of the Chairman.

Dudley Stamp's concept for the report was on a grandiose scale. He was anxious that it should establish once and for all the continuing importance of British agriculture in peacetime, and so the necessity of planning the use of land against that background. At the same time he felt strongly that there should not be an apartheid between the countryside and the urban and industrial centres. He was therefore strongly in favour of the limited decentralisation of suitable industry into the small towns in the countryside where, together with the extractive industries, it could provide diversification, and give alternative employment to the young, without forcing them to move into the towns. In addition he wanted the urban population to have the ability to use the countryside under proper safeguards for recreational purposes, and to this end he was keen that the beauty of the countryside should be conserved. Hence the recommendations about all agricultural buildings being subject to planning control, and the delineation and maintenance of footpaths - neither of which recommendations was very population with the farmers. He also persuaded the chairman and his colleagues on the committee to take a very generous view of the terms of

reference. The Report covered almost every conceivable and inconceivable matter which could impinge on agriculture and the countryside, and went on to detail, as a suggestion, the machinery of government which should be set up to undertake planning work; it even outlined a first five-year plan for implementing the multifarious recommendations included in the report. Dudley Stamp was nothing if not thorough, even if some of his ideas were based on slender evidence. The astonishing thing was his ability to persuade the Chairman and most of his colleagues of the rightness of his views, so that with one exception, a unanimous report was achieved on far-reaching and comprehensive recommendations.

The exception was the Minority Report of Professor Dennison. Dennison was an economist of the pre-war school of thought, who believed that land use should be planned on the basis of what use was likely to yield the best short-term financial return. If good quality agricultural land was taken for development, then other agricultural land would be improved to take its place. Dennison also argued that it would be impossible to maintain a high-cost and large agricultural industry in peacetime without unjustifiable subsidies from the government, and that even in war, it was better to rely upon foodstocks built up in peacetime, and on food convoys, than an agriculture using manpower and other scarce resources. It was soon clear that the views held by Stamp and the majority of the Committee were never going to find favour with Dennison, and although Lord Justice Scott made an attempt to find a compromise which would be acceptable to both sides, this was soon abandoned as impossible. From fairly early on in the Committtee's existence, therefore, it was accepted as inevitable that Dennison would put in a minority report. This was a pity in many ways since it meant that his views, which might have modified some of the recommendations, and injected a more realistic appreciation of the orthodox economic arguments, were to all intents and purposes ignored.

The result was a Report with recommendations on almost every conceivable aspect of the development of agriculture, the use of the countryside for recreation, and their location, the machinery of government for planning, and the implementation of the recommendations through a five-year plan. No member of the Committee could have hoped that any government would have been prepared to adopt all these recommendations wholesale, and, of course, the government didn't. But the Report did do one very important thing. It put agriculture on the map in the developing world of planning. Agricultural matters such as land quality, types of farming, and farm boundaries became accepted factors to

be considered in planning, and this has continued until the present day. The maps of land utilisation, land classification, and types of farming developed by Dudley Stamp and the Ministry of Agriculture became recognized tools of the planning trade. The Ministry of Agriculture also set up a corps of Rural Land Utilation officers under Professor Stamp to advise in the regions on the agricultural and forestry aspects of planning. This carving-out of a place for agriculture in the world of planning was perhaps the most significant achievement of the Report, and for this alone, the Report was worthwhile.

THE BARLOW REPORT AND DEVELOPMENT OF BRITISH 'REGIONAL POLICY'[1]

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1. Introduction

In the 1960s planners and geographers argued ad nauseam, and with little effect, that politicians were more obsessed with avoiding history repeating itself in the 'depressed areas' than with facing up to the contemporary need for an integrated regional planning approach to 'local unemployment' - as had long ago been recommended by the famous Barlow report. However, the sense of frustration in the planning community with the failure of successive governments to adopt a more coordinated strategy to 'regional balance' owed much to the evolutionary view of the history of regional policy which underpinned the arguments advanced by regional planners. It was a history which comes across in the textbooks something like this: Malcolm Stewart and the 'Special Areas' led to the Barlow report, which in turn begat the 1945 Distribution of Industry Act and modern regional policy.

Now, in the light of this kind of historical framework - which viewed post-war policies coming out of pre-war recommendations - it was little wonder that planners could not quite comprehend why policy makers still persisted in applying the 'economics of Stockton on Tees'[2] in the sixties. It is quite noticeable that histories of the development of British regional policy almost entirely pass over the consideration of the impact of the Second World War. Gavin McCrone's Regional Policy in Britain, perhaps one of the most influential texts, pauses only to discuss the war in between chapters on the 'pre' and post-war years.[3] A major feature of Dr. McCrone's book and other studies is the degree to which they stress the continuity of the pre-war and post-war policies, and identify the main reason for this being the role played by the Barlow report.[4] Again, in Professor Peter Hall's Urban and Regional Planning, a similar emphasis on the 'evolutionary' progress of regional policy from the Royal Commission report to the legislation of the 1940s is to be found.[5] Now, whilst giving due emphasis to Barlow in the field of physical planning, Hall, in common with many other commentators, omits to differentiate between the progress of Town and Country physical planning on the one hand, and that of location of industry and unemployment on the other.

Concentrating on the consensual ideological pre-war origins of the policies which emerged during the Second World War has led to a misreading of the actual development of regional policy. It is, we would argue, over-simplifying matters to describe the emergence of the 1945 Development Areas legislation as the outcome of the plans of those whom Addison refers to as the 'architects of reconstruction and consensus'.[6] Indeed, viewing the development of distribution of industry policy in this manner is to fundamentally misinterpret the relationship between pre-war ideas and war-time practice, and also to fall into the error of seeing too simplistic a correspondence between ideas and public policy making. Perhaps the most important questions relate not to the process wherein ideas are translated or converted into new 'policy' so much as the mediation of those ideas into forms that remain acceptable within existing policy objectives. Accounts of policy development by McCrone, Hall et al show how vitally important pre-war thinking was to the origins and growth of 'regional policy'. However, this influence of pre-war recommendations and practice on war time measures is not evident in official documentation. What is interesting about the development of 'regional policy' is the extent to which governments incorporated prevailing concepts and lunguage to justify or legitimise their own policies; the evolution of regional policy was a process of accommodation and assimilation rather than adaptation and change. The 1944 White Paper on employment, for example, refers to the Barlow report, and utilises the notion (later to be criticised for its vagueness) of 'balanced industrial development'. Subsequently, Barlow, Stewart, the 1944 White Paper and the 1945 Distribution of Industry Act were to be grouped together, and thereafter in textbooks of the nineteen fifties and sixties the linkage became firmly established as being 'the historical background' to regional policy. And, of course, regional planners in the fifties and sixties could by pointing to the ideas put forward in the Stewart and Barlow reports highlight the failure of successive governments to implement ideas which had been accepted as far back as the nineteen thirties! The ideas of the 'devil's decade' became, as it were, a benchmark against which to evaluate government performance in the 'New Elizabethan era' and an orthodoxy which, as Hall notes, became difficult to shake.[7]

It is somewhat problematical, but necessary, to separate the 'objective' history of regional policy in the war, derived from official sources and biography, from the more 'subjective' versions offered by regional economists, geographers and planners, based on certain assumptions about the connection between ideas and policies. For, by setting regional policy in the context of

the Barlow report - as opposed to war-time administration and reconstruction plans - the history of regional policy has long been obscured rather than illuminated. And, at the same time, the mistaking of influence for what was actually assimilation inevitably led to an exaggerated (self) perception of the impact of a whole generation of planners, and what was their manifesto, the Barlow report.

2. Whatever happened to the Barlow report?

The fate of the Royal Commission report was sealed early on in the life of the war time coalition. Lord Reith, ever desirous of extending his remit as Minister for Works, took up the report in December 1940 and pressed for the setting up of a national planning authority which would be responsible for physical and economic planning.[8] Reith's recommendations met with little administrative or political support, and a good deal of hostility. After a number of meetings of a sub-committee on the location of industry Barlow's argument for 'integrated' planning was effectively off the agenda.[9] Physical planning went one way - in the Scott and Uthwatt reports - and the issue of the depressed areas, the issue which had initiated the Royal Commission went another - into the discussions surrounding 'full employment'. Crucial roles in all this were played by: Bevin, the Minister of Labour, who had sat briefly on the Barlow Commission and against Conservative opposition championed the cause of the development areas; Dalton, who had his own ideas on the depressed areas problem dating from his chairmanship of a Labour party commission on the depressed areas before the war; and Jay, who was responsible for the development of location of industry policy and the Board of Trade's contribution to the 1944 White Paper. The evidence, both of official documents and recent biography [10] shows that the Barlow report had a negligible impact on the evolution of policy from 1939 to 1945. The 1945 Distribution of Industry Act and the section dealing with the distribution of industry in the 1944 White Paper were essentially the product of war time experience and controls, particularly the expansion of the role of the Board of Trade and the economic ideas of Bevin, Dalton and Jay. This may be borne out by contrasting the purely economic role defined for 'distribution of industry' by the 1944 White paper and the 1945 Act with Beveridge's Full Employment in a Free Society[11] which was far more in keeping with the thrust of the Barlow report.

The White Paper, when set against Beveridge's Full Employment was, from the 'regional policy' point of view, if not others, not a radical document.

Whereas Beveridge sought to define what he conceived as the intrinsic inter-relationship between levels of economic demand, locational controls, labour mobility, governmental reform and geographical balance, the White Paper adhered to a strictly economic conception of the policy based upon defining areas for special assistance. It was a conception which reflects not merely a coalition compromise, but rather a general disassociation of the government from these realms between physical and economic planning. This has led McKay and Cox to characterize the White paper on employment as something of a '... defeat for an integrated, economic and physical planning approach to Britain's social and economic problems.'[12] By 1944, they argue, '... it was clear' that though there would be physical planning and industrial location policies these would not 'be co-ordinated together under one administrative arm'. This was due, they claim, to what they describe as 'institutional inertia' or instititutional 'myopia at the heart of central government decision-making between 1940 and 1945'.[13] However, this interpretation of events is somewhat mistaken. The 'clearest' thing to emerge from an analysis of the history of policy in this period was that the Barlow report was not being advocated by any leading politician within the coalition, apart from Beveridge, who was by this time, persona non grata. If there was a conspiracy against regional planning it was a widely shared and open agreement as to the purpose of distribution of industry policy within the management of the economy. A Labour planner such as Jay not only did not see the role of distribution policy in the context of Barlow,[14] but as is noticeable in the 1960s, was himself quite hostile to the very idea of 'regional planning'.[15] The 1944 White Paper was less a sign of the conspiracy against, or defeat of, planning by civil servants defending departmental interests, than an illustration of how successfully the concepts put forward in Barlow had been incorporated within the new economic paradigm - 'demand management' and 'full employment'.

3. The road from 1945

The interplay between the kind of ideas put forward by the Royal Commission and Stewart reports and the course of policy in the Second World War, is a relationship of some complexity. Pre-war thinking had undeniably helped to shape the broad agenda of discussion and the language of debate. Barlow's recommendations were important contributions to the formation of a general consensus, and provided a source of legitimacy for further extensions of state intervention in the economy. But the onset of the war and the commencement of the reconstruction debate the issue of the distribution of industry and localised unemployment became inextricably linked. At the start, the two

issues - physical planning and industrial location - took separate paths. Paths that may well be considered as running parallel, but nonetheless distinct in their origins and purpose. Where the confusion arises is in the way in which both the 1944 White Paper and the 1945 Act evoked the ideas of the Barlow report; the two principles of the dangers of over-concentration and the need to distribute and balance industry were accepted. But the main argument for the integration of regional and economic planning, as Beveridge argued, was avoided. In one sense, therefore, the 1945 Act was, as The Times put it, a 'triumph' for Barlow, but a triumph of form over substance. The Economist's observations were somewhat more accurate than The Times': the Act was, it concluded, 'very far' from the nationwide planning recommended by the Barlow report - balanced industrial distribution was, it argued, 'largely untouched' by the legislation.[16] The policy which emerged in 1945, and that laid the foundations for the post-war period until the early sixties was, in reality, shaped by a number of pressures: Keynesian political economy which, for the most part, viewed the problem of structural and localised unemployment in terms of demand rather than production or physical planning; the political commitment and strategy of Labour members of the coalition, without whom the 1945 Act would certainly not have been forthcoming; and more generally, the administrative necessities of a war economy. Viewing the development of policy as an outcome of pre-war thinking is to misunderstand the influence of regional planning ideas. As a comparison with Full Employment in a Free Society demonstrates, the strategy which emerged in 1944-5 was based upon an entirely different rationale to that of the kind of approach advocated by Barlow and Beveridge. It was a difference which was destined to become all too apparent in the post-war era.

Notes

1. This article is based on the present author's The Political Economy of British Regional Policy, (Croom Helm, London, 1985) forthcoming.
2. cf. S. Brittan's Steering the Economy, the Role of the Treasury, (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1969). p.203
3. Allen and Unwin, London, 1969, pp.104-6.
4. Ibid., p.104. A widely read account of the war by Henry Pelling, Britain and the Second World War, (Fontana, London, 1970), presents this view when he argues that: "...(the) Act was really an outcome of the recommendations of the Barlow Commission, which had completed its work before the outbreak of the war". (pp.300-1).
5. P. Hall, Urban and Regional Planning, (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1975), p.99
6. P. Addison, The Road to 1945: British Politics and the Second World War, (Cape, London, 1975), p.182.
7. Hall, op.cit, p.93.
8. See W.P.(G) (4) 311, 31st December 1940.
9. Reith, in his Diaries, C. Stuart, Reith Diaries, (Collins, London, 1975), (p.277) refers to it as 'Greenwood's silly committee'.

10. The most complete account of wartime experience based on the Public Records material is A. Booth's 'The Second World War and the Origins of Modern Regional Policy', Economy and Society, Vol.11, no.1 (1982), D. Jay's Change and Fortune, (Hutchinson, London, 1980) is also indispensible to the understanding of this period.
11. Allen and Unwin, London, 1944
12. D.H. McKay and A.W. Cox, The Politics of Urban Change, (Croom Helm, London 1981), p.196.
13. Ibid
14. In an interview with the author (14th December 1979) Jay argued that he was far too busy to read the Barlow report.
15. cf. his article in New Society. 'How much Regional Planning'. 7th March, 1963.
16. The Economist, 3rd March 1945, pp.270-2.

SELLIER AND UNWIN

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It is well known that Henri Sellier, the person chiefly responsible for the cités-jardins built in the Paris region in the 1920s and 30s, greatly admired Raymond Unwin, and indeed that he derived a great deal of his thinking about cites-jardins from Unwin.[1] But what exactly did Sellier learn from Unwin? There were so many phases in Unwin's career, and so many aspects to his thinking, that just to say 'Sellier learned a good deal from Unwin' does not, in itself, get us very far. Was it Unwin the arts-and crafts socialist and disciple of William Morris? Unwin the picturesque domestic architect? The advocate of standardisation? The town planning expert? The advocate of building research? The regional planner? In particular, the causes with which Unwin was identified when he first established a European reputation before the First World War were rather different from those he espoused after the War and in the 1920s. In the first case, as architect of Hampstead Garden Suburb (1905-) and as author of Town Planning in Practice (1909), his work assumed only a limited intervention by the state into the production of housing: production by private enterprise was still taken as the norm, the question being precisely how to regulate and improve it so as to make its products satisfactory. But in the second case, as principal author of the Tudor Walters Report (1918) and as chief architect at the Ministry of Health (1919-), Unwin was clearly identified with the assumption by the state of responsibility for housing production: the state was not just to regulate private enterprise, as the notion of 'town planning' implied, but actually to replace it in the production of housing.

These remarks indicate that it was possible to 'learn from' Unwin a number of different 'lessons'; or, in other words, to 'read' Unwin in a number of different ways. In this paper I wish to establish the way in which Unwin was read by Sellier. I shall not be concerned to establish the extent of Sellier's indebtedness to Unwin; the question whether Sellier's thinking was really as dependent on Unwin as Sellier himself made out is one that will have to be dealt with elsewhere. My aim is merely to establish from which part of Unwin's work it was that Sellier drew when he studied Unwin. To do this I shall focus on the statement on the concept and design of the cité-jardins written by Sellier and dated 1 January 1919, entitled 'Le rôle et les méthodes de l'Office public des habitations à bon marché du département de la Seine'.[2] I shall argue that, while Sellier referred repeatedly to, and quoted

extensively from, Unwin, the Unwin on which he drew was exclusively the Unwin of the early (pre-1914) period, that is, of Hampstead Garden Suburb and Town Planning in Practice. This meant that Sellier omitted the changes in Unwin's thinking brought about by the War. As regards design, these changes were perhaps not very important. But was regards policy, Unwin's thinking changed very markedly between Town Planning in Practice (1909) and the Tudor Walters Report (1918). From the idea of a limited intervention by the state ('town planning'), Unwin had moved to the idea of the state accepting responsibility for housing ('municipal housing').[3] Sellier's exclusive reliance on Town Planning in Practice for his understanding of Unwin meant that Sellier's 1919 policy for cités-jardins was, in the European housing context, decidely old-fashioned.

In looking at the reading of Unwin revealed by this text of Sellier, it will be convenient to deal first with the design, and then with the policy, of the cité-jardins.

In describing the general principles to be followed by the architects of the Office Public in the design of the cités-jardins, Sellier made frequent reference to Unwin, particularly to Hampstead Garden Suburb and Town Planning in Town Planning in Practice (Fig I).



Fig.1. One of the many illustrations from Unwin's Town Planning in Practice reproduced by Sellier.

There were several drawings and photographs of Hampstead, as well as diagrams from Town Planning in Practice. The latter, which Sellier rendered into French as La Practique de l'amenagement des villes, was repeatedly cited as the authoritative text of the international garden city movement. For instance:

> Pour ce qui est des règles générales de détermination des plans, nous ne pouvons que nous référer aux nombreuses publications anglaises et allemands... et notamment au remarkable ouvrage de Raymond Unwin qui se constitute la synthèse, aussi complète que possible, de toutes ces publications. (pp.265-6)

Entire sections of Unwin's book, sometimes several pages long, were translated by Sellier and reproduced verbatim. Perhaps the most important of these was in the section of the text where Sellier discussed the methods by which the

site plan was prepared. Here Sellier wrote:

> Les principes posés dans le chapitre IV du remarkable ouvrage de l'éminent architecte anglais, La Pratique de l'amenagement des villes, chapitre relatif aux études préalables à l'élaboration d'un plan, ont été exactement appliqués par les architectes de l'Office.

He then devoted the next two pages to a translation of the main paragraphs from this chapter: those in which Unwin argued that the site plan must derive from a study of site conditions, topography, access and traffic requirements, etc., and not from the preconceived idea of the architect. Sellier commented:

> On ne saurait mieux exprimer le sens de la méthode générale suivant laquelle ont travaillé d'un commun accord les architectes de l'Office... (p.260)

On other elements of site planning also Sellier quoted Unwin with enthusiasm, (Fig.II). He quoted at length the critique made by Unwin of the aesthetic effect produced by detached and semi-detached houses, including Unwin's conclusion that the only answer was 'grouping'. The format developed by Unwin to achieve this - the combination of four dwellings into a single building, with a passageway running through the middle at ground level to provide rear access - was likewise endorsed by Sellier.



Fig.2 Advantages of the cul-de-sac: diagram from Sellier, following ill.4 in the Tudor Walters Report. Sellier's description of the cul-de-sac as simply 'le plan rationnel' exemplifies the way he perceived Unwin's work.

Similarly on the decoration of roads by planting, Sellier stated:

> Unwin fournit à cet égard un certain nombre de suggestions que nous estimons devoir être retenues. (p.273)

and went on to quote four pages of Town Planning in Practice. On the question of boundaries and walls Sellier stated:

> Sur ce point encore, nous ne saurions mieux faire que de reproduire les explications formulées par Unwin dans l'avant-dernier chapitre de son ouvrage...(pp.282-3)

Only on one point of design did Sellier actually take exception to Unwin. This was on the question of the relationship between individual variety and overall harmony in design. Unwin's view was that 'the variety of each building must be dominated by the harmony of the whole'. But for Sellier the danger was not of excessive variety, but of excessive uniformity and monotony, brought about by the use of standard dwelling types. In this context he even ventured a criticism of English practice.

> L'un des défauts de certains villages anglais aménagés pendant ces dernières années consiste justement à construire... des immeubles de même type se répétant indéfiniment sur des centaines et des centaines de mètres et dégageant une impression d'uniformité des plus fâcheuses. (pp.285-6).

By this date (1918-19) this was a criticism being made by some of those who had seen the housing schemes designed by Unwin for the Ministry of Munitions, particularly at Gretna (1916-). Whether Sellier had visited these schemes himself, or was relying on reports and photographs, is not clear.

All this, it should be noted, did not mean that everything about designing in Town Planning in Practice found its way into Sellier's text, or, conversely, that everything about designing in Sellier's text was also to be found in Town Planning in Practice. Such was manifestly not the case. The limitation on housing density (the 'twelve houses to the acre' rule) was fundamental to Unwin but was not mentioned by Sellier; equally the use of apartment blocks, which was important to Sellier, would definitely not have been endorsed in Town Planning in Practice (see illustration on back cover). The point is simply that, whenever Sellier cited Unwin on the design of the cite-jardins, it was the early Unwin of Town Planning in Practice that he cited.

What about the concept of the cité-jardins? What was to be its role in the development process, the mechanics of its construction, its relationship to

both private enterprise and the state? Here again we find Sellier drawing extensively on Unwin; and here again it is on the early Unwin of Town Planning in Practice that he draws.

Sellier noted that the term 'cité-jardins' was confusing and had several different meanings. What he meant by the term, he said, was not the garden city idea per se, as formulated in theory by Ebenezer Howard and put into practice at Letchworth Garden City (1903-). Rather it was the idea of the garden suburb, involving more diffuse notions of urban improvement and reform, as realised for instance at Hampstead. In such schemes, he said,

> nous percevons dans l'esprit des instigateurs du mouvement des cités-jardins un sens des nécessités sociales, un désir d'organiser une vie commune et de procurer à tous les jouissances réservées à quelques-uns... (p.256)

The role of the Office Public was not to conduct social experiments like Letchworth, but to undertake the realistic task of showing developes that, even within existing economic constraints, it was possible to produce an environment that met basic requirements of health, beauty and social life. The Office Public, he stated:

> a un objet bien limité et bien défini qui consiste à édifier les agglomérations propres à assurer le décongestionnement de la Ville de Paris et de ses faubourgs, à servir d'example aux lottisseurs qui depuis trente ans ont littéralement saboté le banlieue et à montrer comment, tout en tenant compte des conditions économiques et morales normales de la vie urbaine, il est possible d'assurer à la population laborieuses, manuelle et intellectuelle un logement présentant le maximum de confort matériel, des conditions hygiéniques de nature à éliminer les inconvénients des grandes villes, et des modes d'aménagement esthétique contrastant singulierement avec la hideur des formules antérieurement pratiquees. (pp.257-8).

Such too had been the programme at Hampstead Garden Suburb.

Sellier states that in achieving this goal, there were two essential requirements: both the increment in land values brought about by development, and aesthetic control over that development, had to remain in the hands of the community - in this case, as represented by the Office Public. These were two of the essential elements in Howard's garden city idea that had been taken over unchanged in garden suburbs such as Hampstead. The absence in France of a leasehold system, Sellier warned, would make this difficult, but it was absolutely essential that it be achieved. Under the heading, 'Nécessité d'écarter toute spéculation et d'imposer des servitudes rigoreuses', Sellier wrote:

> Que les maisons soient ultérieurement construites par l'Office, qu'elles

soient edifiees par une societe cooperative d'habitations à bon marché ou éventuellement, comme cela a été suggeré, qu'elles soient bâties sous le régime de la réglementation légale relative a la petite propriété, leur édification doit être soumise à des règles précises dont il importe essentiellement de ne pas se départire. Il est indispensable, de meme, que les terrains puissent échapper a la spéculation...(p.262).

And again, in summarising, the major principles to be followed by the Office Public, he reiterated the point. It would be the job of the Office to ensure

le droit éminent de la collectivité en ce qui concerne la recupération des plus values, l'élimination de toute espece de spéculation individuelle et le sauvegarde des règles esthétiques et hygiéniques qui sont à la base de ses projets. (p.291)

Such too had been the role of the Hampstead Garden Suburb Trust. Like the Trust, the Public Office would look to other bodies to build the houses, but would maintain aesthetic control and keep the increment in land values for the community. The only question was how best this was to be achieved.

The cités-jardins of the Office Public would resemble Hampstead Garden Suburb also in that they would cater, not just for the working class, but for all classes of the community. Sellier stated: 'les cités-jardins, telles que nouse les conceivons, ne peuvent être destinées à une catégorie restreinte de la population'. In this passage Sellier quoted with approval the paragraph from Town Planning in Practice in which Unwin described the ideal of the mixed community pursued at Hampstead Garden Suburb.

Il n'y a certainement, dit Unwin, aucune difficulté à mélanger des maisons de dimensions différentes dans des limites plus ou moins grandes... La croissance de faubourgs habités seulement par une classe d'individus est fâcheuse au point de vue sociale, économique et esthétique. (p.287)

The answer, as at Hampstead Garden Suburb, was social mix: 'Nous devons engager, dit Unwin, le médecin à vivre au milieu de ses clients...'. Such a system also had the advantage that the ground rents paid by the wealthy could be used to subsidise those paid by the poor.

Si l'on veut tirer de certaines parties des terraines des revenus plus élèves, susceptibles d'aboutir à la diminution du prix des loyers sur d'autres parties, il s'impose de construire des villas à loyers élevés, dans les parties les plus agréables. (p.288)

Here again, in the concept of an internal subsidy system operating within the boundaries of the cite-jardins, Sellier's thinking was in accord with the policy followed at Hampstead Garden Suburb.

The significance of all this can best be grasped, perhaps, by comparing the

programme put forward in Sellier's text with that proposed in another document of the same period. Published two months earlier than Sellier's text, the Tudor Walters Report was, of course, far larger in scope and context; but like the Sellier text, its purpose was to make recommendations on housing policy for the post-war period.

An official British government report on the design and construction of housing, the Tudor Walters Report was written largely by Raymond Unwin. On matters of design it did not depart radically from what Unwin had written in Town Planning in Practice, although of course it added to it. But on housing policy, it called for something quite different. Whereas Unwin in 1909 had taken the regulation and improvement of private enterprise as the task, in 1918 he believed that private enterprise was incapable of dealing with the housing problem and that the government, acting through the municipalities, would have to undertake to build houses itself; and it was on this assumption that the Tudor Walters Report was based. As events turned out, not just in Britain, but in Europe more generally, this was more or less what happened; and as a result in the 1920s the Tudor Walters Report came to be widely regarded as the 'bible' of the new state housing.

On questions of design, Sellier's 'Le role et les methodes...' resembled the Tudor Walters Report, in so far as it summarised Unwin's earlier work, particularly Town Planning in Practice. But unlike the Tudor Walters Report, its recommendations on policy were also those of Town Planning in Practice. Like the Hampstead Garden Suburb Trust, the Public Office would acquire land and lay it out for building, but get other bodies (either individuals or societies) to undertake the task of building, rather than build all the houses itself. Its role was to regulate and inspire, not to replace, private enterprise in the production of housing. It was a programme closer to the pre-war garden city idea of town planning than to the idea of municipal housing that most countries were to follow in the 1920s.

This paper began by noting the variety of causes with which Unwin was identified at various times in his career. What has emerged from the examination of Sellier's text, 'Le role et les methodes...', is that Sellier's thinking in 1919 indeed drew a good deal from Unwin: but it was from the Unwin of 1909, not 1918 - the Unwin of town planning, not of municipal housing - that Sellier drew.

Fig. 3 - on back cover. Sellier's cité-jardins of Suresnes (July 1919): mixture of English cottages and Parisian apartment blocks on a perimeter block layout, in an early part of the scheme.

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2. H. Sellier, La Crise du Logement et l'Intervention publique en matiere d'Habitation populaire dans l'agglomeration parisienne (Paris, 1921).
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WHOSE VISION? A RE-EXAMINATION OF THE FOUNDING OF ADELAIDE, SOUTH AUSTRALIA

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The city of Adelaide (1837) is well-known in the history of urban design. Its plan is attributed to the first Surveyor General of South Australia, Colonel William Light, whose statue, hand raised like Banquo's to claim the vision as his own, looks from Montefiore Hill. The effigy presents Light as parochial hero. He certainly had heroic qualities: the illegitimate son of an English adventurer and a Eurasian mother; a veteran of the Napoleonic wars and a comrade of Wellington; dying of consumption; misunderstood by his masters; living in sin with Maria Gandy -- these all added to his romantic aura.

Because he was officially responsible for the foundation of Adelaide, the title of Founder is his. But there is doubt that he conceived the plan; whether he chose the site is a matter which must also be re-examined. Much points to his deputy, George Strickland Kingston, as both designer and founder.

A blunt Irishman trained as a civil engineer, Kingston is remembered in South Australia for his architecture but chiefly for his political contribution to the colony. Attracted to the venture in 1834, he moved to London from Birmingham, expecting an official appointment; for over a year he worked unpaid for the Colonization Commission. He wanted the post of Surveyor General, but later he lowered his sights to the Deputy Surveyorship. He took up the duties in August 1835. At the same time, Light was appointed Surveyor General. That may have been a sop, since he had been passed over for the vice-regal office through the machinations of Captain John Hindmarsh - an appointment which was to create disharmony in the incipient colony. Light was expected in London early in 1836. Meanwhile, the founders of South Australia wanted urgently to proceed with their planning. Indeed, while they awaited government approval to despatch the survey expedition, there was little to do but plan. Several expert sub-committees of colonial officers were formed. In Light's absence, it fell to Kingston to organize the Survey Department.

He undertook three significant tasks. Firstly, in September 1835, as convener of a buildings committee he was instructed to prepare designs for the town and official buildings, "on a permanent plan".[1] This was within his ambit; the

roles of engineer, architect and surveyor were not always compartable in 1835. The exact plan he proposed, how it impressed the Commissioners, and how far it affected the form of Adelaide, are now matters for speculation. Most documents have been lost. Second, on 12 November he reported to the colonial officers on the duties of the Survey Department, "with the method to be adopted in laying out the lots of land".[2] Third, about a month later Kingston and Finniss, one of the surveyors, detailed "the plan recommended to be adopted in the survey of the coasts of the colony, with a view to ascertaining a proper site for the town".[3] This report's essential points formed the basis of the Commissioners' instructions to Light. Therefore, at the end of 1835, before Light entered the colonial service, Kingston had completed the preliminary work of the survey.

Light arrived in South Australia and began the search for a settlement site in October 1836. An earlier cursory inspection of the coast had almost convinced him that the eastern side of Gulf St. Vincent was most suitable. (Fig.1) Late in November he instructed Kingston to examine the country between Holdfast Bay and the Mount Lofty Range. It looked promising: the land was good, like English parkland; there was a sheltered harbour nearby, and a supply of fresh water. As far as surviving documents allow, the following is an account of events leading to the choice of the site of Adelaide, during the last five weeks of 1836.



Fig.1 Map of South Australia showing places named in the text

Light left Holdfast Bay on 25 November to explore Spencer's Gulf. Kingston was to concentrate upon country near the harbour and to "point out to (Light) on his return those localities which in his opinion were adapted for the site of the City of Adelaide".[4]

Light's examination of Port Lincoln and other locations confirmed his view that they compared unfavourably with the east coast of Gulf St. Vincent. Neither were their harbours as secure as the inlet. He wrote to the commissioners:

> "The time now lost in much extra labour, and the arrival of many people from England, makes me anxious... I felt convinced I should never find anything more eligible than the neighbourhood of Holdfast Bay."[5]

He returned to Holdfast Bay on 17 December. Meeting him, Kingston had good news:

> "...I had discovered a situation in the vicinity of the river, about six miles north-east of the Bay and the same distance south-east of the harbour, which I felt assured he would finally select as well-suited for the site of the City of Adelaide. I informed him that he would there find an abundant supply of fresh water in the river; that the locality was moderately well wooded at an elevation from 100 to 150 feet above the river and the plains on the west, that lime and building stone as well as brick-earth was easily obtainable... and that no other spot would be found possessing anything like the same advantages as a site for the city."[6]

Wanting to see the place, Light arranged to meet Kingston at the inlet and walk to his camp. On the morning of Friday 18 December, the Rapid sailed for the harbour. The ship with her ran aground, and it took nearly three days to get her off the sandbar. For this reason, but also because of the tuberculosis of which he was soon to die, Light was delayed until Christmas Eve. He managed to walk the six miles to the survey camp, but was too exhausted to go further. Although then less than five miles from the coast, this was the furthest he had penetrated inland. Kingston later wrote:

> "I pointed out to him... the situation of the ground in question, distant about two and a half miles to the east, with the general aspect of which he expressed himself pleased."[7]

Governor Hindmarsh arrived at Holdfast Bay in the Buffalo on 28 December, and the province was proclaimed. The next day Kingston, who had gone to Holdfast Bay for the proclamation, rejoined Light at their camp. They walked over the town site, only as far east as what is now King William Street. Light was "delighted with the appearance of the country, and the supply of fresh water".[8] At four p.m., when Hindmarsh and J.H. Fisher, the Resident

Commissioner, reached the survey camp, Light announced his decision. They arranged to visit the site together, and Hindmarsh was back early the next morning. Shown the place, he peremptorily objected: it was too far from the anchorage. Light wrote in his journal:

> "... I agreed to walk with him by the river and see if another spot nearer the harbour could be found... we determined at last on placing the capital near the river, about a mile and a half down the bank."[9]

Light had immediate doubts about the change. When he discussed it with Kingston the same evening, the Deputy expressed regret that Light should have "to be biassed by the opinions of one so much his inferior". (Kingston had fallen out with Hindmarsh in London). Next morning they re-examined the new site. Evidence of extensive flooding over low ground led Light to reverse his decision: the town would be laid out where first determined. In a commentary upon the events of those few days, he cited his instructions:

> "Although the commissioners leave the decision of this important question entirely in your hands... you will confer with (the Governor) on the subject ... without however yielding to any influence which could have the effect of divesting you in any of the sole responsibility of the decision". Now I did pay due regard to the suggestion of the Governor, (which)... caused me to alter my first selection <u>much against the grain</u>, for we were only gaining a distance of one and a half mile over an uninterrupted plain, and for this sacrificing the most beautiful position for a town."[10]

Kingston was delighted at Light's resolve to withstand Hindmarsh's attempt to usurp his authority. He commented:

> "Colonel Light felt convinced that not only the situation in question was liable to be flooded, but that in every other respect the natural features of the country there did not afford the same advantages for the site of the capital... pointed out by me... <u>and much to my satisfaction</u> determined to fix the site as first determined on by him."[11]

We now turn from narrative to argument. Kingston, I shall argue, not only chose the site of the city, but its first plan was his. Most direct evidence has been lost, much of it burnt in Light's hut in January 1939. But much circumstantial evidence remains. It should be noted that <u>all</u> evidence of Light's authorship is circumstantial. His part in the physical survey of Adelaide is nowhere documented. Light did not claim to have worked in the field whereas Kingston later testified in the Supreme Court to his personal responsibility for surveying most of Adelaide early in 1837.

Kingston's role must be seen beside his expectation of the office of Surveyor General in 1835. Because of perceived urgency, in Light's absence it was he who organized the Survey, planned the first expedition; set out guidelines for

the location of the town and made a plan of a "permanent" town. Because his other proposals were followed, it is reasonable to believe that his town plan was also adopted. That plan was entrusted to Light, to be set out on a site chosen upon Kingston's criteria.

The pragmatic "square mile" (it was eighty by 110 chains) plan is consistent with Kingston's non-innovative philosophy of architectural design. It was normal for European colonists to carry ready-made plans, for development of suitable sites. The typical plan for such towns was either Vitruvian (like Adelaide) or based upon a central place. Geographer Michael Williams speculates upon the influence on Adelaide of Oglethorpe's plan of Savannah, Georgia (1733), or Granville Sharp's ideal colonial town.[12] There are many other possible sources.[13] Kingston had indeed prepared a town plan in London, before he had even seen South Australia. The commissioners may well have regarded that preparation as essential.

We thus approach the conclusion that Adelaide was built to Kingston's plan upon Kingston's site. The following summarizes the most likely sequence of events. Light arrived in South Australia with the plan made by Kingston. Influenced by renaissance models for ideal towns, it had the advantage of being easy to peg out. For arbitrary reasons, it probably had an area of a square mile. Kingston recommended to Light the site south of the Torrens, and the survey soon began at the northwest corner of the grid. The acre numbers, allocated as work progressed, indicate its order and direction. Early in 1837 the Resident Commissioner became uneasy about the limited choice of acres available. The extension east of the rectangle represents the first change, made early enough to incorporate its acre numbers in the first 700. The second and third additions were respectively the sections of North Adelaide bounded by Pennington Terrace and Brougham Place (near the river), and the northernmost section around Wellington Square. The easternmost part, also close to the river, was the final extension. Figure 2 describes the sequential additions to Kingston's plan.



Fig. 2. Adelaide, South Australia. Block plan showing probable sequence of departures from the original town plan.

It is surprising that Light, who asked to be interred wearing a breastplate inscribed "Founder of Adelaide", never admitted Kingston's part in founding Adelaide. The mainstay of his argument with Hindmarsh over the site was that the responsibility was his, not the Governor's; he was unlikely to concede that Kingston had shared in the decision. Then, his position would become vulnerable. Neither would he have admitted that he carried to the colony a plan drawn by Kingston. Besides, he erroneously believed, when Kingston briefly returned to England in 1837, that his deputy had become his supplanter.

That Kingston himself never laid claim to the plan might be used to support the view that he did not make it. But his reticence may have been due to the conviction that, after the resignation of most of the surveyors in 1838, whatever he had to say would not be believed. Light was a popular hero even before he reached South Australia; much that followed, including his death, enhanced that image. Kingston, instinctively a survivor, knew enough to remain silent. But there is evidence that he covertly made his claims within the bosom of his family. A biography of his youngest son, Charles, contains the enigmatic statement that George Strickland Kingston, "next to Colonel Light", was the founder of Adelaide.[14]

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Administration and Charges	44.55
Income Tax for 1983-84, 1984-85	61.20
Expenditure of fund held in Dublin on publication of Dublin seminar papers	105.81+
Total Current Year Expenditure	2083.24
Balance carried forward to 1985	1192.19
	3275.43

BANK ACCOUNTS AT 31 December 1984

Giro Account	56.56
General Fund Current Account	29.35
General Fund Deposit Account	898.62
Held for the General Fund in the Seminar Current Account	50.92
the Seminar Deposit Account	156.74
	1192.19

+ Sterling value at 1 January 1985 of the fund held in local currency converted at the Invoice rate of £1.00 = £1.2755 IRL.

I confirm that I have audited the accounts for year ended 31/12/84 and they appear to be correct.

(signed) C.J. Gibson
Accounts Manager, Williams & Glyn's Bank plc
22/4/85



Fig. 3 Sellier's cité-jardins of Suresnes (July 1919): mixture of English cottages and Parisian apartment blocks on a perimeter block layout, in an early part of the scheme.

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PLANNING HISTORY BULLETIN

(ISSN 0267-0542)

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Typing and production:-

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Printing:-

LSE Printing Services

Materials for inclusion in the Bulletin should be send to the London School of Economics or the Tennessee Valley Authority no later than:-

- end of February for April issue
- end of June for August issue
- end of October for December issue